Willis v. Dennis, Civil Action No. 215.

• Decision Date: 18 August 1947
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 215.
• Citation: 72 F. Supp. 853
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: WILLIS v. DENNIS.

72 F. Supp. 853

WILLIS v. DENNIS.

Civil Action No. 215.

District Court, W. D. Virginia, at Harrisonburg.

August 18, 1947.

Irving Diener, of Alexandria, Va., and Louis E. Spiegler, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Harrison, Benham & Thoma, of Winchester, Va., for defendant.

PAUL, District Judge.

This is an action in tort in which the plaintiff is a resident of the District of Columbia and the defendant a resident of Virginia, and the complaint alleges jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction is lacking in this court, in that the action is not one between citizens of different states. The motion rests on the contention that the District of Columbia is not a state within the meaning of the Constitution and that the Act of Congress approved April 20, 1940, amending the statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41, subdivision 1, relating to jurisdiction of the District Courts on grounds of diversity of citizenship is unconstitutional.

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution relating to the question in issue are found in Article III, Sections 1 and 2. The first of these sections provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish. The United States District Courts constitute one of the inferior courts established pursuant to this power. Section 2 then provides that the judicial power shall extend, among other instances, to controversies "between Citizens of different States."

The statute defining the original jurisdiction of the district courts is found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 41, and prior to April 20, 1940, this statute provided that among the matters of which such courts should have original jurisdiction were those (subject to a named amount of the value of the matter in controversy) in which the controversy "is between citizens of different States." This was in conformity with and pursuant to the powers prescribed in the Constitution, Article III, Sect. 2. Beginning with the case of Hepburn et al. v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed. 332, decided in 1804 and in which the opinion was by Chief Justice Marshall, it was held that the District of Columbia was not a "state" within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution and that a citizen of the District of Columbia could not sue in the courts of the United States on the ground of diversity of citizenship. See also Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, 4 L. Ed. 44; Barney v. City of Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L.Ed. 825; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395, 17 S.Ct. 596, 41 L.Ed. 1049.

By the Act of April 20, 1940, Congress amended the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S. C.A. § 41, subdivision 1, in so far as it relates to diversity of citizenship, to make it read "where the matter in controversy * * * is between citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, or any State or Territory." The italicized words indicate the amendment.

Since the enactment of this amendment its constitutionality has been the subject of attack and has been passed on by a number of the district courts. It has been upheld in Winkler v. Daniels, D.C. E.D. of Va., 43 F.Supp. 265, and in Glaeser v. Acacia Mutual, etc., D.C. N.D. of Cal., 55 F.Supp. 925. On the contrary it has been held unconstitutional in the following cases: McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, D.C. E.D. of Pa., 45 F.Supp. 385; Behlert v. James Foundation, etc., D.C. S.D. of N.Y., 60 F.Supp. 706; Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., D.C. of Mass., 66 F.Supp. 593; Wilson v. Guggenheim, D.C. E.D. of S.C., 70 F.Supp. 417; and in Feeley v. Sidney S. Schupper Interstate Hauling System, D.C.D. Md., 72 F. Supp. 663. So far as I can find these are all of the cases in which this question has been dealt with.

I have read the opinions in all of these cases and find myself in agreement with the views expressed in the latter group of cases — not because these are larger in number but because they appear to offer inescapable reasons for their conclusion that the act is unconstitutional. In view of the careful consideration and full discussion which is exhibited in the cases cited no extended discussion is needful here. It would necessarily be but a repetition of the reasoning set out in those cases.

It might be said, however, that in both of the two cases which have upheld the act, the court acted on reasons which appear to me untenable. In Winkler v. Daniels, supra, the court relied strongly on that provision of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 17, which provides that Congress, among its other enumerated powers, shall exercise exclusive legislation in all cases "over such District" as might become the seat of the Federal Government. And apparently the argument is that this power to legislate "in all cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia went so far as to authorize Congress to grant to...