Williams v. Williams
| Decision Date | 19 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20cv904 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | RONALD C. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. RONALD CALVIN WILLIAMS, II, Defendant. |
This lawsuit is an intrafamilial dispute over ownership of a warehouse and the rights to a related lease. Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by pro se Plaintiff Ronald C. Williams (“Williams”)[1] (Doc. 57) and his son, Defendant Ronald Calvin Williams, II (“Calvin”) (Doc. 37). Also before the court are two notices by Williams to voluntarily dismiss his claims for fraudulent misrepresentation (Doc. 40) and unjust enrichment (Doc. 41). Calvin agrees to such dismissals but urges they should be with prejudice. (Doc. 44 at 2 n.2.) For the reasons set forth below, Williams's motion for summary judgment will be denied, Calvin's motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and the court will grant Williams's motions to dismiss his fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment claims, which will be dismissed with prejudice.
The facts, either not in dispute or viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in the cross-motions for summary judgment, establish the following:
Williams is an 83-year-old resident of North Carolina and the father of Calvin, a resident of Colorado. (Doc. 19 ¶¶ 1-2; Doc. 38 at 2.) Twenty years ago, Williams purchased a warehouse located in Union County, North Carolina. (Doc. 19 ¶ 3.) Since 2018, the warehouse has been occupied by a tenant under a five-year lease who pays approximately $75 000 per year in rent with annual 3 percent increases. (Doc 37-1 at 5-6.) According to Williams, the warehouse is now valued between $1, 000, 000 and $2, 000, 000. (Doc. 19 ¶ 3.) Between May 2012 and October 2016, Williams transferred or directed the transfer of the deed for the warehouse to multiple people, including his brother and his daughter. (Id. ¶ 4; pp. 6-9.)
On April 16, 2020, Williams drafted a quitclaim deed transferring the warehouse to Calvin (“the transfer”). (Id. at 10.) The deed states that the transfer was made in exchange “[f]or valuable consideration," (id.), and affidavits submitted by Calvin and Audra Dougherty, Williams's daughter and Calvin's sister, claim that the transfer was made in exchange for Calvin's agreement to care for Williams for the rest of his life. (See Doc. 37-2 ¶ 3; Doc. 37-1 ¶ 4; see also Doc. 52 at 4 () (“Plaintiff conveyed the real property at issue in this action to Defendant in exchange for Defendant's promise to provide for Plaintiff's room, board, medical care, and related needs for the rest of his life.”).) Dougherty submitted an email sent to her by Williams shortly after the transfer of the warehouse in which Williams stated, “I deeded the warehouse to Calvin in exchange for his taking care of me until my death.” (Doc. 37-2 at 2; see also Doc. 37-3 at 37-38.) Williams, however, has indicated that the transfer was made in exchange for Calvin's promise to transfer the property back to Williams at some unspecified later time at his request.[2] (See Doc. 19 ¶¶ 4-6; Doc. 37-3 at 14-15, 113-14.)
Simultaneously with the transfer the warehouse, Williams executed an assignment to Calvin of the current tenant's lease agreement (“the assignment”). (See Doc. 37-1 at 17.) At the bottom of the lease agreement, Williams wrote by hand, (Id.; see also Doc. 37-3 at 12-14.)
During that same time period in April 2020, Williams made plans to enter an assisted living facility, Abbotswood, located in North Carolina. (See Doc. 19 at 11 ().) Prior to that time, from mid-2019 to early May 2020, Williams resided with Calvin in his home in Colorado. (Doc. 37-3 at 8.) Williams ultimately left Calvin's home on May 3, 2020, and briefly resided with Dougherty before entering Abbotswood on May 6. (Id.) Williams's monthly rent at Abbotswood was approximately $4, 000, which covered meals and other services, and Calvin was expected to pay this from the warehouse rental proceeds.[3] (Id. at 17, 19.)
Around the time that Williams entered Abbotswood and shortly after the transfer and assignment, Williams expressed a desire to have Calvin transfer the warehouse back to him. (See, e.g., Doc. 37-2 ¶ 5.) On May 5, 2020, Williams contacted Calvin via email indicating, (Doc. 37-3 at 43-44, 85.) However, on May 9, 2020, Williams again emailed Calvin and stated, “I suggest as a solution to the warehouse management problem that you receive the rent and pay all the bills without my input and that I receive only my SS check.” (Id. at 86.)
In an affidavit, Williams indicates that he suffers from epilepsy for which he is prescribed lamotrigine. (Doc. 47.) He further indicates that starting in early 2018, his prescription was inadvertently doubled and as a result of his double-dose of medication, he suffered several side effects including difficulty concentrating, drowsiness, paranoia, balance problems, vision problems, and difficulty speaking. (See Id. at 1; Doc. 37-3 at 15-16.) He discovered and corrected his double-dosing in August 2020 (Doc. 47 at 2), after which time his medical condition improved (Doc. 37-3 at 15).
On August 26, 2020, Williams, proceeding pro se, filed the present suit in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division in Guilford County, North Carolina. (Doc. 1-1.) Calvin timely removed the action to this court. (Doc. 1.) In December 2020, Williams filed an amended complaint bringing three claims against Calvin: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) an action for “void contract, ” and (3) unjust enrichment. (Doc. 19.) In January 2021, Williams filed a motion that the court construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was denied. (Docs. 23, 33.) At the time, the court encouraged the parties to resolve their dispute through mediation (Doc. 33 at 12), but that was unsuccessful (Doc. 35). Both parties now move for summary judgment. (Docs. 37, 57.) The motions are fully briefed and ready for resolution. (See Docs. 36, 38, 44, 45, 46.)
Separately, Williams has filed two notices of voluntary dismissal, the first for his claim of fraudulent misrepresentation (claim one) (Doc. 40) and the second for his claim of unjust enrichment (claim three) (Doc. 41). These requests are also ready for resolution. (See Doc. 44 at 2 n.2.)
Williams has filed notices of voluntary dismissal for his claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. (Docs. 40, 41.) Calvin argues that these notices are procedurally improper and the claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 44 at 2 n.2.) Williams has not responded to Calvin's request for dismissal with prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides that a “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1). Here, Williams has filed two notices of dismissal. (Docs. 40, 41.) These notices are untimely as they were filed after Calvin filed both an answer and a motion for summary judgment.[4] (See Docs. 20, 37.) As such, Williams requires a court order to dismiss these claims and Williams' notices of dismissal will therefore be treated as requests for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).
Rule 41(a)(2) provides that, except as provided in section (a)(1) “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Although the decision is discretionary, the “purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is freely to allow voluntary dismissals unless the parties will be unfairly prejudiced.” Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, a district court should grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion “absent plain legal prejudice to the defendant.” Ellett Bros. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001). A defendant cannot establish prejudice sufficient to defeat a Rule 41(a)(2) motion merely by showing that it has filed a summary judgment motion, Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986), or that it faces the prospect of a subsequent lawsuit, see Ellett Bros., 275 F.3d at 388-89. However, where dismissal is requested after proceedings are sufficiently advanced, dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) may be inappropriate. See Andes, 788 F.2d at 1036. A district court may instead dismiss an action with prejudice if the parties have prior notice that the court is considering such an action and the parties had an opportunity to respond. See Hobbs v. Kroger Co., 175 F.3d 1014 (4th Cir. 1999) (table decision) (citing Choice Hotels Int'l Inc., 11 F.3d 469, 471 (4th Cir. 1993));[5] Andes, 788 F.2d at 1037. “In deciding a Rule 41(a) motion, a district court should consider factors such as ‘the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the movant, and insufficient explanation of the need for a voluntary dismissal,' as well as ‘the present stage of litigation.'” Miller v. Terramite Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 536, 539 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Phillips...
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