Williamson v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 15 February 1991 |
| Citation | 586 A.2d 967,402 Pa.Super. 276 |
| Parties | Joyce E. WILLIAMSON (Haas), Appellee, v. Kenneth R. WILLIAMSON, Appellant. Joyce E. WILLIAMSON (Haas), Appellant, v. Kenneth R. WILLIAMSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Lee H. Roberts, Lock Haven, for appellant in No. 542 and appellee in No. 562.
John C. Howett, Jr., Harrisburg, for appellant in No. 562 and appellee in No. 542.
Before POPOVICH, HUDOCK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
This is an appeal 1 from orders of equitable distribution entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. The orders in question are set forth below, in pertinent part.
AND NOW, this 6th day of June, 1989, the Court orders as follows
1. Plaintiff is awarded
Marital residence at 532 Rock Road
State College $110,000.00
Shawnee Village Time"Share 7,900.00
Personal Property 10,000.00
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Total: $127,900.00
2. Defendant is awarded
Williamson Sports Motors $ 65,000.00
Vehicles 18,000.00
IRA account 7,781.00
Motorcycle 4,000.00
Beach Craft T34 Aircraft 55,000.00
Gun Collection 10,000.00
Twin Commanche 25,000.00
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Total: $184,781.00
3. The marital property owned by the parties and located at 532 Rock Road, State College, Pennsylvania, shall be transferred to Plaintiff's name, with Defendant retaining the sole responsibility for the mortgage associated with the residence. If Plaintiff puts up the marital residence for sale, she will be responsible for capital gain tax consequences.
4. Defendant should pay mortgage payments directly to Plaintiff until such time as the mortgage would have been paid in full in accordance with the terms.
5. Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff for their child, Paige, in the amount of $450.00 per month.
6. Defendant is ordered to pay reasonable fees to the Plaintiff's counsel for the amount of $8,000.00.
7. Both parties shall take necessary steps to make order effective within 60 days of this order.
On August 17, 1989, the trial court denied Mr. Williamson's "exceptions" and Mrs. Haas' post-trial motions. On August 18, 1989, the trial court amended its August 17, 1989 order to give Mr. Williamson the right of first refusal to purchase the marital residence in the event that Mrs. Haas decided to sell the house within sixty days for the property's stipulated value of $110,000.00. The amendment also provided that Mr. Williamson would have the right of first refusal at the fair market value of the property if Mrs. Haas exercised her option after the sixty day period had expired. Subsequently, judgment was entered on the record.
Mr. Williamson raises two "catch-all" issues on appeal. He challenges the trial court's award of child support to his minor daughter, claiming that the amount was based on an unsubstantiated earning capacity. He also contests the equitable distribution scheme, asserting that the trial court improperly relied upon the gross value of the residence without deducting the mortgage, improperly considered the tax consequences of various transactions, double-counted assets, improperly calculated the value of his business as it applied to the issue of distribution and improperly included a value for a gun collection which, allegedly, was non-marital property.
In her cross-appeal, Mrs. Haas raises ten issues. In short, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing certain property, in determining an appropriate award of child support, in failing to award her a greater amount of attorney's fees and in ignoring procedural deficiencies in Mr. Williamson's "exceptions." Mrs. Haas also asserts that the instant appeal should be dismissed as a result of various defects in Mr. Williamson's appellate brief.
Before we reach the merits of both parties' appeals, we note that the issues regarding child support are waived. In its order dated June 6, 1989, the trial court explicitly directed that child support be paid in the amount of $450.00 per month. In accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.52(b), claims that involve child support are specifically excluded from matters which require the filing of post-trial motions. Thus, the correct procedure would have been to take a direct appeal from the June 6, 1989 order. See Scheidemantle v. Senka, 371 Pa.Super. 500, 538 A.2d 552 (1988). Since neither party accomplished this within thirty days of June 6, 1989, the corresponding issues are waived. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
However, the economic issues are properly before us. We note our scope and standard of review. Clearly, the trial court maintains discretion in equitably distributing marital property. Powell v. Powell, 395 Pa.Super. 345, 577 A.2d 576 (1990); Williams v. Williams, 373 Pa.Super. 143, 540 A.2d 563 (1988). This Court will not disturb the trial court's determinations absent an abuse of discretion. Kleinfelter v. Kleinfelter, 317 Pa.Super. 282, 463 A.2d 1196 (1983); Gee v. Gee, 314 Pa.Super. 31, 460 A.2d 358 (1983). See Commonwealth ex.rel. Levy v. Levy, 240 Pa.Super. 168, 361 A.2d 781 (1976) (defines "abuse of discretion").
Before we embark on a discussion of the instant distribution scheme, we are compelled to remind the parties of the fundamental principle that equitable distribution need not be equal, only equitable. In Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 360 Pa.Super. 487, 493-94, 520 A.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1987), this Court clearly held that when a trial court distributes marital property, it must not presume a fifty/fifty division. Rather, the trial court must take account of the factors set forth in the Divorce Code, specifically 23 P.S. § 401(d). Id. Then, after full consideration, the trial court must distribute the property in an equitable fashion and in a manner which will promote just results. 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6). This Court will not find an abuse of discretion merely because the parties do not receive equal shares of the marital assets. See also Brown v. Brown, 352 Pa.Super. 267, 273-74, 507 A.2d 1223, 1226 (1986) ().
The first question that we must resolve is whether the trial court improperly awarded the marital home to Mrs. Haas at the stipulated value of $110,000.00 without deducting the outstanding mortgage of approximately $27,500.00. The trial court instructed that Mr. Williamson pay the mortgage. He asserts that he should not be responsible for the payments.
Mr. Williamson cites to the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 401(e)(7) in support of his position, which provides:
For purposes of this chapter only, "marital property" means all property acquired by either party during the marriage, including the increase in value prior to the date of final separation of any nonmarital property acquired pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3), except: [....] (7) Property to the extent to which such property has been mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in good faith for value, prior to the date of final separation.
While we are cognizant of the above provision, we are also compelled to defer to the trial court's reasoning regarding this issue. Clearly, the trial court recognized the value of the mortgage when it equitably divided the property. Additionally, the trial court considered the tax consequences to Mrs. Haas in awarding her the house. At page seven of its opinion, the trial court wrote, See id., June 6, 1989, at 8-9, 11, 17-18 (accord). See 23 P.S. 401(d)(10). As well, at page fifteen of its opinion, the trial court stated:
Both parties stipulated the fair market value of the house to be $110,000.00. The joint mortgage balance owed by the parties to Mid-State Bank and Trust Company is about $27,500.00. The equity in jointly owned marital residence of the parties is $82,000.00 [sic]. Considering in totality the circumstances of this case, the Court awards the marital home to the Plaintiff without any encumbrances. Plaintiff substantially contributed to the making of this marital home. In ten years of her marriage with defendant she utilized her skill as a realtor and made profits. Defendant testified that Plaintiff was solely responsible for real estate transactions.
We are satisfied that the trial court fully considered the $27,500.00 outstanding mortgage and "all relevant factors" pertinent thereto before it awarded the marital home to Mrs. Haas. See Trial court opinion, June 6, 1989, at 8. See also N.T., December 8, 1988, at 147-48. Although the trial court decided to assign responsibility for the mortgage to Mr. Williamson, it also noted that the equitable distribution itself "will effectively give [Mr. Williamson] approximately 60% of the value of marital property, and [Mrs. Haas] approximately 40% thereof." Trial court opinion, June 6, 1989, at 8. We find no error in the trial court's evaluation as it relates to the distribution of the marital residence. 2
Mr. Williamson's next issue on appeal--to wit, whether the trial court improperly considered the tax impact for Mrs. Haas in the event that she decides to sell the marital residence, but did not consider the tax impact for Mr. Williamson when he sold his business--is waived. Mr. Williamson failed to raise this issue when he filed his "exceptions" to the trial court's order. Thus, they are not preserved for appellate review. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.52(a). See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). See Colagioia v. Colagioia, 362 Pa.Super. 213, 523 A.2d 1158 (1987) (...
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