Williams v. Williams, 6623
| Decision Date | 30 September 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 6623,6623 |
| Citation | 344 P.2d 161,86 Ariz. 201 |
| Parties | Mary C. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Beryle W. WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Paul H. Primock, Phoenix, for appellant.
Gibbons, Kinney & Tipton, Phoenix, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment granting a decree of divorce to the appellee husband, on the grounds of cruelty. Appellant bases her appeal upon asserted (1) failure of the trial court to grant support payments to the appellant who was granted custody of the minor child of the parties and (2) lack of corroboration of appellee's testimony concerning the alleged acts of cruelty. The trial court entered judgment granting the appellee an absolute decree of divorce, awarding the appellant the family home, together with the furnishings and fixtures, one of the cars and the sum of $140 per month as alimony.
The trial court in the final decree of divorce granted the custody of the minor child to the appellant, but made no order for the husband, appellee, to support said minor child. Appellant contends that under the provisions of A.R.S. § 25-319(A), when a minor child is awarded to the custody of the mother, the trial court must grant support payments to the mother. There is no merit to this contention.
The statute, § 25-319(A), supra, provides that the trial court may direct the husband to pay to the wife such amounts as are necessary for support and maintenance of the minor children of the parties whose custody is awarded to the wife as may be necessary or proper. The trial court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, divided the community property of the parties, giving to the appellant the family home and furnishings, a car and substantial sum as alimony. It was entirely discretionary with the trial court to determine whether the appellee should be required to pay support payments to his wife for the maintenance of the minor child and under the facts in this case we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
At the trial, appellee testified that for a period of ten to twelve years prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce the appellant would at least once a week make false accusations concerning appellee's conduct with other women; that she would have jealous 'tantrums', become hysterical and that it was Appellee further testified that many of these matters took place in the presence of his son and his son-in-law. These conditions continued until in April, 1956, when the appellee moved from the home and filed this action for divorce. The appellee also testified that the conduct of his wife was such that it made him highly nervous and affected his work.
The only corroboration presented by the appellee was a fellow-employee who testified that he had worked with the appellee for a number of years and that when he first knew him he did not appear to have any worries and was always jolly, but that a year or a year and one-half prior to the divorce he noticed that appellee was upset and seemed to be emotionally disturbed in his work. He also testified that he had been in the home of the parties and noticed no apparent difficulty. There was no testimony corroborating any of the alleged acts of cruelty testified to by the appellee.
Appellee's testimony sustained all the allegations of his complaint, but it is contended by appellant that there was no substantial corroboration sufficient to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-317 (B), which provides that 'Either party may be a witness, but no divorce shall be granted upon the testimony or admissions of a party unless they are corroborated by other evidence.'
We held in Lundy v. Lundy, 23 Ariz. 213, 202 P. 809, that the reason for the rule stated in our statute is to guard against collusion between the parties to the marriage...
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