Williams v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:19-cv-255 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Katrida WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE & STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
Jeremy David Greenberg, Clark Law Group PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Marvin Hudson McClanahan, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Mark Allen Gess, Virginia Tech University Legal Counsel, Blacksburg, VA, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Katrida Williams has sued her former employer, Defendant Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University ("Virginia Tech"), in a three-count complaint. Count I alleges a failure to accommodate her disability, Count II alleges that she was discriminatorily terminated because of her disability, and Count III alleges she was terminated in retaliation for protected activity, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. This matter is before the Court on Virginia Tech's motion for summary judgment on each count, and Ms. Williams' cross motion for partial summary judgment on Count I only.
Ms. Williams was formerly employed by Virginia Tech as a Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Education Extension Agent ("SNAP-Ed Agent") from October 12, 2015, until on or about March 26, 2018. The essential functions of a SNAP-Ed Agent include recruiting volunteers, training them on nutritional education and physical activity programs, and conducting training and collaboration on policies, systems, and environmental changes in the Agent's service area communities.
Ms. Williams suffers from a mood adjustment disorder and generalized anxiety
disorder. In September of 2017, Ms. Williams experienced a flare up of her disability. She applied for and was granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). She also applied for and received short-term disability benefits through Virginia Tech's insurer, effective September 12, 2017. The short-term disability benefits ran concurrently with her FMLA leave. Before she went on leave she was meeting her employer's job expectations.
On December 27, 2017, Ms. Williams requested to return to work. She provided Virginia Tech a return to work release form, which provided she could return to work part time with restrictions, signed by Ms. Margo Sills, a Licensed Professional Counselor. Ms. Williams reported to work on January 3, 2018. Virginia Tech advised Ms. Williams that she must remain on sick leave and could not work until the university determined whether her restrictions could be accommodated or not.
In an email that day, Virginia Tech's Human Resources manager Ms. April Wood noted to another Human Resources employee Ms. Kimberly Hodge that the release stated Ms. Williams could "complete duties in the job description" as of February 1, but "[t]he part that won't work is ‘at employee's discretion.’ " Ms. Hodge replied that "the return to work coordinator ... suggests that the restrictions not be accommodated, but ultimately the decision is up to the department."
The next day, January 4, 2018, a third Human Resources employee, Ms. Mary Christian sent an email to Ms. Wood and Ms. Hodge stating that Virginia Tech was "unable to accommodate" Ms. Williams. She also explained that the next available reevaluation date would be March 1, and after that time Virginia Tech would review and assess a new medical note.
Ms. Pamela Vickers is Virginia Tech's disability coordinator. She was not consulted regarding the December 27 return to work form, or the January 4 decision not to accommodate Ms. Williams.
Ms. Williams contacted Virginia Tech regarding her proposed accommodations on January 18, 2018. In an email to Ms. Hodge, she asked why Virginia Tech was unable to accommodate her and recommended a reevaluation date. She received a response the next day, which stated only that the university is often "unable to accommodate restrictions and must wait until the employee is release[d] as full-time/full-duty without any restrictions."
On February 27, 2018, Ms. Sills emailed Ms. Wood, Ms. Christian, and Ms. Hodge notifying them that she would provide a second return to work release form. That morning, those Virginia Tech personnel and others participated in an email conversation about the situation. During the email thread, Ms. Wood noted that if Virginia Tech had relayed to Ms. Williams or Ms. Sills that the problem with the prior release form was its use of the word "discretion," the current misunderstanding may have been avoided. Ms. Hodge replied to that email and, for the first time, copied Ms. Vickers on that chain. Ms. Vickers asked why she and "ADA and Accessibility Services [were not consulted immediately when the initial return to work was received."
At the end of February, Ms. Vickers contacted Ms. Williams to discuss accommodations and her reevaluation. They engaged in at least three telephone conversations, one of which was a March 6 conference call including Ms. Sills. Ms. Williams asked Ms. Vickers to communicate directly with Ms. Sills about her proposed accommodations.
On March 9, 2018 Ms. Sills emailed Ms. Vickers. Ms. Sills stated that she believed Ms. Williams was ready to return to work since January, but will need an adjustment period to "work up to the duties she was doing before she took her leave." The email then lists "accommodations and recommendations [Ms. Sills] believe[d] could help [Ms. Williams] on her transition back to work." That list is below:
The email invited Ms. Vickers' feedback and further contact. Attached to the email was a revised return to work release form, which provided for an adjustment period of part time work ending on March 31. It also incorporated a separate document, listing several alternative proposed accommodations, by reference.
After receiving Ms. Sills' email, on the morning of March 9, Ms. Wood emailed Ms. Vickers indicating approval for some of the proposed accommodations and disapproval for others. Ms. Vickers called Ms. Williams and left a voicemail stating the proposed accommodations were too restrictive, and that she was happy to speak with Ms. Williams but would leave the office at noon.
Virginia Tech has a policy of automatically enrolling personnel who expend six months of short term disability into long term disability. The short-term disability coordinator called Ms. Williams and notified her that her employment would be terminated on March 12, 2018, the last day of her short-term disability. After that, because Ms. Williams was enrolled in long term disability and no longer working, Virginia Tech ceased considering her accommodation requests.
While Ms. Williams was on leave since September, no one was performing her job duties. Also, Virginia Tech's policies can allow a gradual build up to a full schedule and full duties as a reasonable accommodation. This has been a reasonable accommodation provided to Virginia Tech employees in the past.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing the basis for its motion and identifying the evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the opposing party may show by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
While the facts and all justifiable inferences should be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd , 718 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2013), courts must not resolve disputed facts, weigh the evidence, or make credibility determinations, Foster v. University of Md.-Eastern Shore , 787 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French , 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007) ). When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, courts consider each motion separately and on its own merits. Defs. of Wildlife v. N. Carolina Dep't of Transp. , 762 F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014). "In considering each motion, [courts] ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion.’ " Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar , 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) ).
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute...
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