Williams v. Williams

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WILKIE
• Citation: Williams v. Williams, 44 Wis.2d 651, 171 N.W.2d 902 (Wis. 1969)
• Decision Date: 25 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 117,117
• Parties: Marianna A. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Donald R. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

Page 902

171 N.W.2d 902

44 Wis.2d 651

Marianna A. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Donald R. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

No. 117.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 25, 1969.

The parties to this divorce action were married on May 30, 1941, at Eau Claire, Wisconsin. Three children, all of whom are now of age, were born of this marriage.

Mrs. Williams commenced an action for divorce on October 26, 1967, alleging that her husband had engaged in a course of cruel and inhuman treatment. The husband counterclaimed and nearly a year later, on August 27, 1968, after an extended trial on all issues, the court granted an absolute divorce to the wife, provided for a division of the estate, and also provided for alimony and attorney's fees. The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

'7. That during the time the parties were married the defendant pursued a course of cruel and inhuman treatment toward the plaintiff because of his association with another woman whom he met in July 1967 and with whom he had been keeping company both before and after the separation of the parties which occurred on September 26, 1967, and which became known to the plaintiff after the separation, which conduct has affected her health.

'8. That the proofs of defendant are insufficient to establish ground for divorce as alleged in his counterclaim.

'9. That neither of the parties had any assets at the time of their marriage except their combined salaries and that all of the assets of both parties were acquired since their marriage.

'10. In 1948 the defendant and one Kenneth Fleming incorporated Chippewa Plastics, Inc., at Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.

'11. A jointly owned homestead in Michigan was sold and a $5,000 equity therein was invested in capital of the new company, stock being issued in defendant's name.

'12. In 1951 the defendant desired to purchase the interest of Fleming in Chippewa Plastics, Inc.

'13. About this time plaintiff inherited $30,420 from the estates of her parents, $5,000 of which she invested in Lake Wissota real estate with the defendant subsequently paying off the balance on a land contract on one parcel thereof and $7,000 she invested in a Dover Street homestead after the application of the proceeds of the sale of an equity in another homestead, with defendant paying off balance of purchase price of Dover St. home. Title to the real estate was taken in joint names.

'14. $17,000 of plaintiff's inheritance was used to purchase a portion of the Fleming interest and stock was transferred into her name. (Exhibit No. 7, purporting to be a recapitulation of division of the estates of the parents of plaintiff was withdrawn by consent of counsel after the decision in this matter was rendered because not entirely factual.)

'15. That this purchase of Fleming stock did not contribute to the capital of Chippewa Plastics, Inc.

'16. The purchase of the Fleming interest enabled defendant to control management and the company thereafter prospered under his leadership.

'17. That the success of the company was due to the efforts of the defendant.

'18. That in 1959 Chippewa Plastics, Inc., was merged with Rexall Drug Co.

'19. That at the time of the merger plaintiff held 10,416 shares of the common stock and 80 shares of the preferred stock of Chippewa Plastics, Inc.; all common stock in her name came from the Fleming purchase and all preferred stock in lieu of director's fees. (Plaintiff was a director of the company.)

'20. That at the time of the merger defendant held 15,156 shares of common stock and 500 shares of preferred stock of Chippewa Plastics, Inc. All shares of stock of defendant came from the initial investment of $5,000 (equity Michigan realty), borrowings, a small inheritance of $500, and the balance mainly from his efforts in the business.

'21. In August of 1959 after conversion of Chippewa Plastics, Inc., stock into Rexall stock the defendant's gross estate, excluding life insurance but including joint real estate, was $406,700; that plaintiff's gross estate, excluding life insurance but including joint real estate was $283,400; both estates except life insurance and joint realty were the result of the plastics venture.

'22. That before adopting an estate plan following the merger the parties considered their assets to be jointly owned. A plan was adopted in 1959 and a division of assets made. The plan adopted did not call for jointly held property. At this time a gift of Lake Wissota real estate was made by defendant to plaintiff.

'23. Following the adoption of the estate plan the parties agreed that defendant's assets would be invested in risk type holdings and that plaintiff's assets would be invested in a more secure type of holding.

'24. In 1961 the Dover Street real estate was sold and the proceeds of $23,000 went into the construction of the new home on Lake Wissota real estate at a total cost of $110,000 with furnishings and plaintiff provided the balance of the cost. In addition thereto defendant paid for the erection of a boat house on said property at a cost of $6,000 or $8,000.

'25. That plaintiff retained the earnings from her holdings throughout the marriage.

'26. That defendant paid all income tax of the parties excepting one year.

'27. That defendant paid all of the living expenses of the parties during the marriage.

'28. That defendant paid the real estate taxes on the new home for a year or two.

'29. That the plaintiff's assets are as set forth in Exhibit No. 27 and that her net worth at the time of the trial was $327,196.38.

'30. That the defendant's assets are as set forth in Exhibit No. 28 and that his net worth at the time of the trial was $237,237.84.

'31. That plaintiff's assets do not strictly fall into the category of property derived through her husband under Sec. 247.26 stats., nor do they strictly fall in the category of separate property excepting her inheritance.

'32. That for the purpose of this case I find that the productive assets listed on Exhibit 27 except item 15 therein to be her separate property and not subject to division.

'33. In addition to the defendant's efforts in building a successful business from which the estate of the parties was enhanced and for the most part derived, the defendant made the following contributions to plaintiff's estate:

'(a) His joint interest in the proceeds from the sale of the Dover Street home that went into the Lake Wissota home.

'(b) The conveyance of his joint interest in the lake real estate to her.

'(c) $6,000 or $8,000 for a boat house erected on the lake property.

'(d) $2,000 of the purchase price of the automobile that plaintiff now has.

'(e) A Chris-Craft inboard boat which is one of her assets.

'(f) Payment of most of the income tax burden of the parties throughout the marriage.

'34. Those assets standing in plaintiff's name on Exhibit 27 under the heading 'Property' are awarded plaintiff free and clear of any claim of the defendant.

'35. That the promissory note of defendant listed as item number 15, Exhibit 27, payable to plaintiff was not considered to be an asset of plaintiff on her net worth statement and was in the nature of a gift to defendant and ought not be considered an asset of plaintiff but in any event said note is awarded defendant.

'36. That all of the assets listed on Exhibit 28 are awarded defendant free and clear of any claim of plaintiff.

'37. That each party is to retain his personal effects and belongings.

'38. No other division of property is made.

'39. That defendant earns $24,000 per year salary plus bonus from Winzen Research, Inc., and in addition has $4,000 of other income per annum, making his income at the present time roughly $30,000 per annum.

'40. That at the present standard of living of the parties each requires approximately the sum of $10,500 per annum.

'41. That under the impact of income taxes his income is not sufficient to furnish the amount required for both parties to live in accordance with their past standards.

'42. That the plaintiff has an income from her productive assets of $5,163 per annum at the present dividend rates.

'43. That the sum of $500 per month is a reasonable amount of alimony for the plaintiff considering the income of the defendant and the income of plaintiff from her separate estate.

'44. That both parties are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties but that it is in the child's best interests to have her custody awarded to plaintiff.

'45. That the trusts which have been set up by both parties for the support of said minor child have been sufficient to educate and support her and because of the circumstances here present no support other than the income from the trust set up by the defendant is required.

'46. That both parties should be permitted to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise dispose of real estate awarded in this action free and clear of the interest of the other party, without proceedings under subsections (1) and (2) of Sec. 247.375 stats.

'47. That of the proposed attorney's fees in the sum of $8,500 together with disbursements of $1,428.04, it is reasonable and just that the defendant pay $4,000 attorney's fees and disbursements of $1,000, all in the sum of $5,000 to plaintiff's attorney on or before 30 days from the entry of judgment in this case.

'48. That neither of the parties is now a member of the armed forces of the U.S. of America.

'49. That upon application to the Family Court Commissioner for Chippewa County, Wisconsin, for temporary support during the pendency of this action an order was entered denying temporary support and that other than $500 paid by defendant to plaintiff following the separation of the parties and the payment of a few small bills nothing has been paid by him for support of the plaintiff.

'And I make the following as

'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

'1. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment that the bonds heretofore...