Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant

• Decision Date: 22 July 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 9028.
• Citation: 231 F. Supp. 396
• Parties: George WILLIS, Jr., Woodrow T. Lewis, and Albert L. Dunn, Plaintiffs, Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, Intervenor, v. The PICKRICK RESTAURANT, a Corporation, and Lester G. Maddox, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

231 F. Supp. 396

George WILLIS, Jr., Woodrow T. Lewis, and Albert L. Dunn, Plaintiffs, Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, Intervenor, v. The PICKRICK RESTAURANT, a Corporation, and Lester G. Maddox, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 9028.

Untied States District Court N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

July 22, 1964.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William H. Alexander, Atlanta, Ga., Jack Greenberg, Constance Baker Motley and Michael Meltsner, New York City, and Burke Marshall and St. John Barrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs and intervenor.

Sidney T. Schell, Atlanta, Ga., and William G. McRae, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals, and HOOPER and MORGAN, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This suit was filed by the three named plaintiffs, all Negroes, for themselves and for the class consisting of all other Negroes, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants from violating the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in connection with their operation of a large restaurant in the City of Atlanta.

The United States was permitted to intervene as it is authorized to do under Section 204 of the Act, upon proper certification by the Attorney General. Its intervention was, by amendment, denominated a "complaint in intervention", and it asserted "This is a complaint filed by the United States under Section 206 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after leave to intervene has been granted to the United States under Section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964".

Following its intervention, the Attorney General filed the certificate required under Section 206(b) (where the Attorney General initiates the action), to the effect that in the opinion of the Attorney General "the case is of general public importance". The Attorney General also filed a request for a three-judge court, which is also provided for under Section 206(b), where a proceeding is filed by the Attorney General. Treating the complaint in intervention of the United States in the same light as if the Attorney General had filed the suit initially, the undersigned Elbert P. Tuttle, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, designated a three-judge court to hear and determine the case.

To a considerable extent this is a companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States of America and Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, D. C., 231 F.Supp. 393. While the cases were not joined for argument, the trial of this case commenced immediately following the hearing and argument in the Heart of Atlanta Motel case by the same three-judge court. All parties and the Court recognize that to a considerable degree similar questions of constitutional law were present in both cases.

The real question presented by this complaint and the Government's complaint on intervention is whether Section 201(a), (b) (2) and (c) (2) is constitutional.¹

In substance, this section of Title II declares the right of every person to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services and accommodations of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, etc., if it serves or offers to serve interstate travellers, or if a substantial portion of the foods it serves has moved in commerce.

As was the situation in the Heart of Atlanta Motel case, here, too, the defendants admit that they are denying members of the Negro race the right to be served in their restaurant on account of race. Unlike the other case, however, the application of the Civil Rights Act to these defendants depends upon the resolution of issues of fact, for a restaurant is not brought within the definition of interstate commerce unless it meets one of the tests enumerated in subparagraph (c) of Section 201. These tests are in the alternative. Either it must serve or offer to serve interstate travellers, or a substantial portion of the food which it serves or other products which it sells must have moved in interstate commerce.

Thus, since each place of public accommodation conducts an entirely separate and distinct operation, the factual determination from which the Court must decide that it either is or it is not within the class described in the Act must be made on the circumstances of each case. The decision that is made here, therefore, must necessarily relate to these defendants only, and, by way of stare decisis, to such other places of public accommodations that are sufficiently similar in circumstances as to require the application of the same legal principles to them.

While the proof of actual service to interstate travellers was slight,² there was no doubt but that the defendants offer(ed) service to interstate travellers. This was made apparent by the fact that witnesses testified that upon presenting themselves for service no inquiry was made as to their place of residence, but probably more importantly it was proved that the restaurant has several large signs on two important business route portions of federal highways, such signs being located several blocks from the place of business; moreover, the restaurant itself it situated on the main business route of U. S. 41, a federal interstate highway.

It is likewise clear beyond any question that a very substantial part of the dollar value of the food and other products served or sold by defendant restaurant originated outside the State of Georgia, and that it thus "has moved in in commerce". It should be made plain that this substantial portion is a very substantial figure in annual volume. The restaurant has annual gross receipts from its operations of over $500,000 for the last year, and its purchases of food exceeded $250,000. It was stipulated that it has 61 employees regularly engaged in its operation.

The principal attack made on the constitutionality of the application of the Civil Rights Act to this restaurant is largely one of degree. It is contended that if Congress is to be permitted to bring within its regulatory power what has heretofore been known as a local business merely because its business is a dealing in products which have been shipped in interstate commerce, this would, in effect, abolish all distinctions between what is local and what is national in scope, and thus all would end up in the federal domain.

The plaintiffs and the United States contend that defendants offered to serve interstate travellers, together with the fact that it unquestionably does serve some interstate travellers is sufficient, if Congress so establishes the test, to bring it within the actual stream of commerce. If such is the law, and it may well be determined by the Supreme Court to be the law, then there would be no distinction between a large restaurant serving interstate travellers and a unit of the hotel or motel industry. However, we think we need not go so far in this case, especially on account of the relatively weak proof of actual service to the travelling public, in view of the other test.

We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court's decision in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, a Court whose judgments are binding on this Court, in National Labor Relations Board v. Citizens Hotel Company, 5 Cir., 313 F.2d 708, completely answer the principal contention of the defendants. The facts in the Reliance Fuel Corporation case are that the National Labor Relations Board sought to take jurisdiction in an alleged labor relations dispute by employees of Reliance Fuel Corporation. Jurisdiction of the Board was challenged on the ground that all of the fuel sold by Reliance had been purchased by it locally within the State of New York from Gulf Oil Corporation, and deliveries were made to Reliance from stocks stored in warehouses or tanks located within the state. Thus, it was contended that according to the classical argument prior to National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, the business of Reliance was "local", and its labor relations could not be subjected to congressional control. Elaborating the principle by which it decided that the Labor Board had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court said at 371 U.S. 226-227, 83 S.Ct. 313-314:

"The Act establishes a framework within which the Board is to determine `whether proscribed practices would in particular situations adversely affect commerce when judged by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress. Whether or no (sic) practices may be deemed by Congress to affect interstate commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board. Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce.' Polish National Alliance of United States of North America v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643 at 648 64 S.Ct. 1196 at 1199, 88 L.Ed. 1509 * * *.

"That activities such as those of Reliance affect commerce and are within the constitutional reach of Congress is beyond doubt. See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122. Through the National Labor Relations Act, `* * * Congress has explicitly regulated not merely transactions or goods in interstate commerce but activities which in isolation might be deemed to be merely local but in the interlacings of business across state lines adversely affect such commerce.' Polish National Alliance of United States of North America v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. at 648 64 S.Ct. at 1199."

Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided in National Labor Relations Board v. Benton & Company, 5 Cir., 313 F.2d 629, that a small Florida corporation engaged in strictly local activities of dredging shells to be sold for...