Williams v. Williams

• Decision Date: 22 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 10987,10987
• Citation: 781 P.2d 1170,109 N.M. 92,1989 NMCA 72
• Parties: Ragina C. WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rodney WILLIAMS, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 1170

781 P.2d 1170

109 N.M. 92

Ragina C. WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rodney WILLIAMS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10987.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 22, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 18, 1989.

[109 NM 93] Elizabeth Cunningham, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Services Dept., Roswell, for petitioner-appellant.

Michael E. Dargel, McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, Carlsbad, for respondent-appellee.

OPINION

ALARID, Judge.

Mother appeals from the trial court's order denying her petition for child support arrearages. She challenges some of the findings of fact the trial court made and the trial court's conclusion that she waived her right to collect the child support arrearages. We affirm and hold the trial court could reasonably have concluded mother waived her right to collect the child support arrearages.

FACTS

The parties' son was approximately 19 months old when they divorced in New Mexico in 1976. Mother was awarded sole custody of the parties' son and father was awarded reasonable visitation rights. Father was also ordered to pay $100 per month in child support.

In March 1978, mother remarried and moved to Texas. Father claimed that shortly before this move, mother told him she did not want his money or for him to ever see their child again. Mother denied this. Instead she claimed she sent father a certified letter giving her sister's address in Carlsbad, New Mexico, as a forwarding address and informing father he could deposit his child support payments in a savings account mother opened in Carlsbad before she moved to Texas. After she moved to Texas, mother changed the child's last name without notifying father.

While she lived in Texas, mother filed a URESA petition in New Mexico for child support arrearages that had accrued since February 1978. See NMSA 1978, Secs. 40-6-1 to 40-6-41 (Repl.1986). She moved to Oklahoma during the pendency of this proceeding. The trial court conducted a hearing on mother's URESA petition in October 1978. Father appeared at this hearing and claimed mother had denied him visitation since March 1978. Mother did not appear at the hearing. The trial court found father had deposited $600 in a savings account in New Mexico, which represented child support arrearages that had accrued through the date of the hearing on mother's URESA petition. The trial court ordered father to give this money to mother when he picked up the child for a thirty-day visitation, and to continue to deposit $100 per month into the savings account for child support. Mother testified she received a copy of this order while she was living in Oklahoma. Both father and mother testified that their understanding of the October 1978 order was that father was not obligated to pay any child support until mother allowed him a thirty-day continuous visit with the child. This visit never occurred. Nevertheless, father continued to deposit $100 per month into the savings account for approximately two years thereafter, at which time he withdrew the funds due to financial difficulties.

Between March 1978 and December 1978, mother moved five times, two moves within Texas, and three moves within Oklahoma. Father, his parents, and mother's parents lived in Carlsbad during this time. Father testified he did not see the child during this time and that he made some efforts to locate the mother through her family, but they were uncooperative. Mother testified she did not "think to" inform father of her various moves and that she did not encourage the child to have any contact with her father during this time. She also testified the only contact she had with father during this time was the March 1978 letter she sent him telling him where he could deposit his child support payments, even though she returned to Carlsbad each year for vacation and allowed her parents and father's parents to see the child. She also testified she never informed father of her trips to Carlsbad. Father testified his parents did not tell him of their visits with the child until several months after they occurred. Father also testified his parents told him in December 1987 that mother had "led them to believe" she would deny them visitation if they told father of her trips to Carlsbad. Mother moved back to Carlsbad in December 1987, and shortly thereafter commenced efforts to collect child support between October 1978 and when she filed the petition in March 1988 for the child support arrearages that had accrued since October 1978. Father testified mother told him she intended to use the child support arrearages to buy a home.

On March 8, 1988, father filed a petition to change custody. On March 25, 1988, mother filed a petition for child support arrearages that had accrued since October 1978. On July 22, 1988, the trial court awarded the parties joint custody of the child and ordered father to pay $100 per month in child support. This order is not at issue in this appeal. On August 11, 1988, the trial court entered an order denying mother's petition for child support arrearages, finding that she waived her right to collect them. It is from this order that wife appeals. We set out other facts as they become relevant to our discussion.

DISCUSSION

Mother challenges some of the trial court's findings of fact as not supported by substantial evidence and claims the trial court should have adopted her requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining whether a trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the finding, and we do not consider any evidence unfavorable to the finding. See Trujillo v. Romero, 82 N.M. 301, 481 P.2d 89 (1971). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the trier of fact. See Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1985). The duty to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in the evidence is for the trial court, not this court. See Dibble v. Garcia, 98 N.M. 21, 644 P.2d 535 (Ct.App.1982). We liberally construe a trial court's findings in determining whether they support the trial court's judgment. See Arnold v. Ford Motor Co., 90 N.M. 549, 566 P.2d 98 (1977). An erroneous finding of fact is not a basis for reversal if it is unnecessary to the trial court's decision. See Newcum v. Lawson, 101 N.M. 448, 684 P.2d 534 (Ct.App.1984). We will affirm a trial court's decision when it reaches the correct result for the wrong reason. See H.T. Coker Constr. Co. v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 85 N.M. 802, 518 P.2d 782 (Ct.App.1974). Where the trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence, it is not error to deny requested findings and conclusions to the contrary. See Wright v. Brem, 81 N.M. 410, 467 P.2d 736 (Ct.App.1970).

The findings mother challenges on appeal that we determine are necessary to support the trial court's decision are findings 8, 10, 11, and 13. See Newcum v. Lawson. Therefore, we do not address the other findings mother challenges on appeal. See id. Moreover, since we decide with some modifications that these findings are supported by the evidence and they support the trial court's decision, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing mother's requested findings and conclusions. See Wright v. Brem.

The trial court's finding number eight states mother had not asked father for child support since October 1978, she did not collect any of the money father deposited in the savings account in Carlsbad for two years, and she did not allow the child to contact father for ten years. Mother challenges the first part of this finding that she had not asked father for child support since October 1978. While admitting she did not ask father for child support from October 1978 until she returned to Carlsbad in December 1987, she claims this finding lacks evidentiary support because of her efforts to collect child support after returning to Carlsbad in December 1987. It is clear from the record and the transcript that this finding was meant to apply between October 1978 and when mother began her efforts to collect child support arrearages after she moved back to Carlsbad in December 1987. Findings are not to be construed with the strictness of special pleadings; in the case of ambiguous findings, an appellate court is bound to indulge in every presumption to sustain the judgment. Ledbetter v. Webb, 103 N.M. 597, 711 P.2d 874 (1985). See also Arnold v. Ford Motor Co.

Mother also challenges the trial court's finding number 10 which states mother told father in October 1978 she would not allow a thirty-day continuous visitation and that she did not want his money or for him to ever see the child again. This finding is undoubtedly based on father's testimony because he was the only one to testify about this conversation. Although the date contained in this finding is not supported by the evidence because father testified this conversation took place shortly before mother moved to Texas in March 1978, the date is not material to the ultimate finding concerning the substance of the conversation. Father's testimony provides substantial evidence to support the material portions of this finding. Findings of fact adopted by the trial court are to be construed so as to uphold rather than defeat the judgment, and, if from the facts found, other necessary facts to support the judgment may reasonably be inferred, the trial court's judgment will not be disturbed. Newcum v. Lawson, 101 N.M. 448, 684 P.2d 534 (Ct.App.1984).

The trial court's finding number 11 states that father made reasonable efforts to find the child and paid $100 into the savings account in Carlsbad for over two years and then stopped. Mother challenges the first part of this finding that father made reasonable efforts to find the child. Mother seems to argue the evidence presented at the hearing would only support a finding that father made no efforts to...