Williams v. United States, 9322.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 9322.,9322.
• Citation: Williams v. United States, 357 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1976)
• Parties: James E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

357 A.2d 865

James E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 9322.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 4, 1976.

Decided May 27, 1976.

Kenneth J. Loewinger, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, for appellant.

Henry H. Kennedy, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, James F. McMullin and Martin J. Linsky, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KELLY, FICKLING and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from appellant's jury trial conviction for carnal knowledge in violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2801. The main issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.¹ Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence of penetration of complainant's sexual organs to sustain his conviction for carnal knowledge. We have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury, and we affirm.

Complainant is the eldest of five children; at the time of the offense, she was 8 years old. Appellant is the common-law husband of complainant's mother. Although appellant did not father any of the children, he had been living with complainant's mother and the children for five years.

At about noon on December 24, 1973, complainant's mother left the house to do some last-minute Christmas shopping. Appellant remained in the house with the five children. Complainant testified that after her mother had left the house, appellant told her to "come upstairs," where he took her into her brothers' bedroom and closed the door. Appellant pulled down complainant's slacks and panties and put her on one of the two beds in the room. Appellant then removed his own pants. According to the girl, appellant got behind her on the bed and "put his ding-a-ling . . . in [her] back."² Complainant further testified that she had felt appellant's penis inside her; it hurt her and she began to cry. Appellant persisted until he was interrupted by complainant's mother, who, upon entering the bedroom, pulled the girl from the bed.

Complainant's mother testified that when she returned from shopping, one of the children told her that appellant and complainant had gone upstairs. She went upstairs to the bedroom and opened the door. As she entered the room, she saw appellant having intercourse with her daughter. The girl was on her side facing the door, and appellant was behind her on the bed.³ She took complainant from the bed and shortly thereafter called the police.

Complainant was taken to D.C. General Hospital where a doctor attempted to examine her. She was distraught and refused to allow the doctor to perform the examination. A week later, however, complainant was taken to Children's Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Jeffrey Kline.⁴

Dr. Kline testified that complainant's genitals had no lacerations and looked reasonably normal. Her hymen, however, was not intact. Dr. Kline's examination also revealed that a small amount of blood was "at the right of the beginning of the vagina and the rectum." The rectum appeared normal.

Although penetration of the victim's sexual organs is an essential element of the crime of carnal knowledge, the government need not prove full penetration since the offense is committed if the male organ enters only the labia of the female organs. Moreover, direct medical evidence of penetration is not required; penetration of the female organs may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Holmes v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 171 F.2d 1022 (1948).

To withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, the government must produce only that quantum of evidence by which a reasonable person could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only where there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court may properly take the case from the jury. Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 343 A2d 40 (1975); Borrero v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 363 (1975). Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the government, making allowance for the fact finder's right to determine the credibility of the witnesses and draw justifiable inferences from their testimony. Kenhan v. United States, D.C.App., 263 A2d 253 (1970).

There was abundant evidence in the instant case to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. Complainant's mother testified that when she entered the bedroom she saw appellant having intercourse with her daughter. Appellant was behind the girl on the bed and, when she pulled her daughter away from appellant, she saw his erect penis emerge from someplace behind the little girl.

Complainant testified that appellant "put his ding-a-ling . . . in [her] back" and that she felt his penis inside her. Although the little girl subsequently testified that appellant had put his penis "in the place where you go to dodo," an eight-year-old girl usually lacks the knowledge and experience sufficient to enable her to testify precisely on the details of penetration. A medical examination of the little girl conducted a week after the incident revealed a slight amount of blood near the opening of the vagina. Her hymen was not intact, although her rectum was normal. The evidence was sufficient to warrant the inference that penetration of her sexual organs had been accomplished by appellant. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and the case was properly submitted to the jury.

Affirmed.

HARRIS, Associate Judge (dissenting):

My analysis of the record convinces me beyond question that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for the offense of carnal knowledge. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. In doing so, I stress at the outset that while there was adequate proof of penetration, the penetration which was proven was anal rather than vaginal in character. Appellant, however, was not charged with sodomy. See D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3502.

In order to establish guilt of the crime of carnal knowledge, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was some penetration of the female complainant's genitals (as a minimum, of her labia if not her vagina) by the penis of the defendant. See, e. g., Wheeler v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 211 F.2d 19 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013, 94 S.Ct. 876, 98 L.Ed. 1140 (1954); United States v. Wiley, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 492 F.2d 547 (1973). Three government witnesses offered testimony relevant to the issue of penetration. Of the three, two — the complainant and her mother — specifically described the incident in such a way that the jury could not permissibly have inferred vaginal penetration. The third witness' testimony, that of the" examining physician, could not support such a finding either alone or in the face of the consistent evidence to the contrary from both the complainant and her mother.

The girl's testimony, while expressed in colloquialisms common to the young, was unwavering and straightforward. She declared that appellant had his penis "in [her] back." She stated that she could feel it inside her back and that it hurt her. Later in the trial, when the government recalled the complainant in an effort to clarify this point, she responded in artless but unmistakable terms that she knew the difference between "the place where you go to pee pee" and "the place where you go to dodo", and that appellant had entered her in the latter location.

It is expected that an eight-year-old would be unschooled in precise sexual terminology. Nonetheless, excretory functions are among a child's first learning experiences, and I am unable to join the majority in wholly disregarding the complainant's actual testimony as to the nature of the penetration. Throughout her time on the witness stand, when the complainant was confused or did not know the answer to a question, she readily so stated. In the aggregate, her testimony was both plain and unfaltering.

The majority places an unwarranted degree of reliance on the testimony of the mother that she saw "intercourse" taking place. In its totality, however, the mother's testimony corroborated the fact that anal rather than vaginal penetration occurred.

The mother stated that appellant's penis was "in her [daughter's] behind." She used the ambiguous word "intercourse" often, but when asked on cross-examination to define the term, she replied that she meant "[h]e was having something to do with her."¹ Defense counsel then asked, "But was it in her back?" "Yes", she replied. Later, she acknowledged not having seen the actual penetration. She stated that when she pulled the child off the bed, she saw appellant's penis "coming out of someplace behind her." When she was asked, "You didn't see it coming out of her vagina?", she...