Williamson v. Matthews
Decision Date | 25 January 1980 |
Citation | 379 So.2d 1245 |
Parties | Carolyn Ann WILLIAMSON, etc. et al. v. Bobby C. MATTHEWS et al. 78-267. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Virgil M. Smith, Gadsden, for appellants.
George P. Ford of Dortch, Wright, Ford & Russell, Gadsden, for appellee Family Sav. Federal Credit Union.
William H. Rhea, III of Rhea, Boyd & Rhea, Gadsden, for appellees Bobby C. Matthews and Vicki D. Matthews.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant Williamson injunctive relief seeking to cancel a deed and to set aside a sale of property from Williamson to the Matthews. We reverse and remand.
The Matthews learned from members of their family that Williamson wanted to sell her home. Her mortgage was in default, and the mortgagee was threatening foreclosure. There was some evidence to the effect that Williamson wanted to get enough equity to help her finance a mobile home. When they went to Williamson's house to inquire about it, Williamson showed the Matthews through the house. Bobby Matthews asked Williamson how much she wanted for it. Williamson told the Matthews to come back the next day. It is at this point that the parties are in disagreement. The Matthews contend that Williamson offered to sell her equity for $1,700, and Williamson contends that she offered to sell her equity for $17,000, and that the Matthews agreed to pay off the mortgage. It is undisputed that on September 27, 1978, the parties went to attorney Arthur J. Cook's office to execute a contract for the sale of the property. The contract of sale stated the purchase price to be $1,800 ($100 increase reflecting an agreement between the parties concerning some of the furniture in the home) plus the unpaid balance of the mortgage. Attorney Cook testified that he read the terms of the sale to both parties.
The parties then met on October 10, 1978, at attorney Larry Keener's office to sign the deed and to close a loan from appellee Family Savings Federal Credit Union to the Matthews so that the Matthews could buy the property from Williamson. Appellee The Brooklyn Savings Bank was about to foreclose the mortgage on Williamson's property. Keener disbursed part of the loan proceeds to Williamson. Williamson signed the deed to the property.
This Court was advised at oral argument that further disbursement of funds has been held up pending final disposition of this appeal.
Immediately after the sale, Williamson became concerned that she had not received her full consideration and consulted an attorney.
Two days later, on October 12, 1978, Williamson filed a petition for injunctive relief alleging inadequate consideration and mental weakness. The trial court granted Williamson a temporary restraining order preventing the sale from being completed, but at a full hearing on the petition for injunctive relief, the court denied Williamson the relief she requested. Williamson moved for and was granted a rehearing and further testimony was taken on the issue of Williamson's alleged mental weakness. Following the rehearing, the court issued a final order, again denying Williamson injunctive relief. This appeal followed.
Williamson's contention of inadequacy of consideration is based upon evidence which she introduced at trial showing a property appraisal of $16,500. Using this figure and deducting the existing mortgage of approximately $6,500, Williamson's equity would amount to $10,000, $8,300 more than the $1,700 she was paid. Williamson contends that she was due $17,000 for her equity, which would result in the property being valued at.$23,500 (adding the mortgage of $6,500). In other words, accepting Williamson's first contention, the Matthews should have paid her $8,300 more ; accepting the second contention, Williamson should receive $15,300 more. There was also evidence that the credit union appraised the property for $19,500. This would reflect an equity of $13,000. Accepting this figure she should have been paid $11,300 more. Thus, the claim of inadequacy of consideration (and it would seem to be well established) varied from $8,300 to $15,300.
Although it is a fundamental principle of law that inadequacy of consideration is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to set aside a contract for the sale of land, in Judge v. Wilkins, 19 Ala. 765, 772 (1851), over 128 years ago, this Court stated that:
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