Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office

• Decision Date: 01 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1317,96-1317
• Citation: 118 F.3d 542
• Parties: 76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1841, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,824 Gladys F. WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY AUDITOR'S OFFICE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 542

118 F.3d 542

76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1841,

71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,824

Gladys F. WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY AUDITOR'S OFFICE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-1317.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 6, 1996.

Decided July 1, 1997.

Kevin Scionti (argued), Kenneth T. Roberts, Roberts & Bishop, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James S. Stephenson, John T. Roy (argued), Stephenson, Daly, Morow & Kurnik, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Gladys Willis brought an action in the district court, alleging discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a supplemental state law claim. She also alleged that her discharge had been in retaliation for seeking redress for the alleged discriminatory conduct. The district court dismissed the Title VII discrimination claim and the supplemental state claim on the ground that the applicable statutes of limitation barred relief. Because, on the papers before the court on summary judgment, there appeared to be a genuine issue of triable fact on the retaliation claim, the district court proceeded to trial on that claim. The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Willis. The district court, considering the entire trial record, then determined that the evidence of record would not support the claim. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Ms. Willis now appeals this latter ruling. Because we believe that the district court was correct in concluding that the record will not support the jury's verdict, we affirm its judgment.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Ms. Willis is an African-American woman who worked for the Marion County Auditor's Office as an accounts payable technician until she was discharged on July 31, 1992. In that position, Ms. Willis was responsible for processing invoices for the payment of vendors who supplied services to Marion County. In early February 1992, one of the vendors called the office to complain that its bill, which was supposed to have been processed by Ms. Willis, had not been paid. When asked by her supervisor, Dorothy Conklin, about the invoice, Ms. Willis replied that she did not have the vendor's invoice. When Conklin checked Ms. Willis' files, ¹ she discovered that Ms. Willis had not processed the bill and that several other overdue invoices had not been processed. Conklin issued Ms. Willis two written reprimands for this incident and suspended Ms. Willis for three days. ² Conklin also placed Ms. Willis on probation for 30 days.

After this incident, Ms. Willis filed a grievance with Conklin's supervisor, Deputy Auditor Shirley Mizen. Ms. Willis challenged the reprimands, alleging that Conklin had discriminated against her based on her race and had planted the overdue invoices in her file. Mizen sent Ms. Willis a memorandum requesting more detail or other information supporting her conclusory allegations, but did not receive any further information. Mizen concurred in the issuance of the reprimands and informed Ms. Willis of her further review options. Ms. Willis then took the grievance to the county's grievance panel. The panel approved disciplinary action but recommended that the two reprimands be consolidated into one and that the suspension therefore be reduced to one day. The Auditor, John von Arx, accepted this recommendation, but extended the probationary period to 60 days.

On March 18, the same vendor again called to complain that several of its invoices had not been paid. Again, Conklin found the missing invoices in Ms. Willis' work area. Because this was the second such incident, Ms. Willis was reprimanded and suspended for three days. She did not file an internal grievance but did file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Indiana Civil Rights Commission. Soon thereafter, Conklin and another supervisor, Lori Hupp, initiated a three-day turnaround policy for invoices: All invoices had to be processed within three days of the technician's receipt of the invoice.

In April, during a spot check for compliance, one invoice was found in Ms. Willis' files that would violate this new policy, and Ms. Willis was given an oral reprimand. No further action was taken. During another spot check of the entire accounts payable staff in July, while Conklin was on vacation, Hupp discovered eight invoices that violated the policy in Ms. Willis' files. ³ Mizen convened a meeting at which Ms. Willis was given the opportunity to explain why the unprocessed invoices were found in her files. After the meeting, Mizen concluded that Ms. Willis should be reprimanded for violating Marion County policy, and Hupp issued the reprimand. Because Ms. Willis had received three written reprimands, in a one-year period, for failing to perform her assigned duty, she was discharged pursuant to the office's personnel policy. Ms. Willis then filed a second charge with the EEOC, alleging that Marion County had discharged her in retaliation for filing her original discrimination claim.

B. District Court Proceedings

Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment to Marion County with respect to the claim of racial discrimination and the pendent state claim. Both claims, the district court determined, were time barred. Ms. Willis does not appeal that decision. The court, however, allowed the retaliatory discharge claim to proceed.

At trial, Ms. Willis produced evidence indicating that Conklin and Hupp were biased against African-Americans. These individuals had been overheard making comments to the effect that black employees were less motivated, ambitious and intelligent than white employees, in addition to several other highly inappropriate remarks. Ms. Willis also presented testimony that Conklin frequently would hover around Ms. Willis' desk. The jury returned a verdict in Ms. Willis' favor.

Marion County's attorney filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law; the district court granted the motion. Noting that it had allowed the case to go to the jury in order to avoid the necessity of retrial in the event of reversal on appeal, the district court held that there was insufficient evidence, even when combined with all inferences reasonably drawn in Ms. Willis' favor, to support a verdict that the supervisor with decisionmaking authority had discharged Ms. Willis to retaliate for Ms. Willis' earlier filing of a discrimination claim. The court pointed out that neither employee who had been heard making racially derogatory statements was the decisionmaker in Ms. Willis' firing. In contrast to the materials presented at the summary judgment stage, the evidence at trial did not support, the court determined, the conclusion that Deputy Auditor Mizen had harbored any racial animus or had fired Ms. Willis for any reason other than for her tardy processing of invoices. The court also held that the trial record would not support a jury determination that the employer's procedure for discharge had been used as a conduit for Conklin's and Hupp's desire to retaliate against Ms. Willis for her EEOC claim of discrimination. The district court further ruled that, if its judgment as a matter of law were overturned, Marion County would be entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.

II DISCUSSION

In reviewing a district court's grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we apply the same standard as did the district court. "We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and ascertain whether there exists any evidence upon which a jury could reach a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., 58 F.3d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir.1995) (internal quotation and citations omitted). A mere scintilla is not enough. La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.1984). Here, the jury found that Marion County discharged Ms. Willis in retaliation for her filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Once the plaintiff prevails before the jury, her method of proof at trial is irrelevant; we simply ask whether the jury's verdict for Ms. Willis could be sustained on the whole record. Hiatt v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir.1994); see Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996).

A.

In considering the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court focused initially on whether the individual who had the authority to discharge Ms. Willis acted in retaliation for Ms. Willis' engaging in the protected activity of filing a discrimination claim. The decisionmaker was Mizen, the Deputy Auditor. Mizen was the individual who, after hearing Ms. Willis' explanation as to why there were seven invoices in her file that violated the three-day turnaround policy, informed Ms. Willis that her employment was terminated. Mizen subsequently informed the Auditor that she had terminated Ms. Willis.

Having identified the decisionmaker, the district court proceeded to analyze the evidence with respect to her motivation for discharging Ms. Willis. The court concluded that Ms. Willis had presented no evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mizen, as opposed to her subordinates, harbored either a desire to terminate Ms. Willis for engaging in protected activity or even a general racial animus. The case had survived summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claim because of Rebecca Cafouros' affidavit. In her affidavit, Cafouros had stated that she overheard Conklin and Mizen in conversations in which negative remarks had been made about the African-American employees and about Ms. Willis in particular. Cafouros further had averred that, at a meeting following Ms. Willis'...