Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, Va.

Decision Date13 March 1992
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 90-1861-N.
Citation786 F. Supp. 1238
PartiesDorothy J. WILLIAMSON, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert Jay Williamson, deceased, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation, and Charles R. Wall, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and M. Collins, Sgt. J.C. Moyers, Det. R.W. Pickens, and Det. B.B. Batten, individually and in their official capacities as police officers for the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew M. Sacks, Michael F. Imprevento, Sacks & Sacks, Norfolk, Va., for plaintiff.

Richard J. Beaver, L. Steven Emmert, Office of the City Atty., Virginia Beach, Va., for defendants.

OPINION

PRINCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Nature and Procedural Posture of Case

The plaintiff, Dorothy J. Williamson, brings this action both in her individual capacity and as the administratrix of her deceased minor son's estate. In the Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") she seeks damages on her own behalf and, through the estate, on behalf of her son and his statutory beneficiaries. The defendants are the City of Virginia Beach, its chief of police in his official capacity, and four police officers in their individual and official capacities. The complaint alleges federal causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of decedent's constitutional rights causing his death, and the violation of her own constitutional rights. The Complaint also alleges a pendant state law claim. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge.

Extensive discovery has been conducted and filed, including depositions of all of the parties, of other fact witnesses and of expert witnesses. All defendants have moved for summary judgment, and affidavits in support of and in opposition to the motion have been filed. The motion is now ready for decision.

Issues Presented

The Complaint contains five counts:

Count I, against the four police officers ("Officers"), alleges violations of decedent's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the Officers recruited the decedent, Robert Jay Williamson ("Robbie"), a seventeen year old male, for the purpose of using him "as an informant, cooperating witness, and undercover operative" for vice and narcotics investigations and, in doing so without obtaining parental permission or investigating his background, acted with deliberate indifference or reckless or callous disregard to his rights, resulting in Robbie's suicide. Those actions, it is alleged, were in violation of the duty owed to Robbie because of the special relationship between him and the State.1

Plaintiff further claims that, independent of any special relationship, the Officers' conduct violated Robbie's constitutional right to "the child-parent relationship", which includes the right to care and guidance from his mother in making important decisions. Alternatively, plaintiff alleges that the Officers deprived Robbie of his constitutional right "to be free from violations of his physical and emotional integrity, his right to bodily security and integrity, his right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security, and his right to personal privacy".

Count II, against the City ("City") and the chief of police ("Chief") in his official capacity, alleges that the Chief and the City established a policy of condoning the unconstitutional use of juveniles as informants in violation of the constitutional rights of the decedent. Count III, also against the municipal defendants, alleges that the unconstitutional conduct of the Officers was undertaken pursuant to a known de facto policy of City and Chief of failure to train police officers with regard to the proper limits of their authority to use juvenile informants.

Count IV alleges that the defendants' conduct violated the constitutional rights of decedent's mother, including her right to be free from the deprivation of the parent-child relationship by the death of decedent, and her right to the care, custody and management of decedent's affairs, including the right to consent or not to the use of decedent as an undercover agent of the police department. Finally, Count V alleges a state law claim under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act.2

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts, and assert the defense of qualified immunity to the 1983 claims. The defendant also asserts immunity and various state law defenses to Count V of the Complaint.

Factual Allegations

Robert Jay Williamson ("Robbie"), a 17-year-old male, lived in Virginia Beach with his mother, Dorothy J. Williamson, his 25-year-old half-brother, Steve Brannon, and his younger brother, David, who was 12 or 13 years old when the events recounted here occurred. Robbie called the Virginia Beach Police Department by telephone on Saturday, November 5, 1988, at 6:45 p.m. His call was put through to the Uniform Division Vice Unit ("vice unit"). Defendant Ronald Pickens ("Pickens"), a member of the vice unit, answered. Robbie told Pickens that he had information about drugs at a certain location in the City, which he identified, and that he wanted to give the information to the police. In response to Pickens' questions, Robbie stated his name and age. The conversation ended shortly thereafter. (Plaintiff's Supplemental Appendix PSA, Pickens deposition at Bates # 000014 hereinafter "Pick. 14".).

The following night, Sunday, November 6th, Pickens and his partner, Defendant Bobby Batten, Jr. ("Batten"), went to Robbie's home and talked to him for several minutes outside. Pickens told Robbie that Pickens would have to talk to Robbie's mother to get permission for Robbie to give them information. Robbie stated that his mother was sick and was sleeping. They talked "a couple more minutes about what type information he could give" before Pickens told Robbie that he would call his mother the following day between 3 and 3:30 p.m. Pickens and Batten both gave their business cards to Robbie and left "because there was nothing I could do at that point." (Pick. 15-16.)

Batten's account of the events of Sunday, November 6th, was essentially the same. Batten added that before they went to the Williamson home, Pickens had recounted for him Robbie's call of the night before. Batten said that Pickens told him that Robbie "wanted to work with the police to assist us as far as some narcotics activity—drug activity—to assist us with some drug activity in the area that Robbie lived in." (PSA, Batten deposition hereinafter "Bat." at Bates # 000089.)3

The next day, Monday, November 7th, at 3:20 p.m., Pickens states that he called the Williamson home, asked to speak to Robbie, and then told him that he was calling to speak to his mother. A "lady" came to the telephone and identified herself as Mrs. Williamson. Pickens identified himself to the woman, who, according to Pickens, said she was Mrs. Williamson and gave her permission for Robbie to work with the police. (Pick. 18, 12). Mrs. Williamson denied that Pickens called her home and spoke to her. (PAS, Williamson deposition hereinafter "Wmnson." at Bates # 000419).

After the telephone conversation with the woman who claimed to be Ms. Williamson, Pickens reported to his supervisor, Defendant Sgt. J.C. Moyers ("Sgt. Moyers" or "Moyers"), what had transpired the day before. Sgt. Moyers told him that parental consent was needed and Pickens informed Moyers that he had already spoken to Mrs. Williamson. (Pick. 18.) Pickens then started "my background check ... running Robbie's criminal history." About that time, Pickens "ran into Detective Douglas Williams," who told Pickens that he had in the past arrested Robbie for robbery. Pickens said that Williams also said that he had used Robbie as an informant with the consent of Mrs. Williamson. (Pick. 18.) Williams confirmed that he spoke to Pickens about Robbie, but he does not recall if it was before or after Robbie's death. (PAS, Williams deposition "Wms." at Bates # 000408-9.) No part of Williams' deposition included in the appendix refers to Williams' use of Robbie as an informant with or without the consent of his mother.

The next disclosed contact between Robbie and the police occurred four days later, during the late evening, on Friday, November 11th. Defendant Michael Collins ("Collins"), a member of the vice unit, was working with Sgt. Moyers that evening. He received a message through his pager of a call. When he returned the call, a male told him that he had information "about some narcotics activity that was taking place over in the Holland Road area." The caller said he was at a Burger King on Holland Road.

Collins and Moyers went to the Burger King. They did not know who they were looking for, but when they drove around the Burger King lot, they spotted a person whom they suspected had made the call. That person, who was Robbie, acknowledged that he had called. Robbie then got into the police car and told Collins and Moyers "extensively" about the details of a drug deal that was about to occur. (PAS, Collins "Col." deposition at Bates # 000144-5.) Moyers said that Robbie "described it very much in detail as to who was going where and what they were going to pick up and what they were going to do when they left there." (PAS, Moyers deposition "Moy." at # 000212.) Robbie was going to be involved in the activities that he described. (Moy. 213.) During the discussion, "it became apparent" to Moyers that this was the juvenile whom Pickens had talked to him about. (Moy. 212.)

At this point in the telling of events, the accounts of defendants Collins and Moyers differ from those of defendants Pickens and Batten. Collins said that when they realized...

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