Williamson v. Steele
| Decision Date | 09 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-1548 CAS,4:12-CV-1548 CAS |
| Parties | LAMONT WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff, v. TROY STEELE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on defendants Lola Ann Brannum, Charles Lawson, and Charles Sullens's motion for summary judgment. Also before the Court is defendants Corizon, Inc., Jean Daughterty, and William McKinney's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants Corizon, Inc., Jean Daugherty, William McKinney and Lola Ann Brannum's motions for summary judgment and dismisses plaintiff's claims against these defendants. The Court denies Charles Lawson and Charles Sullens's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Lamont Williamson is a prisoner residing at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston, Missouri. At all times relevant to this suit, he was an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center ("PCC"). In his Third Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil rights and under state law for negligence.1 Plaintiffbrings his claims against Corizon, Inc., a professional healthcare company that specializes in providing medical care in correctional facilities; William McKinney, M.D., a medical provider for Corizon, Inc.; Nurse Jean Daugherty, a medical provider for Corizon, Inc.; Charles Lawson, a corrections officer at PCC; Charles Sullens, a corrections officer at PCC; and Lola Ann Brannum, a corrections officer at PCC. The individual defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities.
In his Complaint, plaintiff brings the following seven (7) counts: deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Corizon, Inc. (Count I); medical negligence against Corizon, Inc. (Count II); deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against defendants McKinney and Daugherty (Count III); medical negligence against defendants McKinney and Daugherty (Count IV); failure to protect against defendants Lawson and Sullens (Count V); negligence against defendants Lawson and Sullens (Count VI); and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against defendant Brannum (Count VII). For relief, plaintiff is asking for money damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. He is not asking for injunctive relief.
Defendants Lawson, Sullens, and Brannum filed a motion for summary judgment. In their motion, these defendants make the following arguments for dismissal: (1) plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) defendants Sullens and Lawson were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's safety; (3) defendants Sullens and Lawsonare entitled to official immunity as to plaintiff's state law claims of negligence against them in their individual capacities; and (4) defendant Brannum is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's federal claims against her in her individual capacity.
Defendants Corizon, Inc., McKinney, and Daugherty filed a separate motion for summary judgment. These defendants make the following arguments for dismissal: (1) defendants McKinney and Daugherty were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs; (2) plaintiff fails to establish a deliberate indifference claim against Corizon, Inc., because he has not shown that the agency's policies, regulations or decisions were the cause of his harm; (3) plaintiff's state law claim of medical negligence fails to comply with Missouri Revised Statute §538.225.1, which requires plaintiff to produce a health care affidavit; and (4) plaintiff cannot establish that defendants Corizon, Inc., McKinney, or Daugherty were medically negligent in treating plaintiff.
The Eighth Circuit has recently articulated the appropriate standard for consideration of motions for summary judgment, as follows:
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and must identify those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. The nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Although the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant, a nonmovant may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial." Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2008) (cited case omitted).
With this standard in mind, the Court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of resolving the parties' motions for summary judgment.
In May 2011, plaintiff was incarcerated at PCC. Defendants Sullens, Lawson, and Brannum were corrections officers at PCC in May 2011. On May 23, 2011, plaintiff and his cell-mate, Issa Emerson were involved in a physical altercation in their cell. During the altercation, Emerson threw hot coffee on plaintiff's face. Plaintiff punched Emerson, bit him and grabbed his testicles. Plaintiff tried to stab Emerson, but he could not find a weapon.
Defendant Sullens was working in plaintiff's housing unit that day and was the first officer to respond to the cell after he heard the commotion from the fight. Defendant Sullens called for assistance, and defendant Lawson and Corrections Officer I Brian Brown ("COI Brown") also responded to the fight in plaintiff's cell. After defendant Lawson and COI Brown arrived at the cell, the door was opened and defendant Sullens sprayed pepper spray inside the cell.
The parties dispute as to what happened next. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, one or more of the officers entered the cell, and defendant Sullens pulled plaintiff outof his cell onto the catwalk. Plaintiff began to walk away, but defendant Sullens told plaintiff to get down on the ground near the entrance to the cell. With plaintiff face down, defendant Sullens kneeled on plaintiff's thighs, pinning him to the ground, and started to cuff him with his hands behind his back. While plaintiff was pinned down in front of his cell, COI Brown walked Emerson out of the cell directly in front of plaintiff. Defendant Sullens grabbed plaintiff by his arms and lifted plaintiff up so that he was "hanging there." While plaintiff's head was lifted, Emerson was walked by and he kicked plaintiff in the face "like a soccer ball." Defendants did not take any steps to prevent the kick.2 Following the assault, Emerson was escorted downstairs. Defendant Lawson picked up plaintiff and marched him down the stairs to the medical unit.
Plaintiff was escorted to the medical unit. Defendant Daugherty, a nurse on duty, conducted a chemical use of force assessment because plaintiff had come in contact with pepper gas. Defendant Daugherty noted that plaintiff complained of injuries to his ankle, wrist, and face from a fight. Defendant Daugherty observed plaintiff walk into the medical unit with a steady gait, she noted that he was alert and oriented, and that his breath was regular and non-labored. Defendant Daugherty further observed that plaintiff had full range of motion in his wrist and ankle with no swelling or tenderness with movement. Plaintiff refused assessment of his vital signs, such as his blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate, temperature, weight, oxygen saturation. Defendant Daugherty observed that plaintiff's right side of his face was red, and that both his upper and lower lips were bleeding. Defendant Daugherty also noted a chin abrasion. Defendant Daugherty irrigated the abrasions with a sterile solution and instructed plaintiff to return if there were any signs or symptoms of infection. Plaintiff was allowed to shower off his head only. Plaintiff told defendant Daugherty that he had hot coffee thrown on his face, and he asked to go to the hospital. Defendant Daugherty responded that he could not go to the hospital.
Plaintiff walked out of the medical unit with a limp and was escorted to 2 House where he was placed in administrative segregation. Two hours after being escorted to administrative segregation, plaintiff washed his face and saw that pieces of his skin had peeled off. Between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., plaintiff was escorted to the medical unit with complaints that he "had hot coffee thrown in [his] face and [his] skin is peeling off." Plaintiff also complained that he could not hear out of his ear, and he again asked to go to the hospital. Plaintiff was assessed by a nurse, who contacted the on-call physician and received orders to place plaintiff into the Transitional Care Unit("TC...
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