Willis v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-4111,91-4111 |
| Citation | 972 F.2d 350,1992 WL 180181 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Charlene WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before RALPH B. GUY, Jr. and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge. *
The plaintiff, Charlene Willis, appeals the district court's dismissal of her suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671, et seq., for injuries allegedly caused by negligence of the Postal Service. A plaintiff is barred from bringing suit under the FTCA unless an administrative claim is first presented to the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Willis had failed to present her claim to the Postal Service within the time required. We agree and affirm.
The plaintiff alleges that on June 13, 1988, she tripped on a broken sidewalk outside the Middletown Post Office in Ohio and broke her arm. On August 26, 1988, Willis's attorney, Bruce B. Gudenkauf, wrote a letter to the Superintendent of Postal Operations of Middletown regarding plaintiff's injury. The United States Postal Service MSC Accident Investigator, Curtis McKinney, Sr., sent a letter, dated September 9, 1988, to Gudenkauf stating that he had received Gudenkauf's letter of August 26. McKinney indicated that he needed additional information and requested that it be sent to a specific address in Cincinnati.
On June 8, 1990, Gudenkauf mailed a Standard Form 95 claim form with the appropriate documentation to the specified address. The envelope, mailed from Middletown, contained the wrong zip code and was not received at the Cincinnati address until June 14, 1990. The two-year statute of limitations expired on June 13, 1990.
The Postal Service subsequently notified Gudenkauf that plaintiff's claim would be denied because it was not timely presented within the meaning of the statute to the Postal Service. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 39 C.F.R. § 912.5. "A claim [is] deemed to have been presented when the U.S. Postal Service receives from a claimant ... written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain." 39 C.F.R. § 912.5(a).
Plaintiff then filed this action in the district court for relief pursuant to the FTCA. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that the timely filing of an administrative claim with the Postal Service was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction. The court found that this prerequisite could not be waived, was not subject to estoppel, and had not been met. The court noted, however, that it did not have before it a copy of the August 26 letter and that it would reconsider its decision if that letter contained the information required by 39 C.F.R. § 912.5(a).
Plaintiff subsequently submitted the letter to the district court with an accompanying motion for reconsideration. The court denied the motion on September 19, 1991, because the letter "failed to make a claim for money damages in a sum certain" as required by section 912.5. (App. 13). Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
Plaintiff argues that the defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because counsel detrimentally relied on McKinney's request that the required information be sent to Cincinnati. Plaintiff asserts that counsel did not know that he could have met the statutory requirements by presenting the requested information at the Middletown Post Office, 39 C.F.R. § 912.4, and would have researched the issue but for McKinney's request. Plaintiff further argues that the general rule that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against the government does not apply because the Post Office, a quasi-independent commercial enterprise, is the real party in interest. See Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir.1982) (). Moreover, she claims that the statute of limitations poses no jurisdictional bar because the Post Office is generally capable of being sued. 39 U.S.C. § 409. Finally, Willis suggests that the Middletown Post Office received the required information within the statutory period because the documents were mailed in Middletown on June 8 and could have arrived at the Middletown Post Office on their way to Cincinnati no later than June 11, 1990. We consider these claims together and find them without merit.
The mere mailing of documents does not constitute presentment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). See Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir.1981). We refuse to adopt an exception to this rule for claims involving the Postal Service. We agree with the district court that Willis presented her claim after the statute of limitations had expired.
This circuit has long recognized that the timely filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite for which there is no equitable exception. Rogers v. United States, 675 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam); accord Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). Whether or not the Post Office is the real party in interest is irrelevant. Congress conditioned the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity upon compliance with the statute of limitations. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). Although the Post Office may generally sue and be sued, its capacity to be sued in tort is limited by the requirements of the FTCA. 39 U.S.C. § 409(c); 1 see Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988) (). The Postal Reorganization Act explicitly states:
Unless otherwise provided in this title, the provisions of title 28 relating to service of process, venue, and limitations of time for bringing action in suits in which the United States, its officers, or employees are parties ... shall apply in like manner to suits in which the Postal Service, its officers, or employees are parties.
39 U.S.C. § 409(b) (emphasis added). Section 409 demonstrates Congress's intent that the Postal Service "should be treated as a government entity rather than a private business when application of [the statute of limitations] is at issue." Mahoney v. United States Postal Serv., 884 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir.1989) (). We hold that there is no "Postal Service exception" to the jurisdictional requirement of the FTCA that an administrative claim be timely filed. Accordingly, the doctrine of estoppel cannot apply.
Moreover, we reject Willis's argument that equitable tolling, even if available for certain claims involving the Postal Service, is warranted on these facts.
AFFIRMED.
Because I find that Willis fulfilled the statutory requirement that she present her administrative tort claim to the Postal Service in this case, I respectfully dissent.
I make only a few additions to the facts as described by the majority. Willis's attorney, Bruce P. Gudenkauf, sent the following letter, dated August 26, 1988, to Angelo Mancini, the Superintendent of Postal Operations in the Middletown, Ohio Post Office:
Dear Sir:
Please be advised that this office was retained by the above referenced person [Charlene Willis] to represent her in connection with the presentation of a claim under the Federal Torts Claim Act [sic] with respect to personal injuries she sustained as a result of a fall at the Middletown Post Office which occurred on or about June 13, 1988.
Kindly direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to this office. Also, please furnish us with any statements that your agency may have taken of our client.
Furthermore, if your agency has medical payments insurance coverage, kindly also advise us of the name of your insurance company and the name, address, and telephone number of the adjuster who will be handling this claim, or of your insurance agent.
Finally, Mrs. Willis is continuing to be treated for her injury. As soon as we are able to obtain a written report by the attending physician showing the degree of permanent disability, if any, and the prognosis, we shall prepare and file an SF 95, together with the appropriate documentation.
On September 9, 1988, Curtis McKinney, Claims Coordinator of the Cincinnati Division of the U.S. Postal Service, notified Gudenkauf that he had received his letter dated August 26, 1988, but that he required some additional information to be mailed to him in Cincinnati. McKinney sent the following letter to Gudenkauf:
I am acknowledging receipt of your letter that was sent to the Middletown Post Office.
I was not able to interview your client when I arrived at the Middletown Post Office. Mr. Mancini was not able to make arrangements with her while I was there. I need to get a statement from her and I need to photograph the shoes that she was wearing at the time of the alleged fall.
In support of a claim for personal injury, you will have to submit a written report by the attending physician, showing the nature and extent of injury, the nature and extent of treatment, the degree of disability, if any, the prognosis, the period of hospitalization or incapacitation, attaching itemized bills for medical or hospital expenses actually incurred. I need your client to sign an...
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Branstad v. Veneman
...to the patentee, which would not be the case here. A nearer miss, but a miss nevertheless, is Willis v. United States, 972 F.2d 350, 1992 WL 180181 (6th Cir.1992) (table opinion), upon which the USDA also now relies. In Willis, the plaintiff used the wrong zip code on the mailing of a claim......