Williams v. United States
| Decision Date | 09 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-6297,90-6297 |
| Parties | Joseph WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission has promulgated Guidelines establishing sentencing ranges for different categories of federal offenses and defendants. The Act allows a district court to depart from a guideline range under certain circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), and provides for limited appellate review of sentences, requiring a remand for resentencing if a sentence (1) was imposed in violation of law or "as a result of an incorrect application" of the Guidelines, § 3742(f)(1), or (2) is an unreasonable departure from the applicable guideline range, § 3742(f)(2). Petitioner Williams was convicted in the Federal District Court of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The applicable sentencing range for someone in his criminal history category and at his offense level is 18 to 24 months. However, the District Court departed upward from that range and sentenced him to 27 months' imprisonment, determining that his criminal history category was inadequate because it did not include two convictions that were too old to be counted in the Guidelines' criminal history calculation and because it did not reflect several prior arrests. The Court of Appeals agreed that the convictions were reliable information indicating more extensive criminal conduct than was reflected by Williams' criminal history category, but it rejected the District Court's reliance upon the prior arrests, finding that the Guidelines prohibit a court from basing a departure on a prior arrest record alone and that the District Court had not adequately explained the factual basis for its use of those arrests as a ground for departure. Although the District Court had used both proper and improper factors to justify departure, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on the ground that it was reasonable in light of the proper factors standing alone.
Held:
1. A reviewing court may, in appropriate circumstances, affirm a sentence in which a district court's departure from a guideline range is based on both valid and invalid factors. Pp. 197-202.
(a) Construing the plain language of the Guidelines and the Act, it is an incorrect application of the Guidelines for a district court to depart from the applicable sentencing range based on a factor that the Commission has already fully considered in establishing a guideline range or, as in this case, on a factor that the Commission has expressly rejected as a ground for departure. An "incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines" occurs when the departure ground is prohibited either by the Guidelines or by general policy statements regarding the Guidelines' application, which the Commission is also authorized to promulgate, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). A policy statement is an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable Guideline, and an error in the statement's interpretation could lead to an incorrect determination that departure was appropriate. Pp. 199-201.
(b) When a district court relies upon an improper ground in departing from a guideline range, a reviewing court may not affirm a sentence based solely on its independent assessment that the departure is reasonable under § 3742(f)(2). In order to give full effect to both § 3742(f)(1) and § 3742(f)(2), the reviewing court must conduct separate inquiries under each provision to determine whether a remand is required. It may not focus on one provision to the exclusion of the other. Pp. 201-202.
(c) Williams' argument that a remand is automatically required under § 3742(f)(1) in order to rectify any "incorrect application" of the Guidelines is rejected. A remand is required only if a sentence is "imposed as a result of an incorrect application" of the Guidelines, i.e., if the sentence would have been different but for the district court's error. The party challenging the sentence bears the initial burden of showing that the district court relied upon an invalid factor at sentencing, but not the burden of proving that the invalid factor was determinative in the sentencing decision. Rather, once the court of appeals finds that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court determines that the error was harmless. Pp. 202-203.
(d) If the court of appeals determines that a remand is not required under § 3742(f)(1), it may affirm the sentence as long as it is also satisfied that the departure is reasonable under § 3742(f)(2). The reasonableness determination looks to the amount and extent of the departure in light of the grounds for departing. In assessing reasonableness, a court must examine the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence under the Guidelines and the district court's stated reasons for the sentence's imposition. § 3742(e). A sentence can be "reasonable" even if some of the district court's reasons justifying departure are invalid, provided the remaining reasons are sufficient to justify the departure's magnitude. P. 203-204.
(e) The limited appellate review of sentencing decisions does not alter the traditional deference a court of appeals owes to a district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion, and the selection of the ap- propriate sentence from within the guideline range and the decision to depart from that range are left solely to the sentencing court. Thus, when only some of the district court's reasons for departure are invalid, an appellate court may not affirm a sentence on the ground that the district court could have based its departure on the remaining factors, since the district court, once apprised of the errors in its interpretation of the Guidelines, may have chosen a different sentence. Pp. 204-206.
2. This Court declines to review the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the reliability of Williams' outdated convictions, because the propriety of the District Court's consideration of nonsimilar outdated convictions was not clearly presented in the petition for certiorari and was not briefed by either party. Pp. 205-206.
3. The case is remanded for a determination whether the sentence was imposed "as a result of" the District Court's erroneous consideration of Williams' prior arrests, since it cannot be ascertained whether the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court would have imposed the same sentence even without relying upon Williams' prior arrest record or whether it affirmed simply on the basis that the sentence was reasonable under § 3742(f)(2). P. 206.
910 F.2d 1574, vacated and remanded.
Kenneth H. Hanson, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Amy L. Wax, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Act), created the United States Sentencing Commission and empowered it to promulgate guidelines establishing sentencing ranges for different categories of federal offenses and defendants. The Act permits a district court to depart from the presumptive sentencing range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines only in certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The Act also provides for limited appellate review of sentences in order to ensure the proper application of the Guidelines. § 3742. In this case, we consider the scope of appellate review, under the Act, of a sentence in which a district court has departed from the guideline sentencing range.
Petitioner Joseph Williams, a previously convicted felon, was the subject of an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in 1988 and 1989. He was indicted and convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for possession of a firearm while a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The presentence report assigned Williams a criminal history category of V. App. 48. Combined with an offense level of 9, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines was 18 to 24 months. Ibid. The District Court departed upward from this range pursuant to § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines Manual, which allows a district court to increase a criminal history classification if "reliable information" indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's criminal background or propensity for future criminal conduct. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, p. s. (Nov.1991). The District Court determined that Williams' criminal history category was inadequate because it did not include two convictions that were too old to be counted in the Guidelines' criminal history calculation, see USSG § 4A1.2(e)(1) (Nov.1991), and because it did not reflect several prior arrests. App. 53-54. Citing these two factors, the court looked to the next highest criminal history category, for which the guideline range was 21 to 27 months. Id., at 53-54. The court then sentenced Williams to 27 months' imprisonment and explained that it was selecting a sentence at the high end of the guideline range because Williams had previously been convicted for the same offense and because he had threatened an undercover agent in this case. Id. at 55-56.1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction and the sentence. 910 F.2d 1574 (1990). It agreed with the District Court that, under the circumstances of this case, the two outdated convictions were "reliable information" indicating more extensive criminal conduct than was reflected by Williams' criminal history category. Id., at...
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