Williamson v. Beardsley

• Decision Date: 15 April 1905
• Docket Number: 1,998,1,999.
• Citation: 137 F. 467
• Parties: WILLIAMSON et al. v. BEARDSLEY. SAME v. SCHOPPE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

137 F. 467

WILLIAMSON et al. v. BEARDSLEY.

SAME v. SCHOPPE.

Nos. 1,998, 1,999.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 15, 1905

Williamson and others sued Prudence Beardsley and Mary A. Schoppe to set aside and cancel certain orders of sale of the district court of Salt Lake county, Utah, probate division, and executor's deeds which were executed and delivered pursuant to sales made under such orders. The property involved consisted of two tracts of land in Salt Lake City formerly owned by Jonathan N. Williamson, who died testate and whose will was probated in 1883. The complainants, now appellants, claimed under express devises of the will; the defendants claimed as purchasers and grantees of the executor. The administration of the estate of the testator was firs begun in the probate court of Salt Lake county whilst Utah was a territory, but upon its admission as a state, and in accordance with a constitutional provision jurisdiction thereof devolved upon the district court of the same county. In the bills of complaint it was averred that various defects existed in the proceedings of the local court, all of which were apparent upon its records; that the acts of the executor were fraudulent as to the complainants and that they did not discover such fraud or defects until shortly before the suits were instituted. The defendants demurred to the bills of complaint, the demurrers were sustained by the Circuit Court, and decrees were rendered accordingly. The complainants prosecuted these appeals.

Richard B. Shepard and Harrison O. Shepard, for appellants.

Benner X. Smith (Frank B. Stephens and Charles C. Dey, on the brief), for appellees.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and LOCHREN, District Judge.

HOOK Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The purpose of the suits was the annulment of the orders of sale of the state court and the deeds of the executor. The suit against Prudence Beardsley was instituted in the court below on March 25, 1902, more than four years and nine months after the sale and the delivery to her of the deed from the executor. The suit against Mary A. Schoppe was instituted March 26, 1902, more than five years after the sale and the delivery to her of the executor's deed.

Among the grounds specified in the demurrers to the bills of complaint were the bar of the statute of limitations and the laches of the appellants.

A statute of Utah provides as follows:

'No action for the recovery of any estate sold by an executor or administrator in the course of any probate proceeding, can be maintained by any heir or other person claiming under the decedent, unless it be commenced within three years next after such sale. An action to set aside the sale may be instituted and maintained at any time within three years from the discovery of the fraud or other lawful grounds upon which the action is based. ' Comp. Laws 1888, Sec. 4193; Rev. St. 1898, Sec. 2870.

To escape the bar of the statute, or rather to evade the application of the equitable doctrine of laches, the appellants averred in their bills of complaint that the executor acted fraudulently, and also that they had no notice or knowledge of the orders of the state court or of the fraudulent acts of the executor resulting in the sale and conveyance of the property until within a few months of the institution of their suits. They now contend that those averments made their bills of complaint secure from the attack of the demurrers.

There was, however, an entire absence of averment of substantive facts justifying the charge of fraud; and in such a case the mere use, by the pleader, of the terms 'fraudulent' and 'fraudulently' signifies nothing. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U.S. 577, 10 Sup.Ct. 390, 33 L.Ed. 683; Moore v. Greene, 19 How. 69, 72, 15 L.Ed. 533; Moss v. Riddle, 5 Cranch, 351, 3 L.Ed. 123. Viewing the bills of complaint in the aspect most favorable to the appellants, it does not appear that the executor acted otherwise than in the utmost good faith. A misconception of power or authority, unaccompanied by corrupt or improper motive, is not fraud. When the executor applied for the orders of sale of the property he stated the condition of the estate and his previous conduct of its affairs truthfully and in most commendable detail. Everything that he did was reported to and met with the judicial sanction of the state court in which the estate was being administered; and upon the showing which he made-- and it is not claimed that it was false in fact-- the court ordered the property to be sold. The sales were made, reported to, and confirmed by the court, and the deeds were duly executed. It it were true that the sales were irregular or even void, it does not follow that the executor was guilty of fraud.

The appellants also contend that the statute of limitations had not run, and that they are not subject to the charge of laches because they did not until recently discover the existence of the proceedings of the state court and the alleged defects therein upon which they rely to defeat the orders of sale and the deeds. It appears from the averments of the bills of complaint that they knew of the will of the testator, its provisions, and the granting of the letters testamentary in 1883. They therefore knew that administration upon the estate had begun and was in course. They were charged with knowledge that their title to the property devised to them might in certain contingencies be devested under the authority of a statute of Utah, which provided.

'In a specific devise or legacy the title passes by the will, but possession can only be obtained from the personal representative; and he may be authorized by the court to sell the property devised and bequeathed in the cases herein provided. ' Rev. St. 1898, Sec. 2810.

The proceeding of administration was in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and in a sense the appellants were parties thereto. Everything they now complain of appeared upon the public records. There was no fraud, no deception, no concealment, nor were the matters of which complaint is made of such a character that they would ordinarily remain secret. Under these circumstances it is a misapplication of terms to say that the grounds of action were discovered years after they arose and appeared upon the records of the court. Discovery as employed in a statute or equitable rule of limitations and knowledge are not convertible terms, nor does the former mean the result of a resort at leisure to known sources of information. The possession of the means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge itself. A party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts of which he complains cannot avail himself of his inactivity, and thus escape the imputation of laches. The grounds of attack against the validity of the orders of sale and the executor's deeds were matters of record. They had notice of the pendency of the administration proceedings sufficient to excite their attention and to put them on guard as to the course thereof. Under these circumstances they must be deemed to have had actual knowledge of what the records showed. The Lady Washington Col. Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45 P. 809; Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. 402, 38 P. 51; Moore v. Boyd, 74...