Williams v. Tri-County Community Center

• Decision Date: 22 January 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4767.
• Citation: 323 F. Supp. 286
• Parties: John Bell WILLIAMS, Governor of the State of Mississippi, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRI-COUNTY COMMUNITY CENTER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

323 F. Supp. 286

John Bell WILLIAMS, Governor of the State of Mississippi, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRI-COUNTY COMMUNITY CENTER, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4767.

United States District Court, S. D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

January 22, 1971.

Maurice R. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., P. Roger Googe, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

Barry H. Powell, John L. Maxey, II, Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

DAN M. RUSSELL, Jr., District Judge.

The issue before the Court arises out of plaintiffs' motion to remand.

On September 18, 1970, plaintiffs filed an information against the above named corporate defendant in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, seeking a forfeiture of defendant's corporate franchises and privileges on the grounds that it has exceeded its corporate powers. Attached to the complaint are copies of the minutes of the organizational meeting, charter, by-laws, from which two pages are missing, and a copy of the approval by the then governor and the secretary of state. On October 23, 1970, defendant filed a petition to remove the action to this Court invoking jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C., Section 1443. On November 2, 1970, plaintiffs filed their motion to remand together with an answer to the petition for removal. On December 9, 1970, defendant moved to consolidate this action with a simultaneously filed cause, being Civil Action No. 4789, styled Tri-Community Center v. John Bell Williams, as Governor of the State of Mississippi, et al. On December 16, 1970, the day set for a hearing on the motion to remand, the United States of America filed its motion for leave to intervene in Cause No. 4767. Upon the government's insistence that it first be heard on the motion to intervene, the Court permitted it to do so for purposes of participating in argument on plaintiffs' motion to remand; however the order presented and signed, before the argument of plaintiffs as respondents was heard, included leave "to intervene for all purposes." At the conclusion of argument on both motions, and before the filing of any complaint in intervention, the Court requested briefs and indicated that, should a decision be reached to remand the case to the state court, a motion to vacate the order allowing the government to intervene would be entertained. Since the hearing, and on December 22, 1970, defendant moved for leave to amend its petition for removal by amending the prayer thereof by adding "and that plaintiff's action be thereupon dismissed by this Court."

As stated in Barron and Holtzoff, Wright's Edition, Federal Practice and Procedure, #109, pp. 536-7, if the federal court is without jurisdiction, it must remand the case, and if lack of jurisdiction requires remand, the federal court may not take any further action in the case. Hedges v. Rudeloff, D.C., 196 F.Supp. 475. In the absence of affidavits establishing a conflict in facts, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 5 Cir., 358 F. 2d 705, the Court is limited to the pleadings as of the time removal was effected. Hedges v. Rudeloff, supra. The burden is on the petitioner and if federal jurisdiction is doubtful the case will be remanded. See Barron and Holtzoff, #109, pp. 538-40.

Turning to the complaint, officials of the State of Mississippi have filed what is commonly called a quo warranto proceeding, under Section 1120 et seq., of the Mississippi Code of 1942, against Tri-County Community Center, a Mississippi non-profit corporation, alleging that said corporation has exceeded its corporate powers and, upon a judgment of forfeiture and ouster, its effects should be placed in the hands of trustees. This action is obviously a state court proceeding and should remain there unless defendant can show its entitlement to removal.

Defendant relies on its right to remove under 28 U.S.C., Section 1443, which has two parts (1) and (2), and is as follows:

"Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.

That defendant cannot remove under part (2) is made clear in the holding of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944, wherein Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, traced the history of this part, and, in effect said, as the legislative history of this provision makes clear, part (2) applies only in the case of federal officers and persons assisting such officers in performing their duties under a federal law providing for equal civil rights.

As emphasized by Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent decision construing Section 1443(1), Thompson v. Brown, 434 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1970), part (1) entitles removal for a person who is denied or cannot enforce in the state court a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens.

By way of summation of the allegations in the petition to remove, defendant set out that on September 8, 1967, it was duly incorporated in the State of Mississippi and was issued a charter as a non-profit, non-stock corporation; that the corporation adopted by-laws and began doing business. Its programs are operated for the purpose of providing services for poor people in Hinds, Madison and Rankin Counties, Mississippi, most of which poor are black people. On or about July 1, 1970, the corporation received from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) a grant in excess of $1,000,000.00 for a health care delivery program to be carried out by the Jackson-Hinds Comprehensive Health Center, a component of Tri-County. Petitioner alleged that prior to the receipt of the grant the present Governor of the State of Mississippi exercised his power in vetoing the grant, which veto was overriden by OEO. The quo warranto proceedings were initiated on September 18, 1970, which action defendant contends is vexatious in nature and another attempt on the part of the Governor to prevent petitioner from operating a health services program for the poor in Hinds County. On September 24, 1970, after the institution of the aforesaid quo warranto, defendant submitted to the appropriate state officials, articles of amendment to the charter heretofore granted specifically setting forth defendant's power to operate a health services program. Additionally, on September 25, 1970, the Jackson-Hinds Comprehensive Health Center filed an application for a charter as a non-profit, non-stock corporation. Defendant charges that plaintiffs have refused to act on either the amendments to defendant's charter, or on the application for a new charter, and that in any event all powers exercised by defendant corporation in the securing of the aforesaid grant and in operating its health program are within its original charter and authorized powers. Defendant alleges that the "rights" it is denied or cannot enforce in the state court accrue and grow out of rights secured by 18 U. S.C. § 245, which provides criminal penalties for whoever, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with any person or any class of persons from the right to participate in and enjoy the benefits of any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Defendant also avers that the state court proceeding denies its rights secured under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 and the equal protection clause of...