Willie Chapman Heap v. General Motors Corporation, a Corporation.
| Decision Date | 29 December 1976 |
| Citation | 65 Cal.App.3d 475,135 Cal.Rptr. 291 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Willie Chapman HEAP, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 48043. |
John J. Schimmenti, El Segundo, for plaintiff and appellant.
Hillsinger & Costanzo, John J. Costanzo and Richard W. Tentler, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
In this personal injury action, plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant granted at the close of plaintiff's case on defendant's motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The action was based on product liability.
On December 20, 1972, plaintiff was involved in a traffic accident while operating her 1966 Buick manufactured by defendant. She was driving northbound on the San Diego Freeway in the number four lane, preparing to exit at Wilshire Boulevard, when the car in front of her stopped suddenly. She applied her brakes and swerved into the number three lane to go around the stopped car, and was struck in the side by a truck. Prior to impact, her foot was on the brake. The impact caused her to be thrown around in the car. She was taken to the U.C.L.A. Medical Center in an ambulance. Her injuries included a severe cut and gouge to the inner right ankle around the ankle bone. At the time of the accident, plaintiff, who was 72 years old, did not personally observe what cut her.
Two to three days later, plaintiff's husband examined and took photographs of the car at the place it had been towed, with particular attention to the accelerator pedal and the rod or 'linkage' which the pedal operated. The pedal was moved away from the linkage when he found it.
George Kaden testified for plaintiff that he examined the accelerator pedal and the linkage which were removed from plaintiff's car, and the pedal and linkage on another Buick of the same year and model. Mr. Kaden had a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering, postgraduate work in electrical engineering, and a law degree. He observed that in a normal 1966 Buick the pedal is not actually attached to the linkage. He found it possible to move the pedal away from the linkage with his hand and move it down on the floor. The linkage rod is quite sharp and the 'rivet heads, for want of a better term, that secure the wheels onto the rod are quite rough, too.' The three wheels at the top of the linkage permit the pedal to 'kick' it from different angles.
After examining the scar on plaintiff's ankle, Mr. Kaden was of the opinion that her ankle was injured when her foot hit the side of the pedal, pushing it away, and that her amkle came in contact with the linkage rod.
It was definitely possible to manufacture an accelerator pedal and linkage which did not come apart so as to create such danger. Mr. Kaden produced photographs of the accelerator and linkage on a 1962 Pontiac and a 1960 Rambler, both of which were made with the pedal connected to the linkage. In his opinion, had the Buick pedal been produced like the Pontiac or Rambler, the injury to plaintiff's ankle would not have occurred.
Mr. Kaden was not familiar with the standard of care in the automobile industry at the time of trial or in 1966. He had once worked on the design of an accelerator pedal linkage for an armored personnel carrier, which had to withstand driving over rough terrain. In Mr. Kaden's opinion, it was obvious that the unconnected parts could create a danger of coming apart in an accident and injuring someone, a problem which 'almost screams for attention.' He further stated:
'It's very difficult to say. But when it's apart like that, and you have got all that junk on the end of that rod for no particular reason, no real, to my way of thinking, valid reason, to have that type of mechanism--the end on the rod I would say that's--that's just not the way to do things in a correct engineering manner.
He also testified that newer model automobiles have a hanging gas pedal with 'nothing underneath, nothing really to come apart in that thing; . . .'
The pertinent trial court findings of fact were:
'3. That said vehicle was not defective as a result of its design and manufacture of the accelerator pedal, its parts and immediately connected mechanisms.
'5. That defendant did not fail to provide reasonably safe devices to protect the operator of said vehicle from exposed moving and driving mechanisms of said vehicle.
'7. That the design and manufacture of the accelerator pedal, its parts and immediately connected mechanisms were not unreasonably dangerous for the intended use of the vehicle.
'8. That the design and manufacture of the accelerator pedal, its parts and immediately connected mechanisms were not unsafe for the intended use of the vehicle.
'9. That defendant did not fail to exercise ordinary care in the designing, manufacturing, and marketing of the accelerator pedal, its parts, and immediately connected mechanisms in the 1966 Buick automobile.
1
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. (Vanermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 260, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168; Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 583, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84.) The defect may be in design rather than in manufacture. (Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 134, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153; Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 475, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229; Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal.App.3d 510, 517, 109 Cal.Rptr. 110; Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 116 Cal.Rptr. 575.)
Our Supreme Court has not formulated any precise definition of 'defective' design, apparently preferring a case-by-case approach. (Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal.3d 379, 383-384, 93 Cal.Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681; Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 134-135 & fn. 16, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153; Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal.App.3d 533, 543-547, 132 Cal.Rptr. 605; cf. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 475, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229; Foglio v. Western Auto Supply, 56 aCal.App.3d 470, 473-476, 128 Cal.Rptr. 545.) Deviation from the industry norm is not necessarily the test. (Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 383, 93 Cal.Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681.) Vehicle manufacturers must take accidents into consideration as reasonably foreseeable occurrences involving their products. )
The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 is to enable a trial court which, after weighing the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case, is persuaded that the plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proof, to dispense with the need for the defendant to produce evidence. (Columbia Engineering Co. v. Joiner, 231 Cal.App.2d 837, 842, 42 Cal.Rptr. 241; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Trial, §§ 370-371, pp. 3164-3166.) Greening v. General Air-Conditioning Corp., 233 Cal.App.2d 545, 550, 43 Cal.Rptr. 662, 665; see also Franco Westrn Oil Co. v. Fariss, 259 Cal.App.2d 325, 329, 66 Cal.Rptr. 458; Eddy v. Gallaway, 11 Cal.App.3d 185, 190, 89 Cal.Rptr. 491; Slater v. Alpha Beta Acme Markets, Inc., 44 Cal.App.3d 274, 278, 118 Cal.Rptr. 561; Rodriguez v. North American Rockwell Corp., 28 Cal.App.3d 441, 446-447, 104 Cal.Rptr. 678; Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 1 Cal.3d 160, 167, 81 Cal.Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495; Columbia Engineering Co. v. Joiner, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 858, 42 Cal.Rptr. 241.)
Since the trial court obviously disregarded the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Mr. Kaden, we can infer that it either disbelieved him or at least drew contrary conclusions from the evidence. This is not fatal to plaintiff's case, however. 2 The crucial question before us is whether or not the findings made by the court are supported by substantial evidence. This is not a case where the trial court found that there was no evidence of injury to plaintiff or found the cause of that injury to be something other than that alleged by pl...
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