Willis v. Gray
| Decision Date | 18 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-cv-1746 (KBJ),14-cv-1746 (KBJ) |
| Parties | ROBERT WILLIS, Plaintiff, v. VINCENT GRAY, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia) |
Plaintiff Robert Willis worked as a biology teacher in the District of Columbia Public School system ("DCPS") for more than twenty years before he was notified that his position would be terminated as part of a district-wide reduction in force ("RIF"). The RIF, which occurred in the fall of 2009, was quite contentious; and this was especially so because DCPS had hired more than 900 teachers in the preceding months, many of whom were under the age of 40 and new to teaching (unlike many of the veteran teachers who were terminated as part of the RIF). In 2014, Willis filed the instant lawsuit against the District of Columbia ("the District"), claiming that the RIF violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., because it targeted teachers on the basis of race and age and was, in fact, a pretext for the unlawful removal of older, African-American teachers.1 Willis's pleading furtheralleges that the decision Willis's supervisor made to discharge him in particular was unlawful discrimination on the basis of his age and rage, and that, in the process of implementing Willis's discharge, the District also violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and District of Columbia common law.
Before this Court at present is the District's motion to dismiss Willis's amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 56(c). (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 31.) For the reasons explained fully below, this Court has concluded that the District's motion to dismiss Willis's amended complaint must be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Willis has brought Title VII and ADEA claims that challenge the basis for the district-wide RIF and/or how the District implemented the RIF as a whole, such claims must be dismissed as precluded by prior litigation. See Washington Teachers' Union Local #6 v. Rhee ("WTU Local"), No. 2009 CA 007482 B (D.C. Sup. Ct. 2012). But the aspect of Willis's Title VII and ADEA claims that maintains that he was specifically selected for termination for discriminatory reasons can proceed. Willis's other constitutional, statutory, and common law claims are all subject to dismissal on statutes of limitations grounds. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
Willis is a African-American man who, according to the amended complaint, began his career with DCPS in 1985 as a biology and mathematics teacher and was 51 years old at the time his employment was terminated. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30, ¶¶ 28, 35.) Willis began teaching at Frank W. Ballou High School in 1886; he received tenure there in 1989. (See id. ¶ 28.) Willis allegedly taught regular and Advanced Placement ("AP") biology and was Ballou High School's only certified AP biology teacher from 1988 until his termination in 2009. (See id. ¶ 5.) According to the amended complaint, Willis also received satisfactory performance evaluations throughout his decades of teaching with DCPS (see id. ¶ 61), and he once even received an award from President Bill Clinton "for his services as a teacher at Ballou [High School]" (id. ¶ 9).
On October 2, 2009, Ballou High School's principal, Rahman Branch, notified Willis that his teaching position had been selected for elimination as part of a district-wide RIF. The following day, Willis received a letter from DCPS Chancellor Michelle Rhee, confirming that his position would be as part of the RIF. (See id. ¶ 30.) The District officially terminated Willis from DCPS on November 2, 2009. According to Willis's complaint, the only two other scienceteachers at Ballou High School who were selected for the RIF were African American and over the age of 45. (See id. ¶ 45.)
Willis specifically alleges that "Rhee, Branch[,] and others were using the RIF as a cover for their actual motive and purpose of terminating older black American teachers [such] as Mr. Willis on the basis of their age and race," and that "they intentionally and deliberately[] engineered [the] 'RIF Criteria' in a way calculated to earn veteran teachers like Mr. Willis fewer or no weighted points, and to rob them [of] the very best thing they had going for them—their long-term service and tenure[.]" (Id. ¶ 37.) Willis's amended complaint also repeatedly assails the District's implementation of the RIF district-wide. In this regard, Willis contends that the District hired 946 new employees in the months before the RIF (see id. ¶ 5), and that the RIF was a "guise" for implementing a district-wide "'change of workforce' and elimination of black veteran teachers like Mr. Willis" (id. ¶ 54).
With respect to its description of how the District accomplished the allegedly discriminatory RIF, the amended complaint asserts that DCPS mandated that four criteria "were to be considered in determining which positions would be abolished" as part of the RIF:
(Id. ¶ 32.) Willis's amended complaint further alleges that these factors "were [then] manipulated and misused[,]" and that "the purported 'competitive process' used for selecting individual job[s] was a ruse[.]" (Id.) With respect to Willis in particular,Principal Branch allegedly ranked Willis with "a score of 5% out of a 100, [which] was outrageously lower than teachers in [Willis's] competitive level who were uncertified,[] had less 'supplemental professional experience,' and knew less about and had participated less in addressing the needs of students [and] their parents, DCPS in general, and . . . Ballou High School." (Id. ¶ 33; see also id. ¶¶ 39-40 ().) According to the amended complaint, Branch further justified his poor evaluation of Willis by citing Willis's "negative attitude[,]" which was allegedly said to be based on Willis's having "align[ed] himself with teachers that foster conflict and resistance to implementing the school improvement plan." (Id. ¶ 41.) In addition to alleging that Branch had "discriminatory motives of age[] and race" with respect to his evaluation of Willis (id. ¶ 35), the amended complaint also asserts that Branch's evaluation of Willis "was retaliatory, because . . . Mr. Willi[s] accused [Branch] of [m]ismanaging [f]ederal [f]unds and donated funds" (id. ¶ 8).
Willis filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on October 6, 2010 (see id. ¶ 49); he received a notice of his right to sue on July 22, 2014 (see id. ¶ 66). He then timely filed the instant lawsuit. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) On April 23, 2015, the District filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (see ECF No. 12). The District's motion apparently prompted Willis to file a motion seeking leave from this Court to file an amended complaint (see ECF No. 27), which the Court granted (see Min. Order of Sept. 15, 2015). Willis filed the operative amended complaint on October 1, 2015. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30).
Willis's amended complaint has eleven counts. Counts I and II claim age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Counts III and IV allege race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Counts V, VI, and VIII—which are brought pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code—allege violations of Willis's constitutional rights of freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection violations. (See id. ¶¶ 115-31 (Count V, Free Speech and Due Process); id. ¶¶ 132-36 (Count VI, Equal Protection); id. ¶¶ 153-57 (Count VIII, Equal Protection).) Count VII-1 alleges race discrimination under federally assisted programs in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. .)3 Finally, Counts VII-2, IX, and X allege District of Columbia common-law violations. (See id. ¶¶ 144-52 (Count VII-2, Defamation); id. ¶¶ 158-64 (Count IX, Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy); id. ¶¶ 165-71 (Count X, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).)
On October 2, 2015, the District filed a renewed motion to dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, which argues that all of Willis's claims fail for various reasons. (Def.'s Mot. at 1.) Specifically, the District asserts that the doctrine of res judicata bars Willis's claims of age and race discrimination (Counts I through IV), because "[f]ive years ago, [Willis's] union brought (and ultimately lost) acase on his behalf that was based on the same age [and race] discrimination allegation[s] that [Willis] makes here." (Id. at 1-2.)4 The District further maintains that this Court "lacks jurisdiction to determine whether the RIF was properly implemented[,]" because "only the Office of Employee Appeals [] has jurisdiction to consider...
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