Williamson v. Lacy

• Decision Date: 07 December 1893
• Citation: 29 A. 943,86 Me. 80
• Parties: WILLIAMSON v. LACY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

29 A. 943

86 Me. 80

WILLIAMSON

v. LACY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 7, 1893.

Report from supreme judicial court, Lincoln county.

Action by Isaac G. Williamson against Andrew Lacy. Heard on report Judgment of nonsuit.

This was an action of trespass against the defendant, a trial justice for the county of Lincoln, on the ground that the plaintiff, who was a spectator at a trial before the justice, was, with other spectators, ordered from the court room, and finally removed by an officer, under the direction of the court, but without the use of force.

Plea, general issue, and a brief statement of special matter of defense that said defendant, deeming it wise, in the interests of justice and the proper and orderly conduct of the trial, that all spectators should be excluded from the trial, and the same be conducted in the presence of the parties and witnesses only, requested said plaintiff to depart from said room, which the plaintiff wholly refused to do, but continued therein in contempt of the defendant, as trial justice aforesaid, and to the disturbance and violation of good order and decency in the administration of justice, and to the great hindrance thereof; and thereupon said defendant, as trial justice aforesaid, requested an officer of said court to remove said plaintiff from said room, and said officer thereupon gently laid his hands upon the plaintiff, and led him therefrom, using no more force in so doing than was necessary, proper, and legal.

W. E. Hogan, for plaintiff. Baker, Baker & Cornish, for defendant.

PETERS, C. J. It is an undeniable proposition to start with in this discussion that courts of justice should be open to the public. That is the rule. History brings to us too vivid pictures of the oppressions endured by our English ancestors at the hands of arbitrary courts ever to satisfy the people of this country with courts whose doors are closed against them. They instinctively believe that it is their right to witness judicial trials and proceedings in the courts.

It is true that courts have discretionary powers to be exercised in such a matter, but not an unlimited discretion. The almost boundless authority exercised by the court of star chamber in England was the seed of its own destruction, and was its historical infamy. Its lessons are not lost on the courts of to-day. We never knew of any court of general jurisdiction in this state conducting a strictly private criminal trial, nor, before this, of such a trial before a common magistrate. The defendant testifies that he never before held a private court during his 18 years' experience as a magistrate.

Mr. Cooley, in his book on Constitutional Limitations (page 312), remarks on the general subject as follows: "It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant that every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal trials, because there are many cases where, from the character of the charge and the nature of the evidence by which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on the part of portions of the community would be of the worst character, and where a regard to public morals and public decency would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial must necessarily bring to light The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with, and not unjustly condemned; and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly met with if, without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence could be of no service to the accused, and who would be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether."

We cannot doubt that it was an unwise exercise of discretion for the defendant to expel forcibly from his court room on the occasion in question all persons but the parties and witnesses. The accused persons had no witnesses, and they were left without the presence of friends. There was room enough for all the spectators to be seated without the discomfort of any one. There was no inclination on the part of any one to create a disturbance, nor was any such state of things apprehended. The magistrate testifies that his order was not based on any such ground,...