Williams v. Williams (Ex parte Williams)

• Decision Date: 19 August 2016
• Docket Number: 1140374.
• Parties: Ex parte John R. WILLIAMS. (In re Denise M. Williams v. John R. Williams).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

218 So.3d 792 (Mem)

Ex parte John R. WILLIAMS.

(In re Denise M. Williams

v.John R. Williams).

1140374.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 19, 2016.

G. Houston Howard II of Law Office of Keith A. Howard, LLC, Wetumpka, for petitioner.

Submitted on certiorari petition only.

Prior report: Ala.Civ.App., 218 So.3d 781.

MURDOCK, Justice.

WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.

MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

BOLIN and MURDOCK, JJ., concur specially.

MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in the denial of certiorari review. I write specially to address concerns regarding the application of Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., in this case.

This is a divorce case in which the wife filed a complaint seeking (1) a divorce, (2) a judgment declaring a prenuptial agreement invalid, (3) a division of property, (4) alimony, and (5) an order that the husband provide the wife with medical insurance. The parties had been married almost nine years at the time the wife filed her complaint; there are no children of the marriage.

The husband filed a motion for a partial summary judgment requesting a judgment declaring that the prenuptial agreement, which provided that neither party would be entitled to alimony or to any portion of the other party's separate estate in the event of a divorce, was valid. The trial court granted the husband's motion and certified the partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b). The wife appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. See Williams v. Williams, 218 So.3d 781 (Ala.Civ.App.2014) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was appropriate, but reversed the trial court's judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Presiding Judge Thompson concurred in the result without writing. Judge Moore, joined by Judge Donaldson, dissented with respect to the appropriateness of the Rule 54(b) certification. Judge Moore's dissent was based solely on a conclusion that there was no reason for immediate appellate review of the partial summary judgment because the remaining issue, the granting of the divorce, could probably be decided in a short time. See Williams, 218 So.3d at 791–92 (Moore, J., dissenting).

There is merit, so far as it goes, in Judge Moore's position that the Rule 54(b) certification was inappropriate in this case because the trial court could have adjudicated the remaining issue—the existence of grounds for divorce—without significant delay. Williams, 218 So.3d at 792 (Moore, J., dissenting). "[T]he adjudication of divorce cases in piecemeal fashion" is disfavored, see Cochran v. Chapman, 21 So.3d 1244, 1246 (Ala.Civ.App.2008), and "[c]ertifications under Rule 54(b) should be entered only in exceptional cases and should not be entered routinely." Baker v. Bennett, 644 So.2d 901, 903 (Ala.1994).¹ This case does not meet this "exceptional case" standard so as to warrant piecemeal appellate review.

I have, however, more fundamental concerns with the Rule 54(b) certification in this case: (1) whether the validity of the prenuptial agreement is actually a separate "claim," rather than a constituent part of the claim for a divorce, (2) whether the prenuptial-agreement issue was completely adjudicated, and (3) whether the prenuptial-agreement issue is intertwined with the granting of the divorce and with the claims seeking property division and alimony.

Subject to a few exceptions not relevant here, an appeal lies only from a final judgment that completely adjudicates all matters in controversy before the court and that is conclusive and certain in itself. Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1976). See also Ala.Code 1975, § 12–22–2 ; Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d 1249, 1253 (Ala.1990) (noting that a final judgment is "one that conclusively determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved").

Rule 54(b) provides an exception to this general rule.² It allows for the entry of a final, appealable judgment as to one or more of, but fewer than all, the claims in an action, but only under certain conditions. This writing will address three of the conditions for Rule 54(b) certification.

Rule 54(b) Certification is Appropriate Only if the Judgment Resolves an Entire Claim

Rule 54(b) certification does not authorize the entry of a final judgment on part of a single claim. Stephens v. Fines Recycling, Inc., 84 So.3d 867, 877 (Ala.2011). In a two-party suit, Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate only if the action presents multiple separate claims, as opposed to a single claim with multiple elements for recovery. See generally Ex parte National Ins. Underwriters, 366 So.2d 687, 689–90 (Ala.1978) (noting that a " 'claim' refers to a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in the claimant"). As the Court of Civil Appeals explained in J.S. v. S.W., 702 So.2d 169, 171 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), a "claim" for child support was not a separate claim that could have been enforced apart from the claim seeking custody of the child.

The wife's prenuptial-agreement "claim" is not in fact a separate claim at all. First, portions of the prenuptial agreement offer a defense to a claim for alimony and property division, rather than a true claim. See Ex parte National Ins. Underwriters, 366 So.2d at 690 (stating that the insurer's "claims were, in actuality, defenses to [the insured's] claim under the policy").³ Clearly, an order validating or invalidating the prenuptial agreement is not one that has any field of operation apart from a judgment granting a divorce. Even if, as may have been true in this case, the trial court were to go further and enter a purportedly final judgment actually denying any and all claims to alimony or for property division, that order also would have no field of operation apart from a judgment granting a divorce.

The wife's "claims" relating to the prenuptial agreement were not claims separate from her claim for a divorce. Such claims, as well as any more general judgment by the trial court regarding alimony or property, derive from the termination of the marital relationship; they are all merely incident to, or constituent parts of, the claim for a divorce. As the Court of Civil Appeals explained in Cochran v. Chapman, 21 So.3d at 1246 : "The question whether the parties are married does not constitute a discrete 'claim' within the case; instead, it is a constituent part of Chapman's single claim for a divorce." Under Alabama law, there is not a cognizable claim for permanent alimony or property division apart from the claim for a divorce. "[T]here is no jurisdiction in the court to grant 'permanent alimony' without a divorce." Ex parte Thornton, 272 Ala. 4, 7, 127 So.2d 598, 601 (1961). "[T]he court is without power to decree a permanent allowance out of the husband's estate, when the court has denied a divorce. Such permanent allowance ... is incident to a decree of divorce." Norrell v. Norrell, 241 Ala. 170, 171, 1 So.2d 654, 654 (1941).

Section 30–2–51, Ala.Code 1975, provides that "the judge, upon granting a divorce, ... may order to a spouse an allowance out of the estate of the other spouse." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the statute authorizes a court to order alimony or a division of property if a divorce is not granted. In Mahoney v. Mahoney, 568 So.2d 832 (Ala.Civ.App.1990), the Court of Civil Appeals rejected the notion that a wife could bring an independent action for alimony following a valid foreign divorce. The court stated:

"The law in Alabama is clear that the power to grant alimony is derived solely from statute, and that the obligation of the husband (or the wife) is derived from the marriage relationship. Pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 30–2–50, alimony may be awarded pending an action for divorce or, pursuant to § 30–2–51, upon the granting of a divorce. However, after a valid divorce judgment, the relationship of husband and wife is dissolved, and the obligation of the husband to provide for support is at an end. Ex parte Thornton, 272 Ala. 4, 127 So.2d 598 (1961). Therefore, in this instance, we find that our statutes do not allow an independent action for alimony after the marriage relationship has been terminated by a valid divorce."

568 So.2d at 833–34 (emphasis added). The claims seeking a division of property and alimony are not separately enforceable in the absence of a divorce judgment. They are merely incident to, or constituent parts of, the claim for a divorce.

Cases from other states are in agreement that there is no cognizable claim for property division and alimony in the absence of a grant of a divorce. See McCotter v. Carle, 149 Va. 584, 595, 140 S.E. 670, 674 (1927) ("[I]t is clear that, when a divorce is not decreed, the power of the court to consider in any respect the estates or property rights of the parties, whether between themselves or otherwise, is nonexistent." (emphasis omitted)); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 177 W.Va. 61, 63–64, 350 S.E.2d 688, 690–91 (1986) (" '[T]he actual division of the property cannot be made until the final decree [of divorce] is granted....' " (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 300(1)(1959) )); Stuart v. Stuart, 144 Ohio St. 289, 291, 58 N.E.2d 656, 657 (1944) ("As a divorce was not granted, there could be no division of the property...."); Mattson v. Mattson, 79 N.D. 381, 389, 56 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1953) ("Since there is no proceeding known to the law wherein there may be a distribution of property between a husband and a wife, based upon their inability to continue the normal marital relations, the manifest implication of the foregoing statutes is that there can be no property distribution, unless there be a judgment or decree of divorce."); and Sanchez v. Sanchez, 609 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex.Civ.App.1980) ("[I]n a divorce case, the division of the property may not be severed from the granting of a divorce.").

The portions of the prenuptial agreement at issue here are...