Williams v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:17-cv-03040-ODW-FFM |
| Parties | WALTER LEE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff Walter Lee Williams ("Plaintiff") filed this action against the United States of America ("Defendant" or "United States") and eighteen named and unnamed individuals (collectively, "Individual Defendants") for various constitutional and common-law torts, as well as a single civil RICO conspiracy claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-40, ECF No. 1.) On May 24, 2017, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve the Complaint and Summons on each defendant no later than August 22, 2017. (ECF No. 19.) To date, the United States is the only defendant that has been served with the Complaint and Summons. (ECF No. 23-29.)
On November 11, 2017, the United States moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, or, in the alternative, to quash service of process because the requisite filing fee was not paid. (Mot., ECF No. 31.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff submitted exhibits demonstrating that the requisite filing fee was paid. (Opp'n Exs. A, B; ECF No. 39.) In Reply, the United States retracted its argument that service of the Complaint should be quashed.1 (Reply 1 n.2; ECF No. 40.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.2
Plaintiff's claims arise from two separate incidents that occurred while he was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles ("MDCLA"). The first occurred on October 7, 2013, when Plaintiff was attacked by a fellow inmate (the "October 2013 Attack"). (Compl. ¶ 71.) The second incident occurred on January 28, 2014, when Plaintiff slipped in a puddle of water in the halls of MDCLA and sustained serious injuries (the "January 2014 Slip and Fall"). (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.)
Regarding the October 2013 Attack, Plaintiff alleges that he was brutally attacked while in another inmate's cell and that certain defendants conspired to allow for the attack to occur. (Id. ¶¶ 71-73.) Plaintiff further alleges that certain defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care following the attack. (Id. ¶¶ 76-82.) Regarding the January 2014 Slip and Fall, Plaintiff contends that, after he fell, he did not receive adequate medical treatment for his serious injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 86-89, 94, 111-12.)
Plaintiff claims that these two incidents demonstrate the existence of a civil RICO enterprise conspiracy between a number of defendants to "willfully, maliciously, intentionally, and wantonly harass and injure Plaintiff." (Id. ¶¶ 330-37.)
On December 28, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a Standard Form 95 ("SF-95") to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). (Verified Compl., Ex. 16, ECF No. 5.) In his SF-95, Plaintiff describes the January 2014 Slip and Fall, but makes no mention of the October 2013 Attack. (Id.) On June 25, 2015, the BOP rejected Plaintiff's administrative claim. (Id., Ex. 17.) The BOP informed Plaintiff that if he was "not satisfied with this determination, [he was] afforded six months from the date of this letter . . . to bring suit in the appropriate United States District Court." (Id.) On August 6, 2015 Plaintiff requested an appeal of the BOP's denial of Plaintiff's administrative claim. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he never received a response to the administrative appeal. (Compl. ¶ 62.)
A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all "factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). But a courtneed not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
The United States argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for several reasons. First, the claims regarding the October 2013 Attack were not raised with the BOP during the administrative presentment process, and are therefore barred by the United States' sovereign immunity. (Mot. 4-6.) Second, the claims regarding the January 2014 Slip and Fall are barred because the plaintiff failed to file his complaint within the time limit mandated by the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"). (Id. at 6-7.) The Court will address each argument in turn.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted); see also Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015).
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to certain common-law tort claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(a); Duggard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2016). When the United States waives its sovereign immunity, it may impose conditions on that waiver and, when it does, those conditions "must be strictly observed." Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981). One of the conditions for waiver under the FTCA is that a plaintiff must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 108 (1993). Any tort claim against the United States shall be "forever barred" if a plaintiff does not submit his or her administrative claim within two years of the claim accruing. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. A plaintiff's failure tocomply with either of these conditions denies the Court of jurisdiction, and, therefore, is grounds for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113.
Here, Plaintiff has yet to file an administrative claim with the BOP concerning the October 2013 Attack. While Plaintiff did file an administrative complaint with the BOP concerning the January 2014 Slip and Fall, that complaint did not include or refer to any events that took place during the October 2013 attack. (Verified Compl., Ex. 16, ECF No. 5.) In Plaintiff's opposition, he incorrectly equates notifying the BOP of "systemic efforts by BOP staff to ignore serious injuries to Plaintiff" with properly submitting an administrative claim, thereby putting the BOP on notice of the October 2013 Attack. (Opp'n 4.) In addition, "[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two year after such claim accrues . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (emphasis added). More than two years have accrued since the October 2013 Attack and Plaintiff has yet to submit an administrative claim regarding the incident. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction. Because this defect cannot be cured through amendment, the Court GRANTS the United States' Motion to Dismiss with regard to the October 2013 Attack, without leave to amend. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2003).
The United States argues the Plaintiff's FTCA claims have all expired. A district court may dismiss claims if the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint and "the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)).
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless . . . action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, ornotice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2401; see also Long v. United States, No. CIV. 05-6383-AA, 2006 WL 1142969, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2006) (). If the claimant files a written request with the agency for reconsideration prior to the expiration of the six-month period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2401, the claimant's statute of limitation "shall not accrue until 6 months after the filing of a request for reconsideration." 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b); Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988) (...
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