Williams v. Walmart Stores E., LP
| Decision Date | 25 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:18-CV-874-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | WILEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. WALMART STORES EAST, LP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Until he was fired in June 2017, Plaintiff Wiley Williams worked for Defendant Walmart Stores East, LP, for almost twenty years. Williams insists that Walmart abruptly fired him in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Because Williams fails to allege that he exhausted all of his administrative remedies before filing this action, his ERISA claim is due to be dismissed. But it also appears that a more detailed complaint could state a plausible ERISA claim, so the court will not dismiss Williams's claim with prejudice.
The court has federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties do not dispute personal jurisdiction or venue.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Wilborn v. Jones, 761 F. App'x 908, 910 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that [the] defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(e), a defendant "may move for a more definite statement" of a complaint that "is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). "The motion is intended to provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading, rather than a vehicle for obtaining greater detail." Faulk v. Home Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 311, 313 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (cleaned up). It "is not to be employed as a substitute for pre-trial discovery." Herman v. Cont'l Grain Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
Wiley Williams started working at the Walmart store in Enterprise, Alabama,in August 1997.1 He kept working there for roughly two months shy of twenty years. For fifteen of those years, he was an Assembler. He never got any disciplinary write-ups or coaching sessions — not once in nearly two decades. To the contrary, he was "Associate of the Month" six times. (Doc. # 1, at 2-3.) Because of his long tenure, Williams was "grandfathered-in" to a plan that allowed him to get health, dental, and life insurance benefits for working twenty-eight hours a week. New employees, by contrast, had to work forty hours a week to get benefits. (Doc. # 1, at 5, 7.) What's more, after his twenty-year work anniversary in August 2017, Williams "would have been entitled to greater vested benefits." (Doc. # 1, at 5, 7.) But he never got them.
In June 2017, a supervisor asked Williams to help him install a beam in a steel shelf in the back of the store. Williams obliged. But when Brian Retherford (the shift manager) saw the men working, he ordered Williams to "get down" off a scissor lift. (Doc. # 1, at 3.) Mylan Hicks (the assistant store manager) then called Williams into a meeting with Retherford. In that meeting, Retherford told Williams that he was "not supposed to be in the steel." (Doc. # 1, at 3.) Williams answered that he had to get "in the steel" to install the beam, yet Retherford fired Williams on the spot, purportedly for violating workplace safety rules. (Doc. # 1, at 3.) At the time, Hicks was twenty-four years old, Retherford was thirty-three, and Williams wassixty-four. (Doc. # 1, at 2-3, 7.)
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Doc. # 1-1), Williams filed a two-count complaint against Walmart in October 2018. In Count One, he claims Walmart discriminated against him based on his age. (Doc. # 1, at 5-6.) In Count Two, he claims Walmart interfered with his employee benefits in violation of § 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I, § 510, 88 Stat. 829, 895 (1974) (). (Doc. # 1, at 7-8.)
Walmart moves to dismiss Count Two for failure to state a claim — or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. (Doc. # 7.) Williams opposes the motion to dismiss but does not seek leave to file an amended complaint. (See Doc. # 13.) Walmart filed a reply in support of its motion. (Doc. # 16.) The motion is now ripe.
ERISA governs employee benefit plans, and § 510 of ERISA prevents anyone from interfering with a beneficiary's rights in an employee benefit plan:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1140. This provision protects beneficiaries by ensuring that when a plan is modified, those modifications go through the proper procedures. See Inter-ModalRail Emps. Ass'n v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1997). In other words, once an employer offers benefits, it is "bound by the terms of its plan" until the plan itself is modified. Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1993).
A plaintiff may establish a § 510 interference claim through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). When there is no direct evidence, courts employ the well-worn McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. There is a prima facie case of § 510 interference if the plaintiff "(1) was entitled to ERISA protection; (2) was qualified for his position; and (3) was discharged under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination." Id. (citing Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Given these requirements, Williams plausibly alleges that Walmart violated § 510.2 But there is still a problem with his complaint: It alleges no facts suggesting that Williams exhausted his available administrative remedies. Nor does it allegeany facts suggesting that failure to exhaust those remedies should be excused. Thus, his complaint is due to be dismissed. See, e.g., Bickley v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006) (); Variety Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Century Med. Health Plan, Inc., 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). Dismissal will be without prejudice, however, so Williams may move for leave to file an amended complaint.
"The ultimate inquiry in a § 510 case is whether the employer had the specific intent to interfere with the employee's ERISA rights." Clark, 990 F.2d at 1222. This "is a factual inquiry to be answered on a case-by-case-basis." Seaman, 985 F.2d at 546. Williams "is not required to prove that interference with ERISA rights was the sole reason for [his] discharge," but he "must show more than the incidental loss of benefits." Clark, 990 F.2d at 1222-23. In other words, it is enough for interference to have been "a motivating factor" in Walmart's decision to fire him, but Walmart's actions must have been "directed at ERISA rights in particular." Id. at 1224.
Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it is plausible that Williams was entitled to ERISA protection. To be sure, whether ERISA actually applies might be a tough question; the definitions of crucial statutory terms have "proved to be elusive at best." Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). But the benefitplans referenced in § 510 include some health benefits, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (3), and it is plausible that ERISA applies to Walmart's employee health insurance plans. By the same token, it is plausible that the "greater vested benefits" Williams was set to receive in August 2017 would have been covered by ERISA. (Doc. # 1, at 5, 7.)
Further, it is plausible that Williams was qualified for his job as an Assembler. He had nearly twenty years' experience at the Enterprise Walmart, his disciplinary record was non-existent, and he was a six-time "Associate of the Month."
Finally, based on the allegations in the complaint, it is plausible that Walmart fired Williams with the intent to interfere with his protected benefits. Most Walmart employees have to work forty hours a week to get benefits, but Williams had to work just twenty-eight.3 This fact might have made Williams's benefits relatively more expensive. Williams also alleges that he was fired a mere two months before he was set to receive greater benefits. That temporal correlation makes it plausible that there is a causal relationship. See Clark, 990 F.2d at 1224 () (citing Dister v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1988)); cf. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (). Together, these allegations nudge...
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