Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 2011-CA-00375-SCT

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
PartiesNYDREEKA WILLIAMS, BY AND THROUGH HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, THERESA RAYMOND, AND THERESA RAYMOND, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT EARL WILLIAMS, DECEASED v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., AND MARTHA PARKER
Docket NumberNO. 2011-CA-00375-SCT,2011-CA-00375-SCT
Decision Date06 September 2012

NYDREEKA WILLIAMS, BY AND THROUGH
HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, THERESA
RAYMOND, AND THERESA RAYMOND,
AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT
EARL WILLIAMS, DECEASED
v.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., AND MARTHA PARKER

NO. 2011-CA-00375-SCT

SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

DISPOSITION: September 6, 2012


DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/19/2011
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CYNTHIA I. MITCHELL
ALMA WALLS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: LAWRENCE D. WADE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams. The fatal bullet had been purchased from the Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi. Robert's daughter and his estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Walmart, alleging that it unlawfully had sold ammunition to the underage Moore and that the sale proximately had caused Robert's death. The trial court

Page 2

granted summary judgment for Walmart based on this Court's decision in Robinson v. Howard Brothers of Jackson, Mississippi, 372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979). In that case, this Court held that, even though the store had violated federal law by selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor, the minor's subsequent murder of a third party had not been foreseeable; the seller, therefore, was not civilly liable for the death. Id. at 1076. Based on Robinson, we find that Moore's criminal act was not foreseeable and that Walmart reasonably could assume that Moore would follow the law. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Walmart.

FACTS

¶2. On January 19, 2006, twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore and his coworker, Ladarius White (a.k.a. Smurf), entered Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi, to purchase clothes and other items. While there, Moore remembered that he needed more bullets for a handgun that he had purchased recently. So Moore entered the sporting goods department and approached Martha Parker, who was working behind the sales counter that day. Moore asked Martha if she had any bullets for a .45-caliber Smith and Wesson handgun. What happened next is disputed.

¶3. Martha asserted that her coworker, Terrence Parker, asked Moore if he wanted the Remington or Winchester brand. She said that Moore said nothing and simply walked away. Moments later, White approached the sales counter and asked Martha if she had any bullets for a .45-caliber handgun. Martha said that she then asked for and received White's driver's license. The license showed that White was more than twenty-one years old; thus, Martha entered White's date of birth into the computer, returned his driver's license to him, and sold

Page 3

him the bullets. Martha acknowledged that she had discerned that Moore and White were together. Further, she noticed that Moore had provided White the money for the transaction.

¶4. Moore's recollection was different. He affirmed that he first asked Martha whether she had any bullets for a .45-caliber Smith and Wesson. He then asked her how much the bullets cost, and she told him the price. Moore said that he informed Martha that he wanted to purchase the bullets, and she began to process the sale. He specifically recalled Martha asking to see his driver's license; he responded by telling her that he did not have it with him. Moore then asked Martha if White, who was browsing in a nearby aisle, could purchase the bullets for him. Martha told Moore that White could do so if White had his identification. Moore then handed White some money, and Martha completed the sale to White. After the purchase, White handed Moore the change and the bullets, and the two of them walked away.

¶5. The next evening, Moore and his then-girlfriend, Barbara Williams, attended a high school basketball game. After the game, they stopped to eat, watched television, and drank a little more than half of a fifth of vodka.1 They then spent the night at the Bayou Apartment complex where Moore lived with his sister, his mother, and his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams.2 In the early morning hours, Moore and Barbara were awakened when Robert began knocking on Moore's bedroom door. Robert demanded that Moore return a box fan he had borrowed. Moore and Barbara slowly got dressed; meanwhile, Robert grew

Page 4

increasingly impatient and began pounding harder on the door. A heated exchange ensued between Robert and Moore. According to Moore, Robert threatened that "when I opened the door he had something for my little a** . . . ." Moore stated that he feared Robert was going to be physically violent.3 Moore then got his preloaded handgun from the closet4 and fired a single shot at the door. Moore maintained that he had aimed about seven or eight feet high and that he had intended only to scare Robert away. "I tried to fire up at an angle but never pointing the gun at anything[,] and then being under the influence of alcohol[,] I guess my vision was a little off. I shot a little bit lower than I thought . . . ," Moore recounted. When Moore and Barbara opened the door, they found Robert lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to the head. Moore and Barbara transported Robert to a local hospital, where he died the next day.

¶6. Martha learned about the shooting death of Robert on January 22, 2006. That same day, Walmart terminated her employment because she had "allowed [a] straw purchase of ammunition." A "straw purchase," according to Walmart's Firearms Training Workbook, "occurs when a [c]ustomer tries to purchase a firearm for someone else (a.k.a. the straw person) and knowingly makes a false statement on the ATF 4473 Form indicating that they are the actual purchaser."

Page 5

¶7. Moore was indicted for murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

¶8. On January 20, 2009, Robert's daughter, Nydreeka Williams, by and through her natural mother, Theresa Raymond, and Raymond, on behalf of Robert's estate (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed suit against eight Walmart entities, MRW Indianola Joint Venture, Martha Parker, and John Does 1-6. All defendants except Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., and Martha Parker (collectively "Walmart") were dismissed later without prejudice. Plaintiffs asserted that Walmart had violated Section 97-37-13 of the Mississippi Code5 and Title 18, Section 922 of the United States Code by selling ammunition to a minor. Plaintiffs further alleged that Walmart had been negligent in its training and supervision of Martha.

¶9. Months later, Walmart filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. It asserted that "even if the bullets in question had been sold to Xavier Moore, which [Walmart] den[ies], still, the sale to Xavier Moore was not a proximate cause" of Robert's death. Walmart relied on Robinson as support.

¶10. The trial court treated Walmart's motion as one for summary judgment and entered summary judgment in its favor. The trial court relied upon Robinson and found that Moore's subsequent criminal act was not "within the realm of reasonable foreseeability." Following the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment, the Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal.

Page 6

¶11. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper and that a jury must decide whether Walmart's unlawful sale was a proximate cause of Robert's death.

DISCUSSION

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Walmart.

¶12. This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g. Nygaard v. Getty Oil Co., 918 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Miss. 2005) (citing Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d 152, 156 (Miss. 2004)). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . ." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, we must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." Nygaard, 918 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Leffler, 891 So. 2d at 156).

¶13. In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Control Act. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.). The principal aim of this legislation "was to [curb] crime by keeping 'firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.'" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824, 94 S. Ct. 1262, 1268-69, 39 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1974) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) of the Act prohibits a licensed firearms dealer from selling handgun ammunition to any person who the dealer knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is less than twenty-one years old. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2006). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that:

It shall be unlawful for any . . . licensed dealer . . . to sell or deliver . . . any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age, and, if the

Page 7

firearm, or ammunition is other than a shotgun or rifle, or ammunition for a shotgun or rifle, to any individual who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2006).

¶14. Because we are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, we must accept as true that Moore was the actual purchaser here and that the sale violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1).

¶15. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) constitutes negligence per se. See Robinson, 372 So. 2d at 1074, 1076. Yet:

[t]he negligence per se doctrine does not create a new cause of action. Rather, it is a form of ordinary negligence, that enables the courts to use a penal statute to define a reasonably prudent person's standard of care. Negligence per se arises
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT