Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2361,92-2361 |
| Citation | 21 F.3d 1368 |
| Parties | 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2524, 63 USLW 2032, 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,698, 9 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 1208 Robert E. WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCHE BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES, INC., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, George M. Allison, M.D., Bill Pace, Bill Bringhurst, Martha Kivlovitz, Defendants. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Bruce V. Griffiths, Houston, TX, for appellant.
D. Faye Caldwell, Jack E. Urquhart, Holtzman & Urquhart, Houston, TX, for Roche Biomedical.
Appeals From the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before KING and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, PARKER, * District Judge.
Robert E. Willis ("Willis") filed this action in Texas state court on July 31, 1991, asserting negligence and defamation claims arising out of a test of Willis's urine that resulted in a false positive for methamphetamines. Willis brought action against Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc. ("Roche"), the laboratory that performed the urinalysis; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company ("Du Pont"), his employer; and four Du Pont employees, George M. Allison, M.D., Bill Pace, Bill Bringhurst, and Martha Kivlovitz. (The Du Pont company and its employees are referred to collectively as "the Du Pont defendants" or Du Pont.)
On August 22, 1991, the Du Pont defendants, joined by Roche, removed the action to federal court on the ground that Willis's claim arose under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The district court subsequently granted the Du Pont defendants' motion to dismiss because Willis had failed to exhaust his contractual remedies. Although Willis appealed from the order of dismissal, that appeal has been previously dismissed and is not now before this Court.
On June 29, 1992, the district court granted Roche's motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed.
The district court concluded that the following facts were established by the summary judgment evidence; and neither party disputes that this portion of the district court's opinion is correct.
Plaintiff-Appellant Willis has been employed by Du Pont at its La Porte, Texas chemical plant since March 26, 1979 as a utility helper. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, his employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement, which included a substance abuse policy covering La Porte plant employees. In July 1990, Du Pont, in alliance with the Union, instituted a random drug testing policy.
Du Pont contracted with Roche to conduct the screening and testing of urine samples provided by Du Pont in accordance with strict protocol procedures in the contract.
On August 2, 1990, Du Pont ordered that Willis participate in a random drug test, in accordance with its substance abuse policy. The test was performed by Roche and a report issued to Du Pont, pursuant to a consent form signed by Willis. The report indicated that Willis had tested positive for methamphetamine use. Willis remained employed at Du Pont and continued to receive his regular salary after Du Pont received Roche's report. Willis was placed on restricted work duty and was sent to a physician. Plaintiff was also required to attend counseling sessions and was required to submit to follow up testing.
On November 2, 1990, Roche informed Du Pont that Willis's drug test had registered a "false positive" (for methamphetamine use). The false positive was the result of confusing the presence of over the counter cold medication with the presence of illegal methamphetamine in Willis's urine. Upon learning of the mistake, Du Pont compensated Willis for lost time and for medical expenses.
Willis brought suit for negligence, gross negligence, and libel and slander--contending that his damages included various aspects of mental suffering and the loss of his good name and reputation. He also claimed monetary damages, but acknowledged that Du Pont had made monetary amends with regard to the payment of these sums in the form of lost work time repayment and reimbursement for medical expenses.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Willis's motion to remand the case to state court, the district court found that Willis's state law claims were preempted by Sec. 185 of the LMRA. If that is correct, the questions before us are governed by substantive federal law. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) () However, the court below applied state law to the claims in its Memorandum Opinion granting summary judgment to Roche.
We hold that Willis's claims against Roche are not preempted by the LMRA, because they do not require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for resolution. Rather, the district court had pendant jurisdiction over these state claims, and it appropriately applied Texas law.
Willis challenges the district court's interpretation of Texas law and its determination that no genuine issue of Defendant's negligence existed in the summary judgment record. We review de novo the district court's determination of state law. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (). The standard of review at the appellate level of a district court's grant of summary judgment requires the same analysis as employed by the trial court. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). Legal questions raised by a grant of summary judgment are reviewed de novo.
To recover under a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff (here, Willis) must establish that the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff, and then, that the defendant breached this duty, and that damages proximately caused by this breach were suffered by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex.1983). The first question in a negligence case such as this one--whether a duty from the defendant toward the plaintiff exists--is obviously a pure legal issue, reviewed by this Court de novo. The second question, whether any such duty was breached by the defendant, is a more nuanced "legal" issue for de novo review by this Court; it is a legal issue only to the extent the district court decided that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of a material issue of genuine fact on the breach question. See, e.g., Jones v. Southern Marine & Aviation Underwriters Inc., 888 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir.1989) ().
The party moving for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (here, Roche) bears the burden of establishing that its opponent has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56 first imposes a burden of production on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. In a case in which the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial--such as this case--the movant might satisfy its burden shifting obligation by either: (1) submitting evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent's claim or defense; or (2) demonstrating that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the opponent's claim or defense. If (and only if) the movant satisfies this prima facie obligation, the movant will have sufficiently "shifted" the summary judgment burden to the nonmovant--to demonstrate that summary judgment is actually inappropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-55, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178-179 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
Of course, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (). Nevertheless, just as settled is the principle that, when viewing summary judgment motions, courts must be vigilant in determining whether either an inference or circumstantial evidence might suffice to create the existence of a factual dispute about the claims--lest courts "use summary judgment as a 'catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into [their] toils and deprive [the litigants] of a trial [to which they are actually entitled].' " Fontenot v. Upjohn, 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir.1986) (). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (...
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