Willis v. U.S., 85-1325

Citation787 F.2d 1089
Decision Date08 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 85-1325,85-1325
PartiesBernard Shaney WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Anna R. Lavin, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Elizabeth Stein, Asst. U.S. Atty., Anton Valukas, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before BAUER, WOOD, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Bernard Shaney Willis appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment against him in the action he brought challenging the government's forfeiture of his automobile. Willis had claimed that the procedures attending the forfeiture violated his fourth and fifth amendment rights, and he had sought the return of the vehicle, money damages and costs, and a judgment declaring those procedures unconstitutional. The district court held that it could not take cognizance of the money damages claims because of jurisdictional and sovereign immunity principles. The district court did find jurisdiction over Willis's claims for equitable and declaratory relief, but on the merits of those claims held that Willis had not demonstrated that his constitutional rights had been violated. Although we decline to reach certain of the jurisdictional issues, we agree that the district court had jurisdiction to reach the merits of Willis's claims and we affirm its grant of summary judgment.

I.

Section 881(a)(4) of 21 U.S.C. authorizes the United States Attorney General, through the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), to seize "[a]ll ... vehicles ... used ... to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment" of illegal, controlled substances. After seizure, forfeiture proceedings are initiated along one of two routes: if the seized property is valued at less than $10,000, 1 the DEA can institute a summary forfeiture, which takes place solely at the administrative level. Constitutional due process requirements are satisfied by providing interested parties with notice and the opportunity to force the government to institute judicial forfeiture proceedings. If the property is valued at $10,000 or more, the DEA must promptly refer the matter to the United States Attorney responsible for undertaking the judicial procedure.

Agents of the DEA seized Willis's 1977 Chevrolet Corvette on August 4, 1981. On August 24, 1981, the DEA notified Willis by letter that his car had been seized "for violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(4)," that the appraised value of the car was $8,000, and that steps were being taken to forfeit the vehicle pursuant to federal statutes and regulations. Copies of the applicable regulations were enclosed with the letter. The letter further stated:

If it is your intention to file a petition for remission or mitigation of forfeiture, it must be filed in triplicate with this office within 30 days from the date of this letter and must conform to the requirements outlined in the above cited authorities.

If you intend to place the matter in the United States District Court to contest the probable cause for this seizure, a claim and cost bond of $250.00 must be filed with this office on or before September 16, 1981. Indigent persons who desire to place the matter before the court, but who are unable to post the $250.00 bond, may file an Affidavit of Indigency. Further information on this is available from the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The letter closed by providing the name and telephone number of a DEA employee to whom Willis could address questions. Attached to the letter was a copy of a notice that the DEA was to publish, pursuant to the requirements of the forfeiture statute. That notice was similar to portions of the DEA's letter and stated the following:

Notice is hereby given that on August 4, 1981 one 1977 Chevrolet Corvette, Vehicle Identification Number 1Z37L7S407252 was seized at Chicago, Illinois for violation of 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4). Any person desiring to place the matter in the United States District Court in order to contest the probable cause for such seizure must file with the Special Agent In Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration, 219 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1800, Chicago, Illinois 60604, a claim and cost bond of $250.00, with approved sureties, on or before September 16, 1981. Otherwise, the property will be administratively forfeited pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1607-1609 and will be disposed of according to law. Interested parties may file petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture with the Special Agent In Charge pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1618 and 21 CFR 1316.79-1316.81 without filing a claim and cost bond.

On September 21, 1981, Willis served the DEA with his Petition for Remission of Seized Property, which asserted that Willis had not violated the law and had no knowledge that his vehicle had been used in violation of the law. The petition further asserted that the DEA agents had no "search warrant to seize any items in the vehicle ... or the vehicle itself" and that the seizure violated Willis's fifth amendment rights. The DEA responded to Willis's petition by letter dated January 7, 1982. The letter stated that "[t]he petition is denied since the facts reveal that the petitioner was involved in the use of the vehicle in violation of the law. Therefore, under the policy of the Department of Justice, the petitioner is not entitled to administrative relief." Subsequent efforts by Willis's counsel to obtain further information about the "facts" referred to in the DEA's response were unavailing. 2

Willis filed a complaint in federal district court on September 30, 1982, alleging that he had been deprived of his property without due process of law. After amendment, Willis's complaint made out the following claims: (1) that the DEA lacked probable cause to seize Willis's car and therefore that the seizure violated his fourth and fifth amendment rights; (2) that the notice failed adequately to inform him of the fact that his pursuit of an administrative, rather than judicial, procedure would constitute a waiver of his right to a hearing; (3) that the DEA's refusal to grant Willis a hearing amounted to a violation of the forfeiture statute, a failure to exercise discretion, and a denial of due process; and (4) that the 108-day lapse between his filing of the petition and the DEA's response violated his right to due process. Willis asked for equitable relief in the form of the return of his car, and for a declaration that the DEA's procedures were in derogation of the forfeiture statute and denied him due process rights. Willis also sought money damages, including interest, attorney's fees and costs, and compensation for loss of use and depreciation. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States on January 11, 1985.

II.

Although Willis and the government agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to review Willis's claims for monetary, equitable, and declaratory relief, the court sua sponte raised several jurisdictional concerns before it concluded that it had jurisdiction over only the non-monetary claims. 3 We agree with the district court that section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702, effects a waiver of sovereign immunity for the claims to equitable and declaratory relief and thus that the court could reach the merits of Willis's claims.

Section 702 of the APA provides that: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States.

Although the district court viewed section 702 as both a waiver of sovereign immunity and an independent source of substantive right and subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that section 702 effects only a waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 n. 47, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1725 n. 47, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-06, 97 S.Ct. 980, 983-984, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Thus, although sovereign immunity is waived pursuant to section 702, Willis's claims rest on his rights under the fourth and fifth amendment, and subject matter jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, the general federal question jurisdiction.

III.

Reaching the merits of Willis's claims, we agree with the district court that they are groundless--but we stress that this is a close case. Willis's first claim is that the DEA lacked probable cause to seize his car. But...

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