Williford v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1857
• Citation: Williford v. The State Of Ga., 23 Ga. 1 (Ga. 1857)
• Parties: Jordan Williford, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

23 Ga. 1

Jordan Williford, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JUNE TERM, 1857.

Indictment for robbery, in Lee Superior Court, before ALLEN, Judge, March Term, 1857.

Jordan Williford was indicted for robbery and put upon his trial on the 31st day of March, 1857, during the regular Term of the Superior Court of Lee county.

After the close of the testimony, argument of counsel and charge of the Court, the jury retired to deliberate upon their verdict, about two hours before sunset. The next morning, when the Court met, the presiding Judge directed the jury to be brought into the Court, and asked them if they had agreed upon a verdict. The jury replied, that they had not. The Court then enquired if they were likely to agree; they replied, that they were not. The Court then of its own motion, the prisoner objecting thereto, passed the following order:

March Term, 1857. It appearing to the Court that the jury empaneled and sworn to try this case, are unable to agree, it is therefore ordered by the Court that a mistrial be declared and awarded, and that the jury be discharged.

Whereupon, prisoner's counsel moved that he be discharged and acquitted of the offence for which he was indicted. The Court refused the motion, and prisoner's counsel excepted.

West, for plaintiff in error.

Evans, Sol.-Gen., for the State.

By the Court. —Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

The jury being charged with this case, deliberated upon it from the afternoon of one day until 8 o'clock the next morning; and being brought into Court without agreeing to a verdict, and stating that they were not likely to agree, the presiding Judge, without the consent and against the objection of defendant's counsel, directed a mistrial to be entered, and the jury discharged from the further consideration of the case. Did this entitle the defendant to an acquittal from the prosecution?

Anciently the doctrine was much more rigid upon this subject than at present; and the most oppressive, not to say odious, means were resorted to, to force the jury to find a verdict. But the Courts with the advance of civilization, relaxed from this barbarous practice; and the rule next was, that a mistrial might be awarded whenever from Providential cause or otherwise, it became necessary; and this is the principle insisted upon by the defendant's counsel on the present occasion. But the modern cases establish a still further departure from the old practice; and at the present day, the question seems to be left pretty much to the discretion of the Judge, under his responsibility to the country for any abuseof his authority; and we are not prepared to hold, that this discretion should be otherwise limited. The due dispatch of the business of the Courts, will depend very much upon leaving this discretion untrammeled. In one case, in New York, the jury were discharged after a half hour\'s deliberation. Here they were out a whole night and a part of the evening and morning of the preceding and succeeding days. Such is the commendable anxiety of the Courts to try offences, that they are not likely to act with hot haste in this matter, knowing, as they do, that let it once be understood...