Willis v. Palmer

Decision Date30 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. C12-4086-MWB (Lead Case),C12-4086-MWB (Lead Case)
Citation175 F.Supp.3d 1081
Parties Damon Willis, Calvin Matlock, Harold Williams, Dave L. Taft, Jr., Paul Huston, Syveno Wright, Eddie C. Risdal, Donald E. Phillips and Michael Millsap, Plaintiffs, v. Charles Palmer, Jason Smith, Matthew Royster, Bob Stout, Bill Turner, Steve Tjaden and Mike Loescher, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Jay Elliott Denne, Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Robert Tiefenthaler, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Gretchen Witte Kraemer, Department of Justice, John Barry McCormally, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARK W. BENNETT, U.S. DISTRICT COURT, JUDGE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...1085
A. Procedural History ...1085
B. Factual Findings ...1087
1. Civil commitment generally ...1087
2. The treatment process ...1089
3. Defendants ...1092
4. Defendants' deposition testimony ...1093
5. Plaintiffs ...1094
6. Relief ...1097
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ...1097
A. Issues ...1097
B. Summary Judgment Standard ...1097
C. Younger Abstention ...1099
1. Standard ...1099
2. Analysis ...1099
D. Colorado River Abstention ...1101
1. Standard ...1101
2. Analysis ...1101
E. Heck v. Humprey...1102
1. The standard ...1102
2. Analysis ...1103
F. Is CCUSO Constitutional? ...1106
1. Treatment program ...1106
2. Punitive as applied ...1110
3. Least restrictive alternative ...1111
G. Qualified Immunity ...1112
H. Personal Responsibility ...1113
I. Contract Claims ...1114
J. Money Damages ...1114
III. CONCLUSION ...1115

“Relax,” said the night man,

We are programmed to receive.

You can check-out any time you like,

But you can never leave!”1

Like the unlucky guest at the eponymous hotel, the plaintiffs, long-term patients at the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) in Cherokee, Iowa, filed this lawsuit arguing that their constitutional rights have been violated because defendants have created a treatment system where the plaintiffs may check-out anytime they want, but they may never leave.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural History

Currently before me is a motion for summary judgment, filed by the defendants, requesting that I dismiss plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983

lawsuit. (docket no. 71). In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants rely on various legal doctrines to argue that plaintiffs' confinement comports with constitutional standards and their current federal claims are barred.

The patients at CCUSO are former inmates who were prosecuted by the State of Iowa for sex crimes. They have served their prison terms but, in a separate civil trial, have been found likely to commit further violent sexual offenses. Pursuant to that finding, the State of Iowa committed the plaintiffs (and other CCUSO residents) to civil confinement at the state hospital in Cherokee. Patients at CCUSO can be released if they complete treatment or if they are released by the state court that originally committed them. This will be discussed in far more detail below.

Willis filed the initial pro se complaint in this case on September 26, 2012. (docket no. 1.). On January 24, 2013, Judge O'Brien entered an initial review order (IRO) allowing Willis's claim to proceed and appointing attorney Jay Denne to represent him. (docket no. 2). On February 15, 2013, Judge O'Brien entered an IRO in case C13-4018, consolidating Matlock's then pending pro se complaint with Mr. Willis's above captioned case. (docket no. 8).

Mr. Denne subsequently filed an amended complaint on behalf of Willis and Matlock. (docket no. 16) The amended complaint had six counts. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide proper treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Iowa Constitution, and the Iowa Code. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were inflicting unconstitutional punishments under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. Third, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were failing to use the least restrictive type of confinement as required by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. Fourth, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were subjecting CCUSO patients to inhumane treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. Fifth, the plaintiffs allege that I.C.A. Section 229A is unconstitutional as applied. Sixth, the plaintiffs alleged common law breach of contract relating to the CCUSO Handbook and treatment contracts. (docket no. 16).

On May 2, 2013, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (docket no. 17). On June 14, 2013, Judge O'Brien entered an IRO in C13-4047-DEO. (docket no. 21). In that pro se case, plaintiffs Taft, Huston, Millsap, Wright, Risdal, and Philips alleged that they were not receiving meaningful treatment and that CCUSO's program was unconstitutionally punitive in nature. Judge O'Brien concluded their pro se case made claims similar to those made by Willis and consolidated C13-4047-DEO with the above captioned case. (docket no. 21). Judge O'Brien also appointed attorney Robert Tiefenthaler to act as co-counsel on the case along with Mr. Denne. Id.

On June 21, 2013, Judge O'Brien entered an IRO in case C13-4052-DEO. In that pro se complaint, Williams asked to be added to Willis's case. Judge O'Brien granted his request. (docket no. 23). On July 26, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to sever the Taft group of plaintiffs from the rest of the case. (docket no. 21). Judge O'Brien conducted a hearing and denied that motion on August 16, 2013. (docket no. 40). On September 4, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. (docket no. 41). In the second amended complaint, the plaintiffs made the same general allegations as in the initial amended complaint, discussed above, but added plaintiffs Taft, Huston, Millsap, Wright, Risdal, Williams, and Philips. (docket no. 41).

On September 25, 2013, the defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss. (docket no. 42). On September 15, 2014, Judge O'Brien granted in part and denied part the motion to dismiss. Specifically, Judge O'Brien allowed all of the plaintiffs' claims to proceed except those filed under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. (docket no. 51, p. 24).

On September 26, 2014, the defendants' filed an answer, generally denying the plaintiffs' allegations and alleging various affirmative defenses. (docket no. 52). Shortly thereafter, two additional CCUSO patients filed pro se complaints similar to those filed in this case. Judge O'Brien considered those filings (docket nos. 57 and 63) as motions to join. After giving the parties an opportunity to respond, Judge O'Brien denied the motions to join and stayed the two new cases pending the resolution in this case. (docket nos. 67 and 68). The defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment on July 28, 2015. (docket no. 71). On August 18, 2015, Judge O'Brien passed away and this case was reassigned to me. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a resistance. (docket no. 79). On October 22, 2015, the defendants filed a final reply brief. (docket no. 80).

B. Factual Findings

This case involves the legal history of CCUSO, the state of the treatment program at CCUSO, and the history of various CCUSO patients. Many of the facts are undisputed.

1. Civil commitment generally

Confining individuals with mental health disorders has a long, and often ugly, history in this country. Historically,

the criminal justice system was afforded considerable prerogative in the performance of its duties which allowed it to discreetly “sweep up” [the mentally ill]. Sanctions could be imposed for “status offenses,” such as vagrancy, even though a specific criminal act had not occurred. Law enforcement officials similarly had wide latitude in their investigations of crimes, with relatively few protections provided to a criminal suspect (e.g., little scrutiny was given to the circumstances under which a confession was given). Following conviction, criminal sentences varied widely and could be increased for individuals perceived as particularly threatening. Finally, once incarcerated, the focus was on assuring secure custody at minimal cost.

Thomas L. Hafemeister & John Petrila, Treating the Mentally Disordered Offender: Society's Uncertain, Conflicted, and Changing Views , 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 733 (1994)

. Thankfully, the civil rights era brought increased awareness to those suffering from mental illness and also caused a reexamination of civil commitment laws. Today,

[i]nvoluntary civil commitment statutes exist in every state, and allow the state to commit a person against his or her will if there is proof of a mental disability

that poses a substantial threat of serious harm to oneself or others. The threat of harm must be real and present, and the burden of proof to establish dangerousness (to self or others) must be clear and convincing.

Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Prevention , 9 J.L. & Pol'y 879, 880-81 (2001)

. The state of Iowa commits persons suffering from ‘normal’ mental illness pursuant to IOWA CODE § 229.2

The U.S. also has a long history of committing persons considered sexual deviants.

The involuntary commitment of sexual predators has its roots in the 1930s when state legislatures first introduced procedures for confinement of “sexual psychopaths, sexually dangerous persons, and sex offenders.” The State of Michigan was the first state to pass such legislation in 1937. These statutes varied in nature and in jurisdictional basis. Some required prior criminal convictions for sex offenses. Many laws required different evidence of mental illness, personality disorders, and propensity to sexually re-offend. Virtually all statutes provided for involuntary civil commitment until the offender was deemed no longer a danger or threat to
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2 cases
  • West v. Palmer
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • August 17, 2017
    ...(January 9, 2017). 2. The treatment "phases" at CCUSO have been explained in numerous other orders. See, e.g., Willis v. Palmer, 175 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1090-92 (N.D. Iowa 2016). 3. The deliberate indifference standard arising under the Fourteenth Amendment for patients who have been civilly ......
  • Wood v. Burns, 5:19-cv-00228-DPM-JJV
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • August 28, 2019
    ...to the ADC, thus the rules imposed on him through the ADC's inmate handbook provide no mutual assent. See Willis v. Palmer, 175 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1114 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (handbook for involuntarily committed patients was not a legally binding contract). Thus, I conclude the facts in the Compl......
1 books & journal articles
  • Part two: case summaries by major topics.
    • United States
    • Detention and Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 69, June 2017
    • June 1, 2017
    ...(Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism, Illinois) U.S. District Court CIVIL COMMITMENT SEX OFFENDER Willis v. Palmer, 175 F.Supp.3d 1081 (N.D. Iowa 2016). Long term sex offender patients who were committed to civil confinement at a state hospital, who were former prison inmate......

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