Willis v. Isd
| Decision Date | 11 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | SA-16-CA-00887-ESC |
| Parties | VENICA WILLIS, Plaintiff v. SAN ANTONIO ISD, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [#31] filed by Defendant San Antonio Independent School District ("SAISD"), the Response [#36] filed by Plaintiff Venica Willis, and Defendant's Reply [#38]. The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended ("ADA"). See 28 U.S.C. §1331. The undersigned has authority to enter this Order as both parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge [#11, #12]. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).1
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff Venica Willis's ADA claims. Plaintiff's complaint also purports to sue Defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("ADEA"). Defendant in its summary judgment motion makes clear that it interprets a previous order of this Court to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims other than her ADA claims. That Order [#3] was issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Pamela Mathy, who has since retired and was succeeded by the undersigned. In her Order, Judge Mathy explicitly granted Plaintiff permissionto proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on her ADA claims, but did not explicitly authorize her to proceed on her ADEA or Title VII claims.
To clarify the record, for the reasons stated in Section I, Plaintiff's ADEA and Title VII claims are DISMISSED. In addition, for the reasons stated in Section II, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claims [#31] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's claims for race, color, and sex discrimination under Title VII, as well as her claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, must be dismissed. In a case that involves a plaintiff who is proceeding IFP, a court must dismiss any claim at any time if the court determines that the claim is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).2 In evaluating whether an IFP plaintiff has stated claim in her complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must apply the same standards governing dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007)). These factual allegations need not be detailed but "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A conclusory complaint—one that fails to state material facts or merely recites the elements of a cause of action—may be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See id. at 555-56.
Of course, courts must construe pro se complaints liberally. Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir.2010). A pro se complaint, even if inartful, "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted). But a plaintiff's pro se status will not serve as "an impenetrable shield . . . [to] clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation . . ." Farguson v. Mbank Houston N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff's complaint contains claims for multiple forms of discrimination, including race, color, sex, age, and disability. Prior to filing a lawsuit alleging discrimination against a former employer, an employee is required to exhaust administrative remedies. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002). To exhaust a claim, an employee alleging discrimination must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id.; see also Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (). After the EEOC completes its investigation of the charge and issues its right-to-sue letter, the employee who filed the charge can sue the employer in federal court, but only for the same type of discrimination that was alleged in the charge, and that the EEOC therefore had the opportunity to investigate. See Bouvier v. Northrup Grumman Ship Sys., Inc., 350 Fed. App'x 917, 921 (5th Cir. 2009) (although courts construe an EEOC charge "somewhat broadly" to determine "what EEOC investigations it can reasonably be expected to trigger," a plaintiff's failure to reference one form of discrimination in her charge defeats her ability to file suit for such a claim) (quoting Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 792(5th Cir. 2006)); see also Floyd v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 532 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (S.D. Miss. 2006) ()
That means the employee must limit the discrimination claims asserted in the lawsuit to the type of discrimination explicitly described in the EEOC charge, other claims that are "like or related" to the discrimination the employee described in the charge, and claims that could "reasonably be expected to grow" out of the discrimination described in the charge. Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1970) (). So, for instance, where an employee only included allegations of race and age discrimination in her EEOC charge, she was precluded from also suing for sex discrimination. See Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990).
The form EEOC charge document contains boxes that an employee can check describing different forms of discrimination, including "age," "sex," "race," and other protected categories. While an employee does not necessarily doom her discrimination claim if she fails to check the appropriate box so long as her factual description of the discrimination puts the EEOC on notice of the various types of discrimination she is alleging, if the employee neither checks the box nor describes facts that would support a particular category of discrimination, that type of discrimination claim will be deemed unexhausted. See Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 792 ().
In this case, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, which she attached to her complaint when she filed her lawsuit. (See Orig. Compl. at 6-7.) In her charge, she complained of discriminatory treatment based upon her weight, and she checked the box for discrimination based on "disability" only.3 (Id. at 6.) She did not check the boxes for "sex," "race," "color," or "age." Nor in describing the factual basis of her discrimination claim did she allege any facts that would have suggested that she was claiming to be retaliated or discriminated against based on anything other than her alleged disability so that the EEOC would have been on notice to investigate potential sex, race, color, or age discrimination. Her allegations of discrimination based on sex, race, color, and age are not "like or related to" the allegations in her Charge and could not "reasonably be expected to grow out of" the charge. Thus, Plaintiff's sex, race, color, and age discrimination claims are unexhausted, assuming the EEOC charge she attached to her complaint is the only EEOC charge she filed.
A plaintiff bears the burden to plead and ultimately prove administrative exhaustion. See DeJesus-Harris v. Blockbuster Video, No. CIVA SA04-CA-1099XR, 2006 WL 2620510, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006); see also Smith v. Flagship Int'l, 609 F. Supp. 58, 61 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (citing Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1980)). Where a plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal is appropriate. DeJesus-Harris, 2006 WL 2620510, at *5; Smith, 609 F. Supp. at 61. Here, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on a form pleading that explicitly directs her to attachany EEOC charge she filed. (See Orig. Compl. at 4.) She attached one charge—which only alleges disability discrimination and retaliation. Thus, Plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of pleading and proving that she administratively exhausted her Title VII and ADEA claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims—disability discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. The uncontroverted evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff will not be able to establish an essential element of each claim, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to...
To continue reading
Request your trial