Willie v. State

• Decision Date: 02 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 6.,6.
• Citation: 139 A. 289
• Parties: WILLIE v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

139 A. 289

WILLIE

v. STATE.

No. 6.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 2, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Prince George's County; J. C. Mattingly and Wm. Meverell Loker, Judges.

To be officially reported.

Linwood Willie was convicted of the larceny of an automobile, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Ogle Marbury, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Thomas H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., John Hubner Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Frank Parran, State's Atty., of Upper Marlboro, for the State.

ADKINS, J. Linwood Willie, the appellant was convicted by a jury October 21st, 1926, of the larceny of an automobile. On the same day he filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment, which motions after a hearing were overruled on December 3, 1926, and exceptions to the overruling of said motions reserved by the traverser. He was sentenced by the court to be confined in the Maryland penitentiary for the period of three years. On the same day he filed an order of appeal. On December 23, 1926, he filed a motion to strike out verdict and sentence, which motion was overruled on April 19, 1927, and on the same day an appeal from the order overruling said motion was filed.

There were two exceptions reserved, one to the ruling of the court in sustaining an objection to certain testimony offered by traverser, and one to the overruling traverser's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment.

Appellant relies on these exceptions and on his appeal from the order overruling his motion to strike out the verdict and sentence. In considering the first exception, it will be necessary to refer briefly to the testimony in the case.

On September 4, 1926, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, George Young, colored, with another man, was driving a "Willys-Knight" car on the Baltimore Pike, towards Washington. He testified that some one in another automobile chased him for a number of miles and "ran me all the way to Hyattsville." The car driven by Young was loaded with fourteen cases of whisky. The car that chased him was a "Lincoln." When he arrived at Hyattsville, Young turned off the Pike in order to dodge his supposed pursuer, and in doing so ran into another car, whereupon he jumped out of his car and ran, followed by Robert C. Gallagher, chief of police of Hyattsville, who overtook and arrested Young for reckless driving. Gallagher testified that, while he had Young under arrest, and as he approached the Willys-Knight car, he saw traverser jump into that car and drive away with it. This testimony was corroborated by several witnesses for the state, one of whom, Newton James, a constable, testified that he in another car followed traverser and caught him at Riverdale, when he turned off the main road into a dark road, and jumped out of the car.

The traverser denied that he drove off the Willys-Knight car or that he ever had his hand on the car. He testified that, when Young jumped off the car at Hyattsville, witness was standing right beside him on the corner at the curb. "I said something, and some one in the crowd said, 'There is the guy that was driving,' and, as he did, Officer James or Constable James run up and grabbed me."

Mrs. George M. Phillips testified that at the request of traverser's mother she went to the magistrate's office at Hyattsville to serve as bondsman for traverser, and informed the magistrate she had come for that purpose. While on the stand as a witness for traverser she was asked: "What charge was against Mr. Willie at the time you got there?"

The court sustained an objection to this question, and that ruling is the subject of the first exception.

It is strongly urged by counsel for appellant that the refusal to permit witness to answer this question was prejudicial error, because witness would have testified that the charge against traverser at that time was reckless driving and transporting liquor, and that afterwards other charges were preferred, including larceny. The argument is that proof of what the original charge was, would have tended to corroborate traverser's testimony and to discredit the state's witnesses. That was certainly the only relevancy the testimony disallowed could have had, and it was not admissible, unless it can be...