Williams v. Weaver, 508

• Decision Date: 20 June 1986
• Docket Number: D,No. 508,No. 85-1282,508,85-1282
• Citation: 495 N.E.2d 1147,99 Ill.Dec. 412,145 Ill.App.3d 562
• Parties: , 99 Ill.Dec. 412, 34 Ed. Law Rep. 205 Raymond WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert WEAVER, Alice Means, Carolyn Webb, and the Board of Trustees of Community College Districtefendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1147

495 N.E.2d 1147

145 Ill.App.3d 562, 99 Ill.Dec. 412,

34 Ed. Law Rep. 205

Raymond WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert WEAVER, Alice Means, Carolyn Webb, and the Board of

Trustees of Community College District No. 508,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-1282.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District.

June 20, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 16, 1986.

Raymond Williams, pro se.

Murray and Girard, Ltd., Chicago (Michael J. Murray, Richard E. Girard, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Presiding Justice SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is from the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 (Board) and certain faculty members of Malcolm X College alleging breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective business and economic advantage.

The record discloses that plaintiff entered into a contract to teach business courses at Malcolm X College during the 1978 spring and fall semesters, commencing January 10, 1978 and ending December 23, 1978. In addition to general terms regarding salary and work load, the contract provided that plaintiff would be advised in writing by October 1, 1978 as to whether he would be tendered a contract of employment for the following year, and that it was "subject to applicable law, the Rules of the Board and the Board-Union agreement."

Article VIII, section J of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time contained provisions whereby recommendations on initial employment and renewal of employment contracts were to be made by eligible members of the department--in accordance with criteria and procedures agreed upon by a majority of the eligible members and published in writing--and then forwarded by the department chairperson to the college president who was free to accept or reject them. The published criteria and procedures of the business department at Malcolm X College provided that "[d]uring or before the tenth week of each semester, all eligible department instructors must fill out the Faculty Evaluation Forms rating each instructor's professional competency."

On February 24, 1978, a grievance was filed by 14 members of the business department charging that the Board violated the collective bargaining agreement by awarding a teaching contract to plaintiff before they were given an opportunity to adjust their teaching programs and, thereby, depriving them of overtime work. The grievance was subsequently denied.

On September 28, 1978, defendant Weaver, chairman of the business education department, sent a memorandum to the vice president for administration recommending that plaintiff's contract not be renewed, giving as reasons therefor: "(1) Poor Evaluations, (2) Incomplete Class Syllabus, and (3) Substandard Final Examination." Weaver further noted that the business department faculty had recommended that plaintiff not be hired in the first instance and that a grievance had been filed relating thereto.

In a letter from James Griggs, the college president, dated September 29, 1978, plaintiff was notified that his employment at Malcolm X College would terminate upon expiration of his one-year probationary contract. It is undisputed that the faculty evaluations enumerated above were not completed in accordance with the published criteria and procedures.

Plaintiff then filed a grievance against the Board protesting the termination decision. Although that grievance does not appear in the record, plaintiff's brief contains a copy of a letter, dated November 14, 1978, from Griggs in response thereto in which he (Griggs) stated that a review of the data presented to him did not reveal "an arbitrary or capricious approach" by Weaver; that Weaver had adhered to the substantive portions of the recommendation procedures enumerated in Article VIII, section J of the collective bargaining agreement; that a majority of the members of the business department had held that he (plaintiff) had not lived up to the standards adopted by the department and, therefore, had recommended that his contract not be renewed; that the "new information" submitted by plaintiff in the grievance was not sufficient to overcome the prior data submitted by Weaver; but that the matter would be remanded to Weaver for reconsideration by him and the other eligible members of the business department.

On November 15, 1978, Weaver circulated a memorandum to the members of the business department recommending that they vote "no" on the question of renewing plaintiff's contract for the reasons that (1) plaintiff had been hired despite faculty recommendations to the contrary; (2) the two teaching evaluations on file indicated poor teaching qualities; and (3) he and several other teachers had received numerous complaints from students of plaintiff's poor teaching performance. In his complaint, plaintiff states that "the eligible voting faculty voted against [his] continued employment [and] [a]s a result thereof, the Board notified [him] that his employment contract would not be * * * renewed."

Plaintiff thereafter brought this action ¹ for breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective advantage in the termination of his employment as a teacher at Malcolm X College. Hearings were conducted after which the trial court, on December 17, 1984, dismissed Count I (breach of contract) and, on April 5, 1985, dismissed Count II (tortious interference) of plaintiff's complaint. This appeal followed.

OPINION

Plaintiff first contends that defendants' failure to comply with the evaluation procedures required by the collective bargaining agreement constituted a breach of his employment contract into which those evaluation provisions were incorporated.

Defendants assert that the supreme court decisions in Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education (1975), 62 Ill.2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7, and Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 (1976), 62 Ill.2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 are dispositive of this issue. Both cases were actions brought by former nontenured teachers whose employment was terminated by nonrenewal of their probationary teaching contracts. The plaintiffs alleged that the boards' noncompliance with evaluation procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreements rendered invalid the decisions to terminate their employment by nonrenewal of their contracts. In Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education, the court noted that the School Code imposed upon the board the duty to appoint teachers (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, par. 20.7), and the right to terminate the employment of nontenured teachers by dismissal or nonrenewal of their contracts (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, pars. 10--22.4, 24--11 through 24--15), and held (1) that these powers are discretionary and nondelegable and could not be subordinated to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and (2) that termination in compliance with the statute was valid despite noncompliance with the evaluation procedures.

In Board of Education v. Cook County College Teachers Union, a consolidation of three cases involving an arbitrator's award of a teaching contract to previously-terminated probationary teachers, the court reiterated its earlier ruling, stating, "In our judgment, the holding in Illinois Education Association controls the result in this case. We adhere to our position there stated that the Board's duties in appointing teachers are nondelegable, and it follows therefrom that the arbitrator is without authority to award an employment contract as a remedy for the violation of a collective bargaining agreement." (62 Ill.2d 470, 476, 343 N.E.2d 473, 476.) The court further held that neither could the arbitrator order a reevaluation of the teacher in accordance with procedures prescribed thereby, reasoning that "Since we held nonrenewal of the teachers' contracts valid even though accomplished without the prior performance evaluation, it is clear that the evaluation provision is not enforceable against the Board." (62 Ill.2d 470, 476, 343 N.E.2d 473, 476), and that since the evaluation was not an obligation of the Board, but was to be conducted by the faculty, nonrenewal of the contracts in the absence of that evaluation does not constitute an impairment by the Board of the employment contract.

Plaintiff acknowledges that his position is in direct contradiction to that expressed by the supreme court, but argues that the error of the rulings in those cases is evidenced by the legislature's enactment of section 103B-3 of the Public Community College Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 122, par. 103B-3) (Tenure Act), which states:

"Every Board shall provide by rule or contract for a procedure to evaluate the performance and qualifications of non-tenure faculty members. If the implementation of such procedure results in a decision to dismiss a non-tenure faculty member for the ensuing school year or term, the Board shall give notice thereof to the faculty member not later than 60 days before the end of the school year or term. The specific reasons for the dismissal shall be confidential but shall be issued to the teacher upon request. If the Board fails to give such notice, within the time period, the faculty member shall be deemed reemployed for the ensuing school year. * * *."

Plaintiff urges that this section was intended to clarify already-existing duties imposed upon the Board with respect to the procedures to be followed prior to termination of a teacher by contract nonrenewal and thus, in effect, overrules the holdings in Illinois Education Association v Board of Education and Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union. In essence, he is arguing that section 103B-3 should be given retroactive application.

Initially, we note that nearly two years after the Tenure Act became effective, the supreme court declared the holdings in those cases to be controlling of the...