Williamson v. Parker
| Decision Date | 08 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-13-899-D |
| Parties | ROBERT WILLIAMSON, Petitioner, v. DAVID PARKER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Petitioner Robert Williamson was tried and convicted by jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma on three counts of lewd molestation of his stepdaughter. After an unsuccessful appeal before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Williamson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). On February 12, 2015, Judge Mitchell issued her Report and Recommendation (R&R) [Doc. No. 23], which recommended that the Court deny habeas relief.
Before the Court is Williamson's objection to the R&R.1 Specifically, he objects to the R&R on the following grounds: (1) 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2414, which allows introduction of propensity evidence, created fundamental unfairness at trial;(2) improper admission of propensity evidence; (3) the Magistrate Judge failed to properly review certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) insufficient evidence.
As stated more fully below, the Court, exercising de novo review, overrules Williamson's objections and adopts the R&R in its entirety.
In order to obtain § 2254 habeas relief with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, a petitioner must show the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was either (1) contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, (2) involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (3) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in previous Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court precedent, butunreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Id. "Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and the burden is upon the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief." Beeler v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1964) (citation omitted).
In reviewing Williamson's objection, the Court must make a de novo determination of any portion of the R&R to which a specific objection is made, and may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision in whole or in part.2 Because Williamson appears pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, cannot take on the responsibility of serving as Williamson's attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the Court will not supply additional factual allegations to round out Williamson's petition or construct a legal theory on his behalf. Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
Williamson's objection largely focuses on the admission of propensity evidence at his trial. Williamson first challenges the constitutionality of 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2414(A),4 which is patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 414, and states: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." Id. At trial, the State introduced propensity evidence that Williamson had once engaged in lewd acts with his biological daughter, T.W., who testified that although she was mature enough to bathe herself, Williamson continued to bathe her to the point it made her feel uncomfortable. T.W. also testified Williamson would give her open mouth kisses and lick her face and neck. T.W. stated Williamson's actions made her feel "weirded out" and that such contact was not normal. To this end, Williamson contends that (1) § 2414 creates an "uneven playing field" and is facially unconstitutional; (2) an underlying offense was not established so as to constitute propensity evidence; (3) the admitted propensity evidence was irrelevant; (4) thetrial court failed to properly determine the admissibility of the evidence; and (5) the jury was improperly instructed regarding propensity evidence.
Williamson's objections on this issue raise only state law questions, which are generally outside the province of a federal habeas court. See Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2001). Williamson must show that the prejudice flowing from the admission of propensity evidence was so great as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights by rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) () (internal quotations and citations omitted); Warner v. Workman, 814 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1223 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (same).
In light of this standard, the Court finds Williamson's objections should be overruled. First, § 2414 has been deemed facially constitutional by the Tenth Circuit. See James v. Martin, 567 F. App'x 594, 597 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); compare United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1998) (). Moreover, the Supreme Court has not issued a decision that calls into question the constitutionality of § 2414 and "[t]he absence of clearly established federal law is dispositive under § 2254(d)(1)." Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d817, 825 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 2008)). On this issue, Williamson has failed to state any grounds that would support the requested habeas relief.
Second, the Magistrate Judge did not find the trial court failed to identify an underlying offense; she merely noted that the trial court "did not specifically state that Petitioner's act of open-mouth kissing T.W. constituted a crime[.]" R&R at 20 n. 18. Indeed, the Magistrate Judge noted such act did constitute a crime that justified the admission of propensity evidence. Id. (citing 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1123). Williamson's other arguments in support of this contention go to the constitutionality of § 2414, which the Court has addressed. This contention is overruled.
Williamson's contention that the propensity evidence "overwhelmingly tainted" his trial finds no support in the record. First, Williamson's argument in support of this proposition is generally a continuation of this argument regarding the constitutionality of propensity statutes. Accordingly, the Court overrules such objection on its face. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as 2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (). Nevertheless, the only lewd act T.W. described was Williamson kissing her with an open mouth and using histongue. The trial court instructed the jury that they could consider such testimony for its tendency, if any, to show Williamson's predisposition or inclination to engage in acts of child molestation. The trial court cautioned the jury that it could not convict Williamson solely on the basis that they believed he committed the other offenses. The fact that such evidence may be prejudicial to Williamson does not render it inadmissible unless it is unfairly prejudicial or otherwise objectionable, and the record does not reflect the evidence in this case was "so prejudicial in the context of the proceedings as a whole that [the defendant] was deprived of the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of due process." United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Williamson next contends the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before the propensity evidence was admitted. Under Oklahoma law, "propensity evidence must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and is subject to the balancing test for all relevant evidence-whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Johnson v. State, 2010 OK CR 28, ¶ 6, 250 P.3d 901, 903 (citing Horn v. State, 2009 OK CR 7, ¶ 40, 204 P.3d 777, 786).5 At the outset, the Court overrules Williamson's objection as he has notshown that any prejudice flowing from the evidentiary ruling was so great as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights by rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the record belies Williamson's claim. The OCCA determined that "[t]he district court substantially complied with the requirements for the admission of propensity evidence set forth in [Horn], and ... the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the propensity evidence in this case under [§ 2414]." The Court, likewise, sees no abuse of discretion. The trial court heard extensive pre-trial arguments regarding the...
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