Willis v. State

• Decision Date: 10 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-0707-CR-295.,49S02-0707-CR-295.
• Parties: Sophia WILLIS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

888 N.E.2d 177

Sophia WILLIS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 49S02-0707-CR-295.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 10, 2008.

Robert D. King, Jr., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0611-CR-982.

RUCKER, Justice.

This case requires us to examine the balance that must be struck in determining when a parent's use of physical force as a form of discipline crosses the line into criminal conduct. We conclude the line was not crossed in this instance.

Background and Procedural History

Sophia Willis is a single mother raising her eleven-year-old son, J.J., who has a history of untruthfulness and taking property belonging to others. The events at issue in this case began at an elementary school Friday, February 3, 2006. On that date J.J.'s fifth grade teacher, Ms. McCuen, saw J.J. giving a bag of women's clothing to a classmate. Finding this to be an "odd exchange," Ms. McCuen contacted J.J.'s mother. Tr. at 31. Willis met with Ms. McCuen and identified the clothing as hers.

Experiencing ongoing disciplinary problems with J.J., Willis sent him to her sister's home over the next two days to ponder her options. When J.J. returned on Sunday Willis had a long conversation with her son and questioned him about his conduct. J.J. denied taking the clothing and instead concocted a story that shifted blame to other students. Willis warned that if he did not tell the truth he would be punished. J.J. again gave the same story. In response Willis instructed J.J. to remove his pants and place his hands on the upper bunk bed. J.J. complied, and Willis proceeded to strike him five to seven times with either a belt or an extension cord.¹ Although trying to swat J.J. on the buttocks, his attempt to avoid the swats resulted in some of them landing on his arm and thigh leaving bruises. J.J. testified that during this exchange his mother was "mad." Tr. at 9. Willis countered that she was not angry but "disappointed." Id. at 59-60.

The following Monday J.J. returned from gym class and asked to see the school nurse.² Showing the nurse the bruises, J.J. told her that he received a "whooping" from his mother "[b]ecause I had took some clothes and I had lied." Tr. at 8. The nurse contacted child protective services that in turn contacted the Indianapolis Police Department. Id. at 26.

Willis was arrested and charged with battery as a Class D felony.³ After a bench trial she was found guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that Willis was a single mother attempting to raise a sometimes rebellious son. Tr. at 65 (The trial judge emphasized there were "obviously some disciplinary issues with regard to [J.J.]"); Id. at 75-76 ("I know that you've been through a lot of things with your son. . . . [T]here were issues [and] the teachers were concerned. . . ."). Noting the uncertainty of the law in this area, the trial court also observed, "[T]his is a tough area of the law. . . . Because you know that a person's intent was not to do the wrong thing. . . . I don't have a good answer for you [as to where to draw the line]. . . . I do believe that as the case law is written that the incident that was before [the court] rose to the level of D Felony, Battery on a Child." Tr. at 75-76. Exercising its discretion to enter judgment of conviction as a Class A misdemeanor,⁴ the trial court sentenced Willis to 365 days in jail with 357 days suspended to probation.

Contending that she had the legal authority to discipline her son, Willis appealed on grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. Sympathizing with Willis' argument that she is a single parent doing the best she can and acknowledging that this is a "closer case" than other reported Indiana decisions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Willis v. State, 866 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Having previously granted Willis' petition to transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the trial court. Additional facts are set forth below as relevant.

Discussion

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). This fundamental interest includes the right of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children," Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14, 92 S.Ct. 1526, including the use of reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior. See I.C. § 31-34-1-15(1) (Entitled "Circumstances Under Which a Child Is a Child in Need of Services," the statute provides in part, "This chapter does not ... [l]imit the right of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child."). However, the potential for child abuse cannot be taken lightly. Consequently, the State has a powerful interest in preventing and deterring the mistreatment of children. See Prince v. Dep't of Child Servs., 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) ("[A] parent's right to her children is balanced against the State's limited authority to interfere for the protection of the children."); Parker v. Monroe County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 533 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989) ("Fundamental rights to family integrity protect the relationship between parent and child from state action; however, in the event of parental neglect, abuse, or abandonment, the State has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child."). The difficult task of prosecutors and the courts is to determine when parental use of physical force in disciplining children turns an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal.

A parental privilege to use moderate or reasonable physical force, without criminal liability, was recognized at common law. For example, Blackstone observed, "[B]attery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice." William Blackstone, 3 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 120 (Oxford reprint 1992). A similar view has been expressed in this state's jurisprudence. See e.g., Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 777, 778 (1891) ("[F]ather has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being guilty of an assault and battery, but he has no right to administer unreasonable chastisement, or to be guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of his child...."); Hornbeck v. State, 16 Ind.App. 484, 45 N.E. 620, 620 (1896) ("The law is well settled that a parent has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being guilty of an assault and battery....").

A number of jurisdictions have specifically codified a parental discipline privilege.⁵ Although Indiana has not yet done so, our courts have construed Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1⁶ — the defense of legal authority — as including reasonable parental discipline that would otherwise constitute battery. See Cooper v. State, 831 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Over several decades our courts have addressed parental claims of legal authority. See e.g., Johnson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind.Ct.App.1998); Townsend v. State, 616 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ind. Ct.App.1993), rev'd on other grounds, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (Ind.1994); Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986). Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals has observed, there is still "precious little Indiana caselaw providing guidance as to what constitutes proper and reasonable parental discipline of children, and there are no bright-line rules." Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422, 427 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We agree. And since adoption of the Criminal Code, this Court has not had the occasion to address the parental discipline privilege.

As a matter of judicial declaration or legislative enactment, several jurisdictions have embraced some, parts, or all of either the Model Penal Code or the Restatement (Second) of Torts to identify permissible parental conduct in the discipline of children. We think it helpful to take a look at these sources. The Model Penal Code provides in relevant part that a parent's use of force is justifiable if:

(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his misconduct; and

(b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.

Model Penal Code § 3.08(1) (1985). We make two observations. First, the Code does not explicitly demand that the use of force be reasonable. Second, under the Code, so long as a parent acts for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare (including the specific purpose of preventing or punishing misconduct), the parent is privileged in using force, unless the force creates a substantial risk of death or excessive injuries. Neither of these two propositions finds support in Indiana's common law. We conclude therefore that the Model Penal Code is not a helpful source to inform our decision on the law in this area.

In contrast, the Restatement provides, "A parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education." Restatement of the...