Williams v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 01 June 1943
• Citation: 172 S.W.2d 202,294 Ky. 520
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

172 S.W.2d 202

294 Ky. 520

WILLIAMS v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 1, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Harlan County; James S. Forester, Judge.

Action by Sherman Williams against the United Mine Workers of America, etc., and others, to recover alleged over-time and liquidated damages, expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

R. S Rose, of Harlan, for appellant.

Golden & Lay, of Pineville, for appellee.

REES Justice.

The question presented by this appeal is whether a labor union may be an employer and, as such, subject to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The appellant, Sherman Williams, was a member of United Mine Workers Union No. 3892 at Verda, Kentucky, and he brought this action against the union and its officers to recover $1,422.46 for overtime and liquidated damages, $516 for expenses and time lost, and, in addition, a reasonable attorney's fee. The defendants, without entering their appearance for any other purpose, filed three special demurrers to the petition. The ground for the first special demurrer as stated therein was "because of defective and improper parties defendant, and because from the petition it is shown that the defendants sued are not and were not the employers of the plaintiff and are improperly named as defendants"; for the second "because the defendants are a voluntary association and the named defendants are only officers or agents of the voluntary association, and under the laws of the State of Kentucky a voluntary association is not suable"; and for the third "because the plaintiff has no right to institute or maintain this alleged cause of action." The court sustained all of the demurrers, the plaintiff declined to plead further, and his petition was dismissed.

The plaintiff in his petition alleged, in substance, that on or about June 25, 1940, he was employed by Local Union No. 3892 as its check weighman at the mine of the Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation in Harlan county, and, as such employee of the union, it was his duty to see that the coal mined by various members of Local Union No. 3892 was correctly weighed and that each coal digger was given proper credit for the coal he mined and loaded; that such employment continued until about March 31, 1942; that he was to receive the sum of $5.76 a day and was required by contract to work at said wages only 7 hours a day; that during the contract period from June 25 1940, to March 31, 1942, he was required by the defendants to work for them as check weighman and did work for them as check weighman for 504 hours overtime for which he has not been paid, in whole or in part, and said overtime was in excess of the 35 hours per week for which he had been paid that under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, U.S.C.A., Title 29, § 201 et seq., he is entitled to compensation from the defendants for time and a half overtime for 504 hours extra labor, amounting to $711.23, and is entitled in addition thereto to recover from the defendants an equal amount for unliquidated damages and a reasonable attorney's fee, as provided in § 16(b) of the act.

Appellees' principal argument in support of the judgment is that it was never intended by the Federal Act, which appellant invokes in this case, to make a labor union subject to the act. It is argued that the act itself expressly excepts from its operation any labor organization or any one in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. Section 3 of the act reads in part:

"As used in this Act--

* * * * *

"(d) 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization."

Plainly it was not the purpose of Congress to exclude a labor organization from the provisions of the act when such organization is acting as an employer. On the contrary, the parenthetical clause in subdivision (d) of section 3 of the act expressly makes a labor organization, when acting as an employer, subject to the provisions of the act. According to the allegations of the petition, the relation of employer and employee existed. Local Union No. 3892 of the United Mine Workers of America was the employer and appellant was the employee. It is said by appellees that the United Mine Workers of America is an association of working men created for their mutual benefit and that it is not in the business of operating coal mines or acting as an employer, and they quote from the opinion in Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079, which sets forth the purposes for which the organization was created. It does not follow, however, that it may not be necessary or proper for the organization, as such, to employ labor in order to carry out...