Williams v. Warden

• Decision Date: 01 June 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:13-CV-1002
• Parties: NOLAN WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, CHILLICOTHE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

NOLAN WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, CHILLICOTHE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:13-CV-1002

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

June 1, 2015

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, a state prisoner, has filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the instant Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Traverse and Notice of Supplemental Authority, Respondent's Reply, Petitioner's Response, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED and this action be DISMISSED.

Facts and Procedural History

This case involves Petitioner's convictions after a bench trial in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas on felonious assault arising out of an October 10, 2010, altercation with his wife, Joanna Williams. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years in prison. Petitioner timely appealed to the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, which has summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Appellant and Mrs. Williams resided at 2212 Walnut, Toledo, Ohio. The record is clear that the altercation between them on October 8, 2010, began in the house on Walnut. At some point in the altercation, Mrs. Williams ran from the house and outside to the street. Appellant followed.

Appellant argues that he did not strike Mrs. Williams when they were outside of the house and that there was no ongoing

emergency when the neighbor (who was outside) called 911. Appellant argues that the purpose of the 911 call was to establish past events and that the neighbor was not describing events as they happened.

The state responds that the neighbor was clearly reporting an ongoing emergency involving domestic violence and made the call to secure emergency police assistance. The 911 call proceeded as follows:

Operator: Toledo 911. (yelling in background)

Caller: Can I have the police at 2216 Walnut St.? This man is beating this lady up real good * * *

Operator: 2216 Walnut?

Caller: Yes

Operator: Does she need medical attention?

Caller: Yes, she does.

Operator: What is your name?

Caller: My name is Fonda, I stay next door. (Yells out: I'm calling the police right now.)

Operator: Any weapons that you can tell? (yelling in background)

Caller: He's just beating her . . .

Operator: Can you give me a description of him, white, black or hispanic?

Caller: Black* * *

Operator: What's he wearing?

Caller: He's got on jeans and a shirt, they stay next door to me * * * (yelling in the background)

Operator: OK police are on notified * * * I'm gonna transfer you over to medical (more yelling in background)Appellant admitted at trial that he chased Mrs. Williams into the street and that his objective was to bring her back to the house. Appellant restrained Mrs. Williams outside as she was trying to get away. Appellant testified that after he stopped her, he punched Mrs. Williams in the knees from behind to make her legs buckle. He testified he did this to permit him to push her back to the porch. Appellant testified that Mrs. Williams was screaming with her voice at a level of 7, 8, or 9 on a scale of 1 to 10 while outside.

Appellant testified that it was nice out and everyone, including the neighbor, was outside. Appellant testified that he was aware that a neighbor was calling 911. According to appellant, the woman who called 911 was "hollering and screaming and she was louder than Joanna."

State v. Williams, 987 N.E. 2d 322, 326-27 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. 2013). Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court deprived Mr. Williams of a fair trial when it erroneously admitted the 911 hearsay call in violation of Mr. Williams' due process and confrontation rights.

II. The trial court violated Mr. Williams' state and federal due process rights to a fair trial when it admitted improper and prejudicial other bad acts evidence in contravention of Evid.R. 404(B).

III. There is insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Williams' conviction.

IV. The trial court violated Mr. Williams' due process right to a fair trial when it failed to consider the lesser offense of aggravated assault because he provided the mitigating circumstances of provocation and sudden passion.

V. The trial court failed to make an explicit finding on the record, regarding Mr. Williams' present and future ability to pay appointed counsel's fees, and failed to notify Mr. Williams on the record and in open court that it was imposing appointed counsel's fees, supervision costs, and confinement costs as set forth in its March 30, 2011 judgment entry.

Id. at 325. On March 1, 2013, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner's judgment of conviction, and sentence except to the extent that the sentence imposed an obligation to pay costs of appointed attorney counsel, costs of confinement, and costs of supervision. The appellate court reversed the judgment on those requirements and remanded the case for resentencing, ordering the State to pay the costs of the appeal. Id. at 332-33. On June 5, 2013, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. State v. Williams, 135 Ohio St. 3d 1461 (Ohio 2013).

On October 10, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that he was denied due process, the right to a fair trial and convicted in violation of the Confrontation Clause due to admission of the contents of a 911 report and that the appellate court abused its discretion by denying this claim (claims one and two); he was denied a fair trial and convicted in violation of state law due to admission of other bad acts (claim three); and that the trial court unconstitutionally imposed sentence (claim four). Petitioner asserts that he is innocent of the charge against him. Reply, ECF 11, PageID# 717-18. It is the position of the Respondent that none of Petitioner's claims warrant relief.

Standard of Review

The factual findings of the state appellate court are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

Further, a federal habeas court may not grant relief unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence that was presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court has explained the circumspect nature of a federal habeas court's review:

"[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Indeed, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id., at 411, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. Rather, that application must be "objectively unreasonable." Id., at 409, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. This distinction creates "a substantially higher threshold" for obtaining relief than de novo review. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). AEDPA thus imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam).

Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S.766, 773 (2010) (footnote omitted.)

"[C]learly established" law under § 2254(d)(1) consists of "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's" cases. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). An "unreasonable application" of that law involves not just an erroneous or incorrect decision, but an objectively unreasonable one. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010).

Wong v. Smith, 131 S.Ct. 10 (Mem), 2010 WL 752363, at *2 (Nov. 1, 2010). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 592 U.S. 86, —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Claims One and Two

In claim one, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted in violation of the Confrontation Clause and denied his right to cross examination witnesses against him because the prosecution failed to establish the unavailability of his neighbor, "Fonda," the key witness against him, prior to admitting her statements in the 911 call into evidence. Petitioner complains that the prosecutor failed to call Fonda as a prosecution witness in an effort to obtain a tactical advantage. Petition, ECF 3, PageID# 33. He argues in claim two that the ...