Willisch v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | 09–5511,09–5514,10–5016.,09–6077,09–5513,09–5515,Civil Action Nos. 09–5276,09–5510,09–5512,10–5469 |
| Citation | 852 F.Supp.2d 582 |
| Parties | Gary WILLISCH, et al. v. NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA Deborah Kolesar v. Encompass Indemnity Company Nicole Mecadon v. Allstate Indemnity Company Ronald Bucari, et al. v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company Robert Besecker, et al. v. Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company Albert Baldoni v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Pamela Lowe–Fenick, et al. v. Progressive Specialty: Insurance Company Ann Warrick v. Allstate Insurance Company Jeffrey D. Justice, II v. Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company Of America Marc Waterman v. USAA Casualty Insurance. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Ira Neil Richards, Jennifer E. Agnew, Kenneth I. Trujillo, Gary M. Goldstein, Trujillo Rodriguez & Richards LLC, Anthony J. Bolognese, Joshua H. Grabar, Bolognese & Associates, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, Christopher P. Caputo, Joseph E. Mariotti, Caputo & Mariotti, Scranton, PA, for Gary Willisch, et al.
G. Franklin McKnight, IV, Michael R. Nelson, Nelson Levine De Luca & Horst, LLC, Blue Bell, PA, for Nationwide Insurance Company of America and Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America.
Mathieu Shapiro, Thomas A. Leonard, Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Encompass Indemnity Company, Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
William C. Foster, Marshall Dennehy Warner Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company.
James T. Moughan, Britt, Hankins & Moughan, Philadelphia, PA, for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
Deborah J. Krabbendam, Francesco P. Trapani, Robert N. Feltoon, Conrad O'Brien, Philadelphia, PA, for Progressive Specialty Insurance Company.
Richard L. Scheff, Peter Breslauer, Philadelphia, PA, for USAA Casualty Insurance.
In these putative class actions filed on behalf of all policyholders of the defendant automobile insurers whose cars were equipped with antitheft devices and did not receive a ten percent discount on their premium for comprehensive coverage, the plaintiffs allege that the insurers violated § 1799.1 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 1701–1799.7 (West 2011). In addition to the statutory claim, they also contend that the insurers breached the implied terms of their insurance contracts when they failed to give the antitheft device discount as they had promised in their rate filings with the Insurance Commissioner. Some plaintiffs assert an additional claim for breach of express contract terms.
With respect to the statutory claim, the plaintiffs contend that the insurers violated § 1799.1 of the MVFRL, the antitheft device discount statute, when they failed to apply a ten percent discount to the premiums for comprehensive coverage for cars equipped with a passive antitheft device as standard equipment. Their breach of contract claim is based on the respective insurer's rate filing with the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner and the insurance contract. Asserting that the rate filing is an implied term of each insurance contract and that the devices on the insured vehicles meet the respective insurers' rate filings' definition of a qualifying device, the insureds argue that the insurers breached the contracts by failing to give the discount. The express breach of contract claim rests upon the language of some policies that represent that the insurers will give the insureds all discounts to which they are entitled under the rate filings and/or information in their possession.
The insurers contend that the plaintiffs' theory of liability rests upon a flawed interpretation of § 1799.1. They argue that the statute does not require them to give the discount described in § 1799.1 unless the insured explicitly requests it. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the insurers must give the discount for each insured's vehicle that has a qualifying device, even without the insured specifically requesting it. Thus, the dispute over the statutory claim is whether the insurer must give the discount only if the insured asks for it.
After examining the text, structure and purpose of the MVFRL, and applying rules of statutory construction, we hold that the passive antitheft device discount provision, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1799.1, mandates that automobile insurers give a ten percent discount on the premium for comprehensive coverage to all of its insureds whose vehicles are equipped with qualifying antitheft devices—whether or not they request it. We also conclude that the failure to give the discount to those insureds whose vehicles contain passive antitheft devices as defined in the insurers' rate filings constitutes a breach of the implied terms of the insurance contracts.
Initially, nine separate putative class actions were filed, each case filed by one or two insureds against a different insurer.1 All parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the statutory interpretation issue, and each insurer filed its own motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The plaintiffs have moved to certify the class in each action. 2 The insurers also filed a joint opposition to the class certification motion. Shortly after oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, three more putative class actions were filed by insureds against three new insurers.3 These later cases were consolidated with the earlier cases.
Typically, a ruling on the plaintiffs' motions for class certification would precede disposition of the motions for summary judgment. However, the parties requested a ruling on the summary judgment motions before deciding the class certification motions.4 Thus, we shall decide the cross motions for summary judgment 5 and deny the motions for class certification without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to file motions to certify classes in light of this memorandum opinion.6
At the center of the dispute is the Pennsylvania antitheft device discount provision, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1799.1. The question is whether the statute mandates that automobile insurers give discounts of at least ten percent on comprehensive coverage premiums to an insured whose vehicle is equipped with a “passive antitheft device” without the insured requesting the discount. Put another way, are insurers only required to give the discount to those insureds who request it?
In resolving the dispute, we must construe the antitheft device statute by applying rules of statutory construction. As a federal court in a diversity action, we shall apply Pennsylvania law to interpret the Pennsylvania statute. 7Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir.2010); see also United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 369–70 (3d Cir.2005) ().
The aim of interpreting and construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Bd. of Revision of Taxes v. City of Philadelphia, 607 Pa. 104, 4 A.3d 610, 622 (2010); Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Cos., 584 Pa. 382, 883 A.2d 562, 567 (2005) (citing 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1921(a)). The starting point is the language of the statute. The plain, unambiguous language of the statute is the best expression of legislative intent. 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1921(b); Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609, 807 A.2d 830, 835 (2002). Hence, where the language is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to look beyond the statute's text.
On the other hand, where the statutory language is ambiguous or the words are “not explicit,” the statutory principles established by the General Assembly for ascertaining its intent are employed. 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1921(c). 8 As we explain later, because the statutory language is unambiguous, we do not apply the factors set forth in § 1921(c).
Additionally, there are two important presumptions that guide the interpretation task. First, it is presumed that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result, or one that is impossible to execute. Bd. of Revision of Taxes, 4 A.3d at 622 (citing 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1922(1)-(2)).9 Second, the General Assembly is presumed to have intended to favor the public interest over any private interest. 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1922(5).
To overhaul Pennsylvania's automobile insurance scheme, the General Assembly enacted the MVFRL, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 1701–1798, in 1984. The MVFRL was later amended in 1990 (“Act 6”), amending many MVFRL provisions and adding §§ 1799–1799.7. One of the primary purposes of the MVFRL and its amendments was to reduce insurance premiums to enable more drivers to purchase insurance. See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 93–94 (3d Cir.2009) . 10 To accomplish this goal, the legislature provided various premium discounts to reduce the cost of insurance to the insureds.11
Among the discounts was one for vehicles equipped with antitheft devices. The relevant section reads:
§ 1799.1. Antitheft devices
(a) General rule.—All insurance companies authorized to write private passenger automobile insurance within this Commonwealth shall provide premium discounts for motor vehicles with passive antitheft devices. These discounts shall apply to the comprehensive coverage and shall be approved...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cessna v. Rea Energy Coop., Inc.
... ... See Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 298 F.R.D. 285, 292 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Seldon, 647 F.Supp.2d at 470 ). And for both ... Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 135 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001), which "reconciled the conflicting case ... 649, 660, 43 S.Ct. 651, 67 L.Ed. 1157 (1923) ); see also Willisch v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 852 F.Supp.2d 582, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ("Statutes that pertain to ... ...
-
Moll v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-1040
... ... See West v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. , 509 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2007); Willisch v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. , 852 F. Supp. 2d 582, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co. , 10 F.3d ... ...
-
Gramaglia-Parent v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co.
...in force,' pertinent statutory provisions are deemed incorporated into the insurance contract.” Willisch v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 852 F.Supp.2d 582, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Clairton City Sch. Dist. v. Mary, 541 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)); see also Coolspring Stone Supply......
-
Boyle v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-5515
... ... See Willisch v ... Nationwide Ins ... Co ... of Am ., 852 F. Supp. 2d 582, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2012). After Page 3 the summary judgment decision, the plaintiffs ... ...