Willis v. City of Fresno

• Decision Date: 17 July 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:09-CV-01766-BAM
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: CHRIS WILLIS, MARY WILLIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO STEPHEN WILLIS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FRESNO, OFFICER GREG CATTON, and OFFICER DANIEL ASTACIO, Defendants.

CHRIS WILLIS, MARY WILLIS, INDIVIDUALLYAND SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO STEPHEN WILLIS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FRESNO, OFFICER GREG CATTON,and OFFICER DANIEL ASTACIO, Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:09-CV-01766-BAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: July 17, 2014

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES;

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' BILL OF

COSTS, AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

FOR REVIEW OF DEFENDANTS' BILL

OF COSTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. (Doc. 299.) Also before the Court is Defendants' Bill of Costs, for which Plaintiffs have sought judicial review. (Doc. 256, 257.) The matters were briefed extensively.¹ (Doc. 256, 257, 258, 267, 299, 302-311, 313, 314.) The Court deemed the matters suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) and took the matters under submission. (Doc. 271, 312.)

Having carefully considered the parties' submissions, as well as the entire record in this case, the Court (1) GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and awards Plaintiffs $717,642.74 in attorney's fees and $106,852.20 in additional costs, and (2) ORDERS Defendants to bear their own costs.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2009, Stephen Willis was fatally shot by Defendants Greg Catton and Daniel Astacio, who are Officers with the Fresno Police Department. Stephen Willis's parents, Chris and Mary Willis ("Plaintiffs"), allege that Stephen Willis's Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the shooting. Plaintiffs further allege that Officer Catton and Officer Astacio were negligent in causing the death of Stephen Willis.

Following over four years of extensive litigation and a ten-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Officer Catton used excessive force in violation of Stephen's Fourth Amendment rights, and Officer Catton was negligent in causing Stephen's death. The jury found Officer Astacio was not liable on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and negligence claims. On Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim, the jury awarded $1 in nominal damages. On Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim, the jury awarded funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $10,224.00, and further awarded Plaintiffs $1,500,000.00 in compensatory damages. The jury also made a finding of comparative negligence, and determined that Stephen Willis was eighty percent responsible for his injuries. On January 31, 2014, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, and awarded Plaintiffs $1 on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim, and $302,044.80 (20% of $1,510.224.00) on Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim. (Doc. 251.)

As relevant to Plaintiffs' Motion, the jury instructions for the Fourth Amendment claims and the wrongful death claim were identical. Compare, Jury Instruction No. 19, 20, and 21 with Jury Instruction No. 24 and 25, Doc. 237. Thus, the jury decided these claims under identical legal standards.²

Following trial, Defendants submitted a Bill of Costs seeking $76,904.41 in costs.³ (Doc. 256.) Following resolution of the parties' post-trial motions, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees, seeking $2,590,173.75 in fees (loadstar fees of $1,726,782.50 with a 1.5 multiplier), and costs in the amount of $197,490.57. (Doc. 299, Attach. 1.)

The parties present numerous arguments in opposition to their counterpart's request for fees and costs.⁴ The majority of these arguments concern specific fees and costs, which the Court addresses to the extent it is necessary below. Defendants' primary argument, however, is that because Plaintiffs received only nominal damages on their Fourth Amendment claim, they are not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.⁵

III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Plaintiff is Entitled to An Award of Attorneys' Fees

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs...." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A Section 1983 plaintiff who receives a nominal damage award is a prevailing party for purposes of Section 1988. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). That does not mean, however, that such a plaintiff is necessarily entitled to an award of fees. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (explaining that although the "technical nature of a nominal damages award ... does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988").

Defendants argue that under Farrar and Ninth Circuit authority interpreting Farrar⁶, an award of nominal damages under Section 1983 is insufficient to justify an award of attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs respond that this case is distinguishable from Farrar because Plaintiffs achieved significant success on their wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs also argue that even if Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees were analyzed under Farrar, an award of fees would be appropriate.

In Farrar, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for $17 million dollars against six defendants. After ten years of litigation, they obtained a nominal damage judgment of one dollar against one defendant. The district court nonetheless awarded the plaintiffs $280,000 in attorney's fees. The Supreme Court explained, " 'the most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award 'is the degree of success obtained.' " Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933). "In a civil rights suit for damages ... the awarding of nominal damages [ ] highlights the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury." Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. In light of the nominal damages award, the Supreme Court explained that the Farrar litigation "accomplished little beyond giving petitioners 'the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had been violated' in some unspecified way." Id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)). Farrar concluded that "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. at 115, 107 S.Ct. 2672. (internal citation omitted.) "Farrar therefore teaches that an award of nominal damages is not enough" to justify an award of attorney's fees. Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9^th Cir. 1994); See also, Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The guiding consideration for the district court is the difference between the damages sought and the amount recovered.")

In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized two factors, in addition to the difference between the damages sought and the amount recovered, that would support an award of attorneys' fees when only nominal damages are awarded. These factors include "thesignificance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed" and whether the success "accomplished some public goal...." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121, 113 S.Ct. 566 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has adopted Justice O'Connor's factors for resolving the degree of success inquiry under Section 1988. See Cummings, 402 F.3d at 947. The parties' briefing debates whether the O'Connor factors articulated in Farrar justify an award of attorneys' fees in this case.

A straight analysis of these factors, however, is not probative. Farrar is distinguishable because, here, Plaintiffs received a substantial award on the litigation as a whole, whereas the plaintiffs in Farrar received only a nominal award of $1 in total. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 107, 113 S.Ct. 566. Indeed, every case cited by Defendants applying the O'Connor factors concern circumstances where the total award was comprised of nominal damages. See, e.g., Benton v. Oregon Student Assistance Com'n, 421 F.3d 901 (9^th Cir. 2005); Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550 (9^th Cir. 1994); Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054 (9^th Cir. 2010). The substantial award on Plaintiffs' pendent state claim, which was based on the same standard as the Section 1983 claim, distinguishes Plaintiffs from the plaintiffs in Farrar, as well as the plaintiffs in every cited Ninth Circuit case applying Farrar.

This Court has not located a single case applying a classic Farrar analysis to a case where nominal damages on a qualifying federal claim are coupled with substantial damages on a pendent state claim. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the relevance of Farrar in situations such as the case at bar, and there is very little guidance from courts elsewhere. See, Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 177 (3^rd Cir. 2009) (noting that this issue, "supris[ingly,] ... has been sparsely litigated elsewhere.") Nonetheless, because of the important distinctions between this case and Farrar, the following discussion considers whether Plaintiffs' success on their state law claim may independently inform the degree of their success under Section 1988.

1. Plaintiffs' Successful Wrongful Death Claim Informs the Degree of Plaintiffs' Success Under Section 1988

Discussed supra, Plaintiffs succeeded on two claims: Plaintiffs were awarded significantmonetary damages on their wrongful death claim; and Plaintiffs were awarded a nominal dollar on their Section 1983 claim. Both of these claims stem from identical facts, and were decided under identical legal standards. However, Plaintiffs' ability to obtain attorneys' fees under Section 1988 concerns Plaintiffs' success under Section 1983. The Court must determine whether a substantial victory on a pendent state claim, when coupled with a nominal victory on a Section 1983 claim, operating under identical facts and law, informs the degree of success under Section 1988.

The Court begins with the language of Section 1988....