Willis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company
Decision Date | 07 August 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 7835.,7835. |
Citation | 269 F.2d 549 |
Parties | George WILLIS, III, Administrator d. b. n. of Estate of Jacob Willie Bell, deceased, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Robert Cantor and J. D. McMullan, Richmond, Va., (Cantor, McMullan & Cantor, Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas H. Willcox, Jr., and Thomas H. Willcox, Norfolk, Va. (Willcox, Cooke, Savage & Lawrence, Norfolk, Va., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SOPER, Circuit Judge, and BOREMAN and THOMPSON, District Judges.
This case is before the Court on appeal from the decision of the District Court denying appellant's motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter judgment for appellant or to order a new trial on the single issue of damages or on all the issues. The appellant, personal representative of J. W. Bell, deceased, plaintiff in the trial court, and the appellee, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, defendant in the trial court, will be referred to herein as plaintiff and defendant, respectively.
Seaman 2nd Class J. W. Bell was killed when the automobile operated by him collided with the side of defendant's moving train where the highway intersects defendant's double-track main line railroad in Northampton County, Virginia. Plaintiff brought this action for damages on account of Bell's death.
The defendant's evidence tended to show that:
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that:
the defendant\'s train conductor was in the caboose, the last car on the train, and as the caboose crossed the crossing, he looked out the window and saw that the gate on the side from which Bell had approached was about half way up, high enough that there was room for an automobile to have passed beneath the extreme extension of the gate without striking it. Highway Trooper Duval and Naval Investigator Powell arrived at the scene approximately two hours after the accident and observed skid marks in the north lane (Bell\'s proper lane) of the highway which seemed to veer to the center of the road, near the crossing. They found no scratches or marks on the gate. They made photographs of the scene of the accident at that time. They also found a gouged-out place on one of the cross-ties in the north highway lane, which they undertook to identify as having been made by the right-front wheel of Bell\'s vehicle from a piece of matching wood they found in the right-front wheel of his car.
This evidence presented a factual situation for the jury. The applicable law is found in the Virginia highway crossing statutes, Va.Code Ann. § 56-414 (1950)1 requiring the defendant to have its locomotive equipped with certain warning signals, and § 56-4162 thereof providing that if the required statutory signals are not given and an accident occurs, the comparative negligence rule is applicable. Under these statutes, if the statutory signals were not given, such failure constitutes negligence per se, and the defendant would be liable if such failure proximately contributed to the accident even though Bell may have been guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. Negligence on the part of Bell would mitigate the damages, but not bar a recovery. If, however, the defendant gave the required statutory signals, it then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was guilty of other negligence which was the sole proximate cause of the accident, for if the statutory signals were given, plaintiff can recover only if his decedent was free from any negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, as the doctrine of comparative negligence is only applicable where the statutory signals are not given.
The jury was fully instructed on the different theories of negligence involved. The jury found for the defendant. There was an abundance of credible evidence to support its finding, and we will not disturb the verdict unless there was reversible error in the trial.
The plaintiff seeks a reversal on the following grounds, which, stated in his brief, are as follows:
The first ground assigned is that the court should have allowed the testimony of Dorothy Pete to go...
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