Williamson County v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 32 Ill.App.2d 363,178 N.E.2d 149
• Decision Date: 09 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 61-M-12,61-M-12
• Parties: COUNTY OF WILLIAMSON, State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, an Insurance Corporation, et al., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 149

178 N.E.2d 149

32 Ill.App.2d 363

COUNTY OF WILLIAMSON, State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, an Insurance Corporation, et al., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 61-M-12.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 9, 1961.

Jay B. Stringer, Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Carl D. Sneed, State's Atty., Williamson County, Robert L. Butler, Asst. State's Atty., Public Square, Marion, for appellee.

SCHEINEMAN, Judge.

The Standard Accident Insurance Company, defendant, had issued a policy to plaintiff, Williamson County, in 1956, covering motor vehicles. About a year later, plaintiff's truck was involved in a collision, but when the defendant received notice of it, defendant replied there was no coverage under the policy, because it had been cancelled some months before. Plaintiff brought this suit for declaratory judgment, and obtained a favorable verdict of a jury, upon which judgment was entered, declaring the policy was in effect at the time of the collision.

The policy contained provisions for cancellation by the insured and by the company, of the latter the pertinent parts are as follows:

'This policy may be cancelled by the company by mailing to the named insured at the address shown in this policy written notice stating when not less than ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The time of surrender or the effective date and hour of cancellation stated in the notice shall become the end of the policy period. * * * Payment or tender of unearned premium is not a condition of cancellation.'

The address of the insured stated on the policy was: 'Williamson County Highway Department, Marion, Williamson, Illinois.' This is not disputed. An employee of the defendant stated she had prepared the notice of cancellation, dated February 11, 1957, giving notice the policy was cancelled as of February 22, 1957, at 12:01 a. m. Standard Time. She addressed it to the address shown on the policy and delivered the envelope to another employee. He testified to receiving the letter and that he delivered it to the post office in Chicago, affixed the required postage and received a receipt from the clerk with the official post office stamp. The receipt was produced and admitted in evidence.

This testimony is not contradicted. Testimony for the plaintiff was that insured's correct address is: 'Williamson County Highway Department, Williamson County, Marion, Illinois,' rather than as shown on the policy. The highway Commissioner testified he did not receive the notice, and knew nothing of the cancellation until he gave notice of loss. This is all there is pertaining to the alleged cancellation.

There has been a great deal of litigation over insurance cancellations. A comprehensive annotation on the subject appears in 64 A.L.R.2d 982. There are several types of cancellation clauses, the type involved here is discussed beginning on page 1000. The rule supported by the great weight of authority is that the express terms of the contract make the notice of cancellation sufficient when deposited, and that the provision of the policy being unambiguous, must be enforced by the courts as written. Many of the decisions state that the parties have by their contract, in effect, constituted the government in its business of operating the mails, the agent of the insured for the purpose of receiving the notice of cancellation.

In Boyle v. Inter Insurance Exchange, 335 Ill.App. 386, 82...