Williams v. Williams, No. 2-08-033-CV (Tex. App. 12/11/2008)

Decision Date11 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 2-08-033-CV.,2-08-033-CV.
PartiesJERRY W. WILLIAMS, JR., Appellant, v. DANIELLE MARIE WILLIAMS, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from the 393rd District Court of Denton County.

Panel: HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

PER CURIAM.

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Jerry W. Williams, Jr. appeals from a divorce decree dissolving his marriage to Appellee Danielle Marie Williams. In four issues, Jerry argues that the trial court erred by mischaracterizing property, incorrectly valuing the marital estates, and improperly dividing the community estate. We will affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The trial court signed a final decree of divorce on January 12, 2006, dissolving Jerry's and Danielle's marriage. The trial court entered findings of fact, which included in part the following findings relevant to the Williams's property at 881 Blackjack Road, referred to as the "ranch property":

[Danielle] and [Jerry] purchased the [ranch property,] on August 7, 1997, and had a note with a final maturity payment due on August 1, 2000.

When the final maturity payment became due in the summer of 2000, [Danielle] and [Jerry] entered into an agreement with [Danielle's] mother Rita Soto Lang and her husband Paul Lang.

The agreement was for Mr. and Mrs. Lang to pay the final maturity payment on the ranch property in August of 2000, and [Danielle] and [Jerry] would then pay Mr. and Mrs. Lang.

The Langs made two payments in August of 2000, one for $50,000.00 on August 8, 2000, and the[n] one for $62,000.00 on August 25, 2000.

[Danielle] and [Jerry] made payments to Mr. And Mrs. Lang.

In 2002, the Langs attempted to have a Promissory Note in the amount of $112,000.00 and secured by the ranch property executed by [Danielle] and [Jerry]. [Danielle] did sign the promissory note on May 6, 2002, however, [Jerry] did not sign.

On April 19, 2004, the Langs executed a document purporting to convey a gift solely to [Danielle] the balance of the property loan of $51,097.24. The same document also purports to acknowledge a gift to [Danielle] on August 8, 2000, for the original $50,000.00 payment made by the Langs.

Because the property was originally purchased as community property and the subsequent loan was a debt of both parties[,] the court finds that any forgiveness of debt benefitted the community estate[,] and [Danielle] has no claim for separate property reimbursement from the community estate.

The court finds that [Danielle] does not have a separate property claim in the [ranch property].

The trial court entered conclusions of law, which included in part the following:

Because the ranch property was originally purchased as community property and the subsequent loan by the Langs was a debt of the community estate, the court concludes as a matter of law that any forgiveness of debt by the Langs benefited the community estate and [Danielle] has no claim for separate property reimbursement from the community estate in regards to the ranch property.

Danielle appealed and challenged the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law providing that she did not have a separate property claim in the ranch property. See Williams v. Williams, No. 02-06-00143-CV, 2007 WL 79698, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 11, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). In our memorandum opinion, we reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to its denial of Danielle's separate property claim based on the $ 50,000 check that the Langs issued on August 8, 2000. Id. at *4-5. However, we reversed the trial court's judgment as to the property division and remanded the case to the trial court to re-divide the parties' community estate because the trial court erred by characterizing the Langs' $51,097.24 gift to Danielle of the remaining balance of the ranch property loan as community property. Id. at *5-7.

On remand, the trial court conducted a "Rehearing on Property Issues," in which it took judicial notice of "everything that was admitted in the previous trial." On October 15, 2007, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce, and it later entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. As part of its property division, the trial court awarded Danielle a $ 101,097.24 separate property interest in the ranch property, finding that she, "by gifts from her mother and stepfather, acquired a $101,097.24 separate property claim against the Ranch Property, donative intent on the part of the Langs having been evidenced over a year before the divorce was even filed." Now Jerry appeals.

III. PROPERTY DIVISION
A. Standard of Review

A trial judge is charged with dividing the community estate in a "just and right" manner, considering the rights of both parties. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (Vernon 2006); Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). The court has broad discretion in making its just and right division, and absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb that division. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981); Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).

Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury's answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury's answer. Oritz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).

In family law cases, however, the traditional sufficiency standard of review overlaps with the abuse of discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Accordingly, to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court's decision, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) did the trial court have sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err in its application of that discretion? Id.; Moroch, 174 S.W.3d at 857. The applicable sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611. We then determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id.

A party who seeks to assert the separate character of property must prove that character by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003(b) (Vernon 2006). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann § 41.001(2) (Vernon 2008); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994). This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979). While the proof must weigh heavier than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence, there is no requirement that the evidence be unequivocal or undisputed. Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570.

In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co., L.P. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004). We must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. This means that we must assume that the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. We must also disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. We must consider, however, undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005); Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170. That is, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 827.

B. Mischaracterization of Community Property

In his first issue, Jerry challenges the trial court's finding that Danielle has a $101,097.24 separate property interest in the ranch property. He seems to contend that Danielle failed to meet her burden of proving the separate property character of the ranch property by clear and convincing evidence.2 Jerry also challenges the characterization of Pflamenco, a horse, as Danielle's separate property.

Property possessed by either spouse at the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. In order to overcome the community property presumption, the burden is on the spouse claiming certain property as separate to trace and...

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