Williamson v. Casey

Decision Date31 July 1974
Docket NumberNo. 2--56333,2--56333
Citation220 N.W.2d 638
PartiesFaye WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. Sarah Ann CASEY et al., Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Robert Kohorst, of Louis, Moore & Kohorst, Harlan, for appellant.

James A. Pratt, of Porter, Heithoff, Pratt & Reilly, Council Bluffs, and James W. Knowles, Omaha, Neb., for appellees.

Submitted to MOORE, C.J., and LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.

McCORMICK, Justice.

We granted plaintiff interlocutory appeal of trial court's order sustaining defendants' motion to set aside a default judgment. We reverse the trial court because we find no basis in the record for the judgment to be set aside. We remand the case for determination of damages.

Plaintiff Faye Williamson commenced a tort action for personal injury damages against defendants Sarah Ann Casey, Thomas C. Casey, and John P. Casey under the provisions of the nonresident motorist statute, §§ 321.498--321.512, The Code. The action arose from a motor vehicle collision which occurred on interstate 80 in Cass County on December 21, 1970. Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by Marian Euvon Peterson which was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defendant Sarah Ann Casey and owned by defendants Thomas C. Casey and John P. Casey.

Plaintiff was a resident of Shelby County and defendants resided in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The suit was brought in Shelby County. An original notice of suit was filed with the commissioner of public safety on December 15, 1972. Notification of the filing was mailed within ten days thereafter by restricted certified mail to each defendant. See §§ 321.501, 321.502, The Code. Separately, notification was personally served in Colorado on each defendant. See § 321.504, The Code. The original notice and notification were in statutory form. Proof of service was duly filed. See § 321.505, The Code.

Defendants failed to appear in the action by noon of the sixtieth day following service of the original notice on the commissioner. See § 321.500, The Code. On February 14, 1973, the sixty-first day, plaintiff obtained a default judgment against them. The order recited that 'defendants and each of them are in default and their default is hereby entered herein and * * * judgment is hereby entered against the defendants and each of them for such amount as the court shall determine upon hearing thereon, and for the costs of this action.'

On February 15, 1973, defendants filed appearances. On February 21, 1973, they filed a motion to set aside the judgment under rule 236, Rules of Civil Procedure. They alleged 'the default occurred because of inadvertence, mistake, excusable neglect and unavoidable casualty in that there was confusion between the date notices were filed with the Commissioner of Public Safety * * * and the date these defendants received actual notice of these proceedings.' They asserted they had a good defense to the action as shown in an answer contemporaneously filed. The motion was not accompanied by affidavit.

It came on for hearing. No evidence was introduced. No record of argument was made. On April 5, 1973, the court entered an order reciting submission of the motion upon oral argument March 26, 1973, finding the motion should be sustained, and setting aside the default judgment.

Rule 236, R.C.P., provides in relevant part that, 'On motion and for good cause shown, * * * but not ex parte, the court may set aside a default or the judgment thereon, for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.'

A proceeding under rule 236 is at law. A trial court has wide discretion in making its ruling. The burden is on the movant to plead and prove good cause to set aside the default or judgment thereon. Good cause is shown only if one of the grounds in the rule is proved. We are bound by trial court findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. Hansman v. Gute, 215 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1974). We view the evidence in its light most favorable to the court's ruling. Even where, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact, or as in In re Estate of Staab, 192 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971), bases its ruling on a different ground, we will uphold the ruling of any proper ground appears in the record.

Our task in each case is to decide, viewing the evidence in its light most favorable to the ruling, whether a rule 236 ground exists in the record to support the exercise of trial court discretion in ruling as it did.

A trial court abuses its discretion if it sets aside a default judgment under rule 236 without some proper basis in the record. In re Estate of Staab, supra, at 808; Insurance Co. of No. Amer. v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 168 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Iowa 1969). Where a factual basis is relied on and is not admitted by the adversary, the movant must offer evidence in support of his motion. It is his obligation to make an adequate record.

Evidence to sustain (or resist) the motion may be by affidavit or in any other form to which the parties agree or the court directs. Rule 116, R.C.P. The evidence must be competent and substantial. Insurance Co. of No. Amer. v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., supra, at 757.

In the present case plaintiff contends trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because good cause for doing so was not shown. We...

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16 cases
  • Flexsteel Industries, Inc. v. Morbern Industries Ltd.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1976
    ...of Staab, 192 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971); and Dealers Warehouse Co. v. Wahl & Associates, 216 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1974). In Williamson v. Casey, 220 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1974), this court reiterated the well settled rules of review in this type of 'A proceeding under rule 236 is at law. A trial c......
  • Campbell, Matter of
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1977
    ...rulings is wholly inadequate for such a purpose. We so held in reversing an order setting aside a default judgment in Williamson v. Casey, 220 N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1974). We held the movant had an obligation to make a record adequate to establish a ground for the relief sought. When such a reco......
  • Snyder v. Allamakee County
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 18, 1987
    ...district court abused its discretion in denying the motion. See Whitehorn v. Lovik, 398 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Iowa 1987); Williamson v. Casey, 220 N.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Iowa 1974). Berns, however, appealed neither ruling. Rather, thirty-seven days later, after the appeal time had expired, Berns fi......
  • Oberreuter v. Orion Industries, Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • October 22, 1986
    ...1984). The trial court decision will be upheld if any proper ground appears in the record. Blair, 347 N.W.2d at 420; Williamson v. Casey, 220 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1974). II. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict dismissing Mid-State at the close of evidenc......
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