Williams v. Wayne County Sheriff

• Citation: 235 N.W.2d 552,395 Mich. 204
• Decision Date: 25 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1,J,1
• Parties: In the Matter of the Extradition of Robert F. Williams. Robert F. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF et al., Defendants-Appellees. an. Term. 395 Mich. 204, 235 N.W.2d 552
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 552

235 N.W.2d 552

In the Matter of the Extradition of Robert F. Williams.

Robert F. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1, Jan. Term.

395 Mich. 204, 235 N.W.2d 552

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 25, 1975.

Fieger, Golden & Cousens by Bernard J. Fieger, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney Research, Training & Appeals, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

COLEMAN, Justice (To Affirm).

The central concern of this case is a legal argument towards change in the law of extradition by our Court. However, a full understanding of the facts is crucial and pointedly illustrates the fallacy of that argument.

In 1961 plaintiff and four other persons were indicted for kidnapping in North Carolina by the Union County Grand Jury. In 1964 the four co-indictees were tried on the 1961 indictments and found guilty. However, plaintiff was not tried with the co-indictees, having been a fugitive from North Carolina at the time. On January 29, 1965 the North Carolina Supreme Court quashed the 1961 indictments upon which the verdicts and judgments were based. ¹ In May 1965, indictments were again issued against plaintiff and the four previously convicted persons. Plaintiff disputes validity of the 1965 indictments.

Plaintiff's location in 1965 and thereafter is not a matter of record. But in 1967 plaintiff was apparently residing in Peking, China. While in China, he wrote letters to the clerk of the Union County Superior Court and the solicitor of the Thirteenth Solicitorial District of North Carolina regarding charges which might be pending against him.

In a letter dated August 3, 1967, the clerk of the Superior Court responded:

'I enclose Xerox copies of the bills of indictments pending in the Superior Court of Union County against you. This office does not have authority to fix bail' ²

At the habeas corpus hearing, plaintiff also introduced copies of the 1961 indictments which were claimed to have been attached to the letter. The 1961 indictments against plaintiff's alleged accomplices were quashed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. ³ In a letter dated December 11, 1967, the solicitor of the Thirteenth District responded to plaintiff:

Plaintiff claims his 1961 indictment is also invalid for the same reasons.

'I have your letter of December 2nd, 1967, in reference to cases pending against you in the Superior Court of Union County, Monroe, North Carolina. 'In response to your letter, I wish to advise that you are charged with violating North Carolina General Statute 14--39 entitled, 'Kidnapping' in two cases which are alleged to have occurred on or about August 28, 1961 in Union County, North Carolina. I am informed the Clerk of the Superior Court in Union County has heretofore sent you copies of the Bills of Indictment in these two cases. I know of no other statutes you are charged with violating and so far as I know, no additional warrants have been issued against you since the original bills were returned by the Grand Jury in August, 1961. So far as I know, no appearance bond has been fixed by the court in the aforesaid cases, and this would be a matter for you to arrange with the presiding judge, Honorable John D. McConnell, Southern Pines, N.C.' ⁴

Plaintiff claims the letters show that no charges were pending against him in 1967. He argues that the 1961 indictments are invalid as a result of State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965), and that the 1965 indictments are forgeries.

Action bringing the instant case to Michigan began on October 9, 1969 when the governor of North Carolina executed a Governor's Requisition requesting rendition of plaintiff. The requisition was based on the 1965 indictments against plaintiff, as verified by the solicitor of the Thirteenth District and certified by the clerk of the Superior Court. On November 12, 1969, Governor William Milliken issued a Governor's Warrant for extradition of plaintiff. After unsuccessfully challenging the extradition proceedings, ⁵ plaintiff was arraigned on the Governor's Warrant on October 29, 1971. Plaintiff then pursued his habeas corpus remedy, beginning in 1971 and continuing until the Court's opinion today.

Circuit Judge Thomas Roumell, in the habeas corpus proceedings, succinctly summarized plaintiff's theory of the case:

'His theory of the case is that, although he was not a defendant in the 1964 trials, and not a party to the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision that, nevertheless, that decision, quashing the indictments on the basis of the invalidity of the Grand Jury proceedings, was effective to quash the 1961 indictments against him; that, whatever proceedings were later instituted in the Grand Jury as against the other defendants named in the 1961 indictments, that he was never re-indicted; and that the 1965 indictments purporting to name him as a defendant, are forgeries.' ⁶

Judge Roumell appropriately stated the issue presented to the Court:

'Petitioner has offered, and requested the opportunity to prove, by way of affidavits and depositions from witnesses who testified before the Grand Jury, lawyers who represented the several other witnesses named in the purported 1965 indictments, the Grand Jurors themselves, and other that, in fact, no indictments were ever found against him sebsequent to 1961. The question to be decided here is whether he should be permitted to attempt such proofs.' ⁷

Plaintiff urges that since the 1965 indictments against him are forgeries, he is not charged with a crime and cannot be extradited.

He requests opportunity to prove the forgery in the habeas corpus hearing.

THE SCOPE OF A HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGE OF EXTRADITION

The issue presented to this Court arises directly from several constitutional and statutory provisions. U.S.Const. art. IV, § 2 provides in pertinent part:

'A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.'

18 U.S.C. § 3182 provides in pertinent part:

'Whenever the excutive authority of any State . . . demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State . . . to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment . . . charging the person demanded with having committed . . . crime, certified as authentic by the governor . . . of the State . . . to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured . . ..'

Thus, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to extradite a fugitive when the governor of the demanding state produces an indictment charging crime, certified as authentic.

Both North Carolina and Michigan have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. ⁸ M.C.L.A. § 780.2; M.S.A. § 28.1285(2) is the most important section relating to the instant case and provides:

'Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the constitution of the United States controlling, and any and All acts of congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.' (Emphasis added.)

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act recognizes that federal law is controlling on the subject of extradition. The Act is expressly subject to all acts of Congress. While the Act aids states in providing specific procedures to be followed by state officials, ⁹ ultimately we must look to federal constitutional and statutory provisions, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Our immediate concern is the scope of a habeas corpus hearing challenging an indictment used for extradition on the basis that it does not charge a crime.

In Pierce v. Creecy, ¹⁰ the United States Supreme Court examined a challenge to extradition. Plaintiff claimed that the indictment from the demanding state was defective and, therefore, did not charge a crime as required by the United States Constitution. The indictment was claimed defective on several grounds: (1) the crime of false swearing was not adequately stated since opinion, not fact, was involved; (2) the indictment did not contain sufficient facts showing false swearing; (3) the indicted charge was not stated with certainty- The Court declined to examine whether there was good faith in finding the indictment. It also refused to determine whether the indictment charged the wrong crime since that was a mixed question of law and fact. More significantly, the Court did not dissect the indictment regarding the other four alleged defects. While admitting that the defects would show the indictment to be bad and appropriate for a motion to quash, the Court upheld the indictment as a basis for extradition: '(T)he Constitution does not require, as an indispensable prerequisite to interstate extradition, that there should be a good indictment . . ..' ¹¹ Even if the defects were admitted, the Court held that extradition is possible where the indictment charges the elements of a crime:

; (4) the statute of limitations barred prosecution; (5) the indictment was found in bad faith; and (6) the indictment charged the wrong crime under the demanding state's law.

'The only safe rule is to abandon entirely the standard to which the indictment must conform, judged as a criminal pleading, and consider only whether it shows satisfactorily that the fugitive has been in fact, however inartificially, charged with crime in the state from which he has fled.' ¹²

The Court explained the policy reasons for such a rule:

'This Court . . . has said . . . that the indictment, in order to constitute a...