Williams v. Vandergriff

Decision Date31 August 2021
Docket Number4:18 CV 515 (JMB)
PartiesBELVIN WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. DAVID VANDERGRIFF, [1] Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Belvin Williams' petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 1, 22)[2] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner Belvin Williams ("Petitioner") is incarcerated pursuant to the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of City of Saint Louis, Missouri. In particular, on February 14 2013, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of assault in the first degree (Count I), one count of robbery in the first degree (Count III), and two counts of armed criminal action (Counts II and IV). (ECF Nos. 15-1 at 526) The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a prior and persistent offender to four consecutive sentences of thirty years of imprisonment. (ECF Nos. 15-1 at 553-54 and Judgment, 15-4 at 48-51)

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Missouri Court of Appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred by not replacing an alleged sleeping juror with an alternate juror and (2) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a parole officer regarding Petitioner's electronic monitoring device. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's arguments and affirmed convictions and sentences in a published decision. See State v. Williams, 427 S.W.3d 259, 263-68 (Mo.Ct.App. 2014) (ECF No. 15-7).

On July 28, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, alleging seventeen grounds for relief. (ECF No. 15-8 at 8-15) The State Court appointed counsel for Petitioner, and on December 22, 2014, appointed counsel filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion. (Id. at 23-32) In his amended Rule 29.15 motion, Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to impeach Victim and failed to raise objections to his parole officer's testimony. Petitioner also alleged that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel's errors resulted in his conviction. (Id. at 24-25)

The trial court denied Petitioner's Rule 29.15 motion following an evidentiary hearing. (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ("FFCL"), ECF No. 15-8 at 39-40). Petitioner appealed, contending that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise valid legal objections to the parole officer's testimony. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief in an unpublished opinion. Williams v. State, 519 S.W.3d 816 (Mo.Ct.App. 2017) (ECF No. 1511).

On April 6, 2018, Petitioner filed a timely petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the instant petition, Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief. First, Petitioner contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him that another attorney would serve as primary counsel at trial. Second, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to remove an allegedly sleeping juror. Third, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise valid legal objections to the parole officer's testimony regarding how Petitioner's location monitoring system operated. Fourth, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to impeach Victim with evidence of his prior felony conviction.

Respondent concedes that Petitioner properly preserved Grounds Two and Three but contends that Petitioner procedurally defaulted Grounds One and Four.

II. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the state court record. On January 29, 2011, Petitioner attended a birthday dinner with D.C. (the mother of one of his sons) and her children. (Trial Transcript, ECF No. 1 at 176-78, 250-51) After dinner, they left separately; D.C dropped off her children at her mother's house and returned home. (Id. at 253-54, 350) Petitioner testified, that after dinner, he ran some work errands, picked up his live-in girlfriend L.B., returned to their townhouse around 7:00 p.m., and played cards with friends the rest of the evening. (Id. at 251, 313, 343-44)

Later Victim and his cousin, J.L., drove to D.C.'s house. Victim parked in front of D.C.'s house and left to go bar hopping with D.C. and J.L. (Id. at 177-79, 245, 253) After dropping D.C. off at a strip club, Victim and J.L. went out for food and then J.L. returned Victim to his car sometime between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. on January 30, 2011. (Id. at 181-84) While in his car and waiting for the windshield to defrost, Victim heard a loud banging on the driver's side window. The frost on his windshield prevented Victim from seeing outside so he opened his car door. (Id. at 184-85, 217, 231) When he opened the door, Victim saw a man pointing a gun at his face. The man told Victim to "stop ‘effing' with my girl" and shot Victim in the leg. (Id. at 185, 188-89, 195, 199210-11; see also ECF No. 15-7 at 2) The man then hit Victim's head with the gun, stole his wallet, and shot Victim again. (Id. at 191, 197) Victim heard the gun click several more times, but the gun either jammed or was out of ammunition. (Id. at 191) After Victim heard a voice yell to the man to leave because he was not worth it, Victim heard the sound of squealing tires and a vehicle driving away. (Id. at 200-01) Victim testified that he had never seen the man before and that the man wore a black shirt and jogging pants. (Id. at 199)

Victim returned to his running car, drove away, and called 911. (Id. at 201-02) After passing police cars responding to the call, Victim turned around and followed the police cars back to the scene of the shooting. (Id. at 202)

After the shooting, Victim contacted J.L. and described the shooter as a black male with a medium complexion, black low-cut hair, no scars, marks, or tattoos, weighing between 155 to 185 pounds, and between 25 to 30 years old. J.L. told Victim that Petitioner must have been the shooter. (Id. at 202, 224-27, 241-42) After seeing a picture of Petitioner on the computer, Victim realized Petitioner was the shooter. (Id. at 202-03, 242)

Victim contacted the detective investigating the case, gave him Petitioner's picture, identified Petitioner as the shooter, and signed the photograph of Petitioner. (Id. at 203, 271-72) The detective arrested Petitioner. Victim identified Petitioner from a physical line-up and again at trial. (Id. at 203-04 208-09, 271-73)

Petitioner presented an alibi defense at trial, testifying that, on January 11, 2011, he was living with L.B, he arrived home after dinner at 7:00 p.m., and he did not leave the house until the following Monday morning. (Id. at 339, 343, 347-48, 359) Petitioner also testified that on the evening of the crime, he was supervised by a parole officer and on a location monitoring program that required him to wear an electronic bracelet[3] and be home at a certain time. Petitioner testified that he had complied with those requirements. (Id. at 358-59, 401-02, 404-06, 408) In addition, L.B. testified that Petitioner had returned home before his curfew on January 29, 2011, she heard him come upstairs to go to bed at 1:30 a.m., and she saw him in bed wearing the same clothes at 3:00 and 7:00 a.m. when she went to the bathroom. (Id. at 312-13, 315-17)

Petitioner's parole officer testified for the State, in rebuttal, over defense counsel's objection. The parole officer noted that the location monitoring system can be inaccurate if there is power loss or an issue with the phone lines inside the house. (Id. at 422) The parole officer acknowledged that Petitioner's phone service provider had more problems with the monitoring system than other providers, and an incident occurred where the system indicated an unauthorized leave when Petitioner was home. (Id. at 420-21) The parole officer explained that Petitioner's electronic monitoring system reported an unauthorized leave after midnight and an entry back home around 5:00 a.m., and that her call to his house went unanswered. (Id. at 407, 409-10, 423) L.B. testified that when the parole officer called the house regarding the unauthorized leave, she answered the phone and verified with the parole officer that Petitioner was at home. (Id. at 444)

III. Legal Standards
A. General and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief is permissible under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), only if the state court's determination:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if "it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). "The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court cases ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'" Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Early v....

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