Willis v. United States, 7068.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1938
• Docket Number: No. 7068.,7068.
• Parties: WILLIS v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

69 App. DC 129, 99 F.2d 362 (1938)

WILLIS v. UNITED STATES.

No. 7068.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued May 18, 1938.

Decided July 5, 1938.

Reargument Denied October 13, 1938.

George E. Sullivan, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Alex. H. Bell, Jr., Henry H. Glassie, and David A. Pine, all of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and VINSON, Associate Justices.

VINSON, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia in a condemnation proceeding which was instituted by the United States of America. The case was tried before a jury in the District Court at which time each of the parties introduced two expert witnesses who testified as to the value of the property, two lots and dwelling, to be taken. After hearing the testimony, the jury had a view of the land, at which time the dwelling had been removed, and, thereupon, returned a verdict for the appellant in the sum of $2,811 as compensation for the property. The record then discloses that the appellant filed "Objections and Exceptions" to the verdict on the ground that the "appraisement" was inadequate, unjust and unreasonable; that it was not supported by, but contrary to, the evidence in the case; and that it disclosed a plain oversight or abuse of discretion on the part of the jury. Thereafter, the District Court overruled the "Objections and Exceptions" and ratified and confirmed the verdict of $2,811. From this order, the appellant appeals and assigns as error here substantially the same objections as were filed in the lower court to the verdict of the jury.

The statutes relative to the condemnation of land in the District of Columbia are evolutions of several prior acts of Congress. Until 1929, the same procedure was provided for both the United States and the District of Columbia. The acts differed in their respective provisions concerning the method of appraisement. The Act of August 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 412, 413, § 3, 40 U.S. C.A. § 120, set out the procedure for the taking by condemnation of private property in the District of Columbia. It provided for the appointment of 3 commissioners to examine the premises, hear persons, and make their appraisement. Their report was to be confirmed by the court. The statute contained no specific grounds for setting aside the appraisement. The Act of June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 665, controlled the condemnation proceedings necessary for the extension of Columbia Road. It provided for a jury to view the premises and to hear evidence relative to the value of the property taken. After verdict, the court was granted power to hear any objections made to the verdict and to set it aside when satisfied that it was unjust or unreasonable. From the Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1266, § 487 et seq., until March 1, 1929, there was provision for a jury to view the premises and to hear evidence relative to the value of the property taken. After verdict, if any party interested excepted to the verdict, the court could set it aside "for good reasons". On March 1, 1929, Congress changed the method of procedure in condemnation cases in the District of Columbia. Different methods were provided for the United States (45 Stat. 1415, c. 416; Tit. 25, c. 5, § 100 et seq., D.C.Code of 1929; 40 U.S.C. §§ 361-386, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 361-386) and for the District of Columbia (45 Stat. 1437, c. 439; sec. 487, Tit. 25, c. 5, § 41 et seq., D.C.Code of 1929).

This action is brought under the act of Congress which allows the United States of America to condemn private property situate in the District of Columbia whenever that property is necessary and desirable for suitable development of the National Capital park, parkway, and playground system. 45 Stat. 1415, c. 416. The act sets forth with particularity the necessary steps in the trial of the case (sec. 14) "in like manner as in other civil trials", its submission to the jury (sec. 15) "as in other trials at law", and the vacation of the verdict (sec. 16) "as in other trials at law and upon the ground that said verdict, or any award contained therein is, in the judgment of the court, grossly excessive, or inadequate, or otherwise unreasonable or unjust." D.C.Code 1929, T. 25, §§ 110c to 110e, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 374-376.

We quote in part, the applicable sections:

"Sec. 14. * * *

"Every party, whether petitioner or respondent, may except to any ruling of the court admitting or excluding evidence, granting, rejecting, or modifying prayers for instruction, or other ruling made in the cause in like manner as in other civil trials.

"Sec. 15. At the close of the evidence the court shall charge the jury as in other trials at law and furnish them with a written form to be used in returning their verdict. * * *

"Sec. 16. The court shall have power to set aside or vacate the verdict of the jury, or any award contained therein, and to grant a new trial upon the same grounds as in other trials at law and upon the ground that said verdict, or any award contained therein is, in the judgment of the court, grossly excessive, or inadequate, or otherwise unreasonable or unjust. * * *" (Italics supplied.)

Although they were not applicable in the instant case, counsel for appellant followed the provisions, concerning procedure after verdict, of the present statute relating to acquisition of land for the District of Columbia. This statute differs materially in its procedural steps from Chapter 416, supra, providing for the condemnation of land for the United States. It provides for the drawing of a jury who shall hear evidence and return to the court their appraisement of the land. The court may then hear any objections or exceptions filed against the appraisement, and shall have the power to vacate and set aside any appraisement when satisfied it is unjust or unreasonable and appoint a new jury. This is analogous to the procedure which formerly obtained in the condemnation of land either by the District of Columbia or the United States. We quote in part from the statute relating to the setting aside of the verdict of the jury in the condemnation of land for the District of Columbia, (45 Stat. 1437, c. 439): "The said court shall hear and determine any objections or exceptions that may be filed to any appraisement of the jury and shall have the power to vacate and set any appraisement aside, in whole or in part, when satisfied that it is unjust or unreasonable * * *." D.C.Code 1929, T. 25, § 46.

As stated, counsel for appellant did not file a motion for a new trial called for by Chapter 416, sec. 16 thereof, supra, D.C. Code, T. 25, § 110e. However, the appellee throughout the action has treated it as a motion for a new trial. The court below, overruling the objections and exceptions, entered judgment upon the verdict of the jury. We feel that, under the circumstances of this case, this court may well treat it as a motion for a new trial.

In this court counsel for appellant urges his theory of sound value for the house in question. He says in his brief: "In the case at bar, the Court below declined to interfere with the jury's arbitrary acceptance of a mere guess or speculation by a person who admitted his lack of acquaintance with the present sound value of the building, and who admitted that the sound value should be added to the land value given by him."

The record contains no exceptions respecting the admissibility or exclusion of evidence by either party; no objections to any of the instructions given by the court; no request for a modification thereof; and no request for a particular instruction, submitting any theory relied upon by appellant. Therefore, appellant will not be heard in ...