Williams v. Werlinger
| Decision Date | 28 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11 C 266 |
| Parties | REGINALD WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. ROBERT WERLINGER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
OPINION AND ORDER
On April 12, 2011, Reginald Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241 ("the petition") against the warden of the Federal Correction Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin, seeking relief from a disciplinary conviction and reinstatement of his lost good-time credits on various constitutional and administrative grounds.1 (Dkt. 1.) For the following reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.2
Williams is serving a prison term of 120 months, followed by eight years supervised release, after being convicted in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than 35 but less than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Dkt. 1 at 4.) From May 15, 2008 to May 19, 2010, Williams was housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey ("FCI-Fort Dix"). (Dkt. 1 at 4.) TheFederal Bureau of Prisons ("the FBP") then transferred him to the Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin ("FCI-Oxford") where he remains in custody. (Dkt. 9 at 3.)
On March 29, 2010, while in custody at FCI-Fort Dix, Williams was written up for violating various FBP Codes as enumerated in the Code of Federal Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Tbl. 3.3 (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1 at 1.) According to the incident report, a FCI-Fort Dix officer pat-searched Williams during a routine shakedown and felt something in the waistband of Williams' pants. (Id. at 2.) Williams refused to turn over the item and attempted to run from the room. (Id.) The officer stated that Williams used his shoulder to strike the officer in his attempt to escape, prompting the officer to call for assistance. (Id.) Once Williams was restrained, officers found a Samsung cellular telephone in his waistband. (Id. at 2-3.) Williams was subsequently charged with violating various FPB codes, including (1) 108 - Possession of a Hazardous Tool ("Code 108"), for possession of a cellular telephone and charger; (2) 224 - Assaulting any person ("Code 224"); (3) 316 - Being in an unauthorized Area ("Code 316"); and (4) 305 - Possession of anything unauthorized ("Code 305"). (Id. at 1.) The Warden at FCI-Ft. Dix had issued a memorandum to the prisoner population on December 28, 2009, while Williams was at FCI-Ft. Dix, explicitly warning inmates that those "found in possession of electronic communication devices, or related equipment such as a cell phone, cell phone charger, . . . etc., will be charged with a violation of Code 108, Possession Manufacture, or Introduction of a Hazardous Tool[.]" (Id., Ex. 3.) The Warden had issued similar memoranda on May 5, 2005, and October 4, 2006. (Id., Exs. 1-2.)
Williams received a copy of the incident report on March 30, 2010. (Id.) On April 2, 2010, Williams met with a case manager, T. McKinnon, who advised him of his rights at hisupcoming disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Williams waived staff representation at his April 14, 2010 disciplinary hearing, which was held before Discipline Hearing Officer ("DHO") A. Boyce. (Id.) DHO Boyce was presented with Williams' own testimony and written evidence. (Id. at 1-2.) Shortly thereafter, on May 19, 2010, Williams was transferred to FCI-Oxford. (Dkt. 1 at 4.)
On May 28, 2010, DHO Boyce found Williams had violated Codes 108, 224 and 316, but made no finding as to the Code 305 violation. (Id. at 3.) As punishment for the Code 108 violation, DHO Boyce gave Williams 30 days of disciplinary segregation, disallowed 40 days of good conduct time, deprived him of his phone privileges for 18 months, and caused him to forfeit 216 days of non-vested good conduct time.4 (Id.) On June 9, 2010, Williams received the DHO packet, which included a copy of the decision and the discipline imposed, via institutional mail. (Id. at 4.) The DHO packet advised Williams of his right to appeal within twenty calendar days. (Id.)
Williams filed a regional administrative appeal on November 30, 2010, which was received by the North Central Regional Director on December 16, 2010—long after the twenty-day period to file an appeal had lapsed. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 2 at 2.) Williams acknowledged that he filed his appeal after the twenty-day deadline in a letter accompanying his appellate filing, but he argued that the regional director should accept his appeal because Williams had been "in transit from May 19, 2010 until November 22, 2010." (Dkt. 1, Ex. at 1.) He stated that he received the DHO report on July 9, 2010, while he was in transit, but had only received his property and legal documents seven days after arriving at FCI-Oxford. (Id.) Substantively, Williams did not dispute in his appeal that he had been in possession of the cellular telephone. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 3.) Instead, Williams argued that possession of the cellular telephone had been miscategorized as aviolation of Code 108, a greatest category offense in FBP Code, rather than Code 305, a moderate category offense. (Id.) While the recommended sanctions for greatest category offenses include forfeiture of non-vested good conduct time, the recommended sanctions for moderate category offenses do not. See 28 C.F.R. § 541. 3, Tbl. 1. Williams argued that because he was never provided notice that possession of a cellular telephone would be categorized as a Code 108 violation, his right to due process had been violated and he was entitled to restitution of his good conduct time. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 3 at 1.)
The regional director rejected Williams' appeal on December 23, 2010. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 2 at 1.) Williams was notified of the regional director's rejection on January 5, 2011. (Id.) The regional director rejected the appeal on three grounds: (1) Williams failed to submit a complete set of the documents he was required to submit; (2) Williams' appeal was more than one continuous page; and (3) Williams' appeal was untimely. (Id.)
Williams appealed the regional director's decision. The FBP central office received documentation of the appeal on January 28, 2011.5 (Dkt. 1, Ex. 5.) On February 15, 2011, the general counsel rejected Williams' appeal as untimely because it was not filed within thirty calendar days from the date the regional director's decision. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 3.) The pending § 2241 petition followed.
Williams' main argument is that possession of a cellular telephone should have been categorized as a Code 305 offense rather than a Code 108 offense. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) He argues that (1) his due process rights were violated because he was never notified of the punishment for the charged conduct; (2) the FBP changed its rules in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act("the APA"); (3) Code 108 is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) he was treated differently from other similarly situated inmates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 3.)
Absent its suspension, the writ of habeas corpus is available to every individual detained in the United States. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 159 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2004) (). A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that should not be issued merely to "do service for an [additional] appeal." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354, 114 S. Ct. 2291, 129 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1994)).
Prisoners seeking to overturn the results of an administrative hearing that resulted in a loss of good time credits must petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000). Although prisoners do not forfeit their rights under the Due Process Clause, "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)).
When an inmate faces the possible loss of good time credits in a disciplinary proceeding, he is entitled to certain due process protections. These include (1) advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on and the reasons for taking any disciplinary action; (3) a hearing in which he is afforded the right to callwitnesses and present evidence, (so long as doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns); (4) the opportunity to have non-attorney representation if the inmate is illiterate or the complexity of the hearing makes one necessary; (5) an impartial decision-maker; and (6) a written decision. Id. at 564-71. A federal court will only disturb the findings of fact of a disciplinary hearing officer if they are unsupported by any evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). Therefore, the question on review is "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56.
Courts generally do not grant writs of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted all other administrative remedies available to him. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has held that the (federal) common law exhaustion rule applies to § 2241 actions. Id. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and...
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