Williamson v. Hampton Management Company, 72 C 630.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72 C 630.,72 C 630.
• Citation: Williamson v. Hampton Management Company, 339 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
• Parties: Valerie WILLIAMSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. HAMPTON MANAGEMENT COMPANY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

339 F. Supp. 1146

Valerie WILLIAMSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. HAMPTON MANAGEMENT COMPANY et al., Defendants.

No. 72 C 630.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

March 27, 1972.

F. Willis Caruso, Ronald S. Samuels, James M. Rosenbaum, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Harry A. Bahrmasel, David H. Brill, Charles D. Connor, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

TONE, District Judge.

This action under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1982) raises the issue of whether defendants refused to lease or consent to the sublease of an apartment to two of the plaintiffs because of race. After commencement of the hearing on plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction, that hearing and the trial on the merits were consolidated pursuant to Rule 65(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Bonita Nichols, who is white, was the lessee of the subject apartment from defendant Hampton Management Company under a lease that was not to expire until August 31, 1972. When the young woman with whom she shared the apartment moved out because of marriage plans, plaintiff Nichols decided to sublease the apartment. Because the lease required the lessor's consent to a sublease, she reported her decision to Hampton Management's agents in the office of the building, who were defendants Jewel Valerio, desk clerk, and Nora Sudol, assistant manager. Defendant Valerio, in the presence of defendant Sudol, told plaintiff Nichols that a sublease rather than a new lease would have to be executed and that it was the lessee's responsibility to find a sublessee. She also said that plaintiff Nichols should advertise the apartment, find as many applicants as possible, have them fill out applications on forms which were handed to plaintiff Nichols and then bring the completed applications back to the office of the building, where the building agents and plaintiff Nichols would jointly make a selection from those who had applied. The application form stated that it was to be accompanied by a security deposit for one month's rent.

A series of newspaper advertisements placed by plaintiff Nichols in late February, 1972, brought several responses, one from a single man named Daryl Harris, who was soon to be married, one from a married couple, and one from plaintiff Valerie Williamson on behalf of herself and plaintiff Joyce Tucker, both single women and both black. All filled out application forms, but plaintiffs Williamson and Tucker were the only applicants to tender a security deposit check with their application. The married couple lost interest early. Harris, after several telephone calls to him by both plaintiff Nichols and defendant Valerio in an effort to ascertain whether he wanted the apartment, finally, on March 3, gave a negative answer to plaintiff Nichols. She immediately reported this development to plaintiff Williamson and then called defendant Valerio and told her of Harris' refusal and her report of that fact to defendant Williamson and said plaintiffs would be over that evening to sign the papers. Thereupon defendant Valerio stated that the apartment was rented to someone else, who would move in April 1. Since plaintiff Nichols wanted someone to take over her apartment immediately, she protested, and this litigation ensued. The persons to whom defendants say the apartment has been rented are existing tenants of the building who had been scheduled to move on May 1 into another apartment similar to the one in issue.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1982) provides that all citizens have "the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to ... lease ... real property." The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)) makes it unlawful "To refuse to ... rent after the making of a bona fide offer, ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin." Race need not be the sole reason for the decision to refuse if it is an element in that decision. Smith v. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-350 (7th Cir. 1971). Finally, a white plaintiff upon whom a discrimination against black persons has an impact may bring an action under the statute. Walker v. Pointer, 304 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Tex.1969).

Plaintiffs Williamson and Tucker made a bona fide offer. Plaintiffs contend that the refusal to accept it was because of race. Defendants contend that the refusal was because Hampton Management has a policy against renting to two single women and also because the incomes of the plaintiff applicants were inadequate to enable them to afford the $265 monthly rent. I find for the plaintiffs.

The conduct of defendants is inconsistent with their present assertion that their refusal was based on a policy against renting to two single women. Defendants rely upon a memorandum in Hampton Management's file dated October 5, 1971, written by a representative of Hampton Management's New York office, which states:

"Please be advised that at no time in the future are we to rent to two girls living in one apartment or two men together or to anybody on welfare.

"Such renting reduces the credibility of the building."

Defendants Sudol and Valerio gave a reason different from "credibility of the building," whatever that may mean, for the policy as to two single women. They testified that the reason for the policy is the likelihood that one of the women will marry and the other will not want to stay in the apartment alone, with resulting inconvenience to the lessor. I assume a lessor could lawfully adopt and enforce such a policy, if it is enforced without regard to race. But...