Williamson v. Waldman
Decision Date | 21 July 1997 |
Docket Number | ABC-XYZ |
Citation | 150 N.J. 232,696 A.2d 14 |
Parties | Karen WILLIAMSON and James Williamson, her husband, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Leonard WALDMAN, M.D., Jeffrey Feldman, M.D. and Jacques Losman, M.D., Defendants-Appellants, and John Doe, M.D. (a fictitious name), Richard Roe (a fictitious name), Sue Soe (a fictitious name) andCorp. (a series of fictitious names), Defendants. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Hugh Francis, Morristown, for defendant-appellant Jacques Losman, M.D. (Francis & Berry, attorneys; Mr. Francis and Joan B. Lorio, of counsel; Peter A. Olsen, on the brief).
Stephen O. Mortenson, Springfield, for defendant-appellant Leonard Waldman, M.D. (Mortenson & Pomeroy, attorneys; Robert J. Mormile, on the brief).
John Zen Jackson, Princeton, for defendant-appellant Jeffrey Feldman, M.D. (Jackson & Buckley, attorneys; Sean P. Buckley, of counsel; Daniel R. Esposito, on the brief).
David M. Fried, Newark, for plaintiffs-respondents (Blume, Goldfaden, Berkowitz, Donnelly, Fried & Forte, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This case is based on plaintiff's complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from her fear of contracting AIDS. Plaintiff, a cleaning person, was pricked by a sharp medical instrument that had been discarded improperly in a general trash receptacle at an office shared by several medical doctors. Fearing that she had contracted AIDS from the prick, plaintiff instituted this suit against the doctors to recover damages for her emotional distress.
The case requires the Court to consider the standard for establishing causation for emotional distress attributable to the fear of contracting AIDS through infection from the HIV virus. More specifically, the issue posed is whether the standard of causation is based on objective factors, such as the actual exposure to HIV and/or the exposure to a viable means or channel of transmission of HIV; or, in the alternative, whether it is sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of the claimant's emotional distress over the fear of contracting AIDS.
Plaintiff, Karen Williamson, worked for her husband's cleaning business. On June 6, 1991, plaintiff was pricked by a lancet while cleaning a common-trash receptacle in the examining room of offices occupied by defendant doctors, Leonard Waldman, Jeffrey Feldman, and Jacques Losman. A lancet or "short sharp" is "a surgical knife with a small, sharp-pointed, two-edged blade" that is used to prick fingers to acquire blood samples. Stedman's Concise Medical Dictionary 551 (2d ed.1994).
After being pricked, plaintiff finished up, washed her hands, and went home for the night. On the way home from work, plaintiff went to her sister-in-law's home and, while there, discussed the incident with an acquaintance who was a nurse. As a result of that discussion plaintiff became alarmed, particularly over the potential of contracting hepatitis and AIDS. The nurse informed plaintiff that she should go to the emergency room immediately. Instead, plaintiff made an appointment to see her family physician, Jerome DeMasi.
On June 10, 1991, four days after the incident, plaintiff visited Dr. DeMasi, who recommended that she be tested for the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") annually for seven to ten years. (Although Dr. DeMasi subsequently modified the time period for testing to a "year or two," plaintiff was not informed of that until November 1994.) Whether an HIV test was administered during that initial visit is unclear. According to Dr. DeMasi, he did not conduct an HIV test because he believed it was too soon following the incident to obtain a meaningful result. Plaintiff avers, however, that she was tested. Dr. DeMasi informed plaintiff that a test taken a year from the date of the incident would be most decisive in determining whether she was infected.
Eight months later, in February 1992, plaintiff returned to Dr. DeMasi complaining of fatigue. During that visit, blood work was ordered, without an HIV test, and plaintiff was prescribed anti-depressant medication.
Since the incident, plaintiff has been tested for HIV several times, each test showing her to be HIV-negative. According to plaintiff, she underwent blood tests for HIV and hepatitis in July 1992, both of which proved negative. Moreover, she was tested in July 1993, and July 1994; again, both tests were negative. After the second negative test result, Dr. DeMasi informed plaintiff that her chances of having contracted HIV from the incident were "slim or remote."
Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the lancet-stick incident, she has become depressed and suffered "lifestyle changes." For example, at the time of the incident, the Williamsons were contemplating having another child. Because plaintiff's husband carries a rare blood disorder, known as neutropenia, which was passed along to their daughter, the Williamsons originally postponed having more children. According to plaintiffs, neutropenia prevents a person from properly fighting infections. Prior to the incident, however, plaintiff's husband had been taking a drug to control the effects of the disorder, which gave them hope of having another child. Since the incident, however, plaintiff has refused to have another baby, because she fears that the child will be born HIV-positive. Plaintiff also asserts that she and her husband have engaged only in protected sexual relations since the incident.
On May 19, 1993, the Williamsons filed a complaint in the Law Division against defendants Drs. Waldman, Losman, and Feldman. The complaint alleged that defendants breached their duty "to use reasonable care to inspect and [to] make the premises reasonably safe," 1 and that because of defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered "severe personal injuries, ... great physical and mental pain ... [and] loss of enjoyment of life." Ibid. Moreover, defendants' breach allegedly led to a loss of earning capacity and resulted in the need for "future medical treatments and/or hospitalizations." Regarding plaintiff's husband, James, the complaint alleged that, as a result of defendants' actions, James was deprived of "the support, society, ... consortium, [and] services ..." of his wife. Subsequently, during a deposition, Dr. DeMasi described plaintiff as a "nervous person" who had had several bouts of depression prior to the incident. Moreover, prior to the incident, Dr. DeMasi had referred her to other medical professionals for treatment for depression.
After discovery was completed, defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Law Division granted, dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that she was exposed to HIV. Moreover, the Law Division found that, given her negative test results, her continued fear was "idiosyncratic" and that, as a result, defendants' acts were not the proximate cause of her emotional distress. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiff was not required to demonstrate actual exposure to HIV but could recover based on the reasonableness of her fears, which created a jury question. 291 N.J.Super. 600, 677 A.2d 1179 (1996). Defendants each filed petitions for certification, which we granted. 147 N.J. 259, 686 A.2d 761 (1996).
A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress involves traditional concepts of duty, breach, and causation. Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 74-75, 222 A.2d 513 (1966). To establish liability for this tort, "a plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct was negligent and proximately caused plaintiff's injuries." Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 429, 561 A.2d 1122 (1989). Determining defendant's negligence "depends on whether defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, which is analyzed in terms of foreseeability." Ibid.; see Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994) ( ); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 533, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) ( ); see also Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 561, 568-69, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) ( ). Similarly, to establish that the alleged negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the emotional injury, the emotional distress must be reasonably foreseeable. Compare Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 59, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) ( ) and Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 556, 561, 495 A.2d 495 (Law Div.1985) ( ) with Decker, supra, 116 N.J. at 431, 561 A.2d 1122 ( ); Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355, 368-69, 544 A.2d 857 (1988) ( ); and Caputzal, supra, 48 N.J. at 76-77, 222 A.2d 513 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Veggian v. Camden Board of Education, Civil Action No. 05-70(NLH).
...law, "a plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct was negligent and proximately caused plaintiff's injuries." Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 696 A.2d 14, 17-18 (1997) (citing Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 561 A.2d 1122 (1989)). "Determining defendant's negligence `depe......
-
J.S. v. R.T.H.
...Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in the determination of whether a duty exists. See Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 239, 696 A.2d 14 (1997). The "[a]bility to foresee injury to a potential plaintiff" is "crucial" in determining whether a duty should be imp......
-
Taylor v. Metzger
...people cannot recover for idiosyncratic emotional distress that would not be experienced by average persons. See Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 250, 696 A.2d 14 (1997) (denying damages for emotional distress reasonable people would not experience). This objective standard ensures that......
-
Hagerman v. Gencorp Automotive, Docket No. 107059
...sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point"); see also, Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 245, 696 A.2d 14 (1997) ("[T]he limit of proximate cause is, ultimately, an issue of law and similarly entails a consideration of public policy......
-
The decade of Supreme Court avoidance of AIDS: denial of certiorari in HIV-AIDS cases and its adverse effects on human rights.
...See the appellate court's discussion of the actual exposure issue, Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1204-06. (513) See, e.g., Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 18-20 (N.J. 1997) (surveying cases of emotional distress for the fear of contracting AIDS); Illinois Court Seeks New Course, supra note 483, ......