Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of Shelby

Citation611 N.W.2d 693,235 Wis.2d 409,2000 WI 56
Decision Date20 June 2000
Docket Number No. 98-0138., No. 97-2075
PartiesWILLOW CREEK RANCH, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. TOWN OF SHELBY and County of LaCrosse, Defendants-Respondents. WILLOW CREEK RANCH, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. TOWN OF SHELBY and County of LaCrosse, and Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by James R. Koby, Julie A. Mougin and Parke O'Flaherty, Ltd., LaCrosse and oral argument by James R. Koby.

For the defendant-respondent, Town of Shelby, there was a brief by William W. Ehrke and Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by William W. Ehrke.

For the defendant-respondent, County of LaCrosse there was a brief by David L. Lange, Deputy Corporation Counsel, LaCrosse and oral argument David L. Lange.

For the defendant-respondent, Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company, there was a brief by Bradley D. Armstrong, Steven A. Brezinski and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison and oral argument by Steven A. Brezinski.

s 1. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

Willow Creek Ranch (Willow Creek) seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals that in these consolidated cases affirmed summary judgments in favor of the Town of Shelby (Town), the County of La Crosse (County), and Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company (WMMIC).2 Willow Creek contends that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has the exclusive authority to regulate the operation of a game bird farm and that the actions of the Town and the County in regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm were illegal and unconstitutional.

s 2. We conclude that the DNR's statutory authority does not preclude the authority of the Town and the County to regulate the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm. We further conclude that the Town's and the County's actions are immune from suit under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (1995-96)3 and that the actions are legal and constitutional. Finally, we determine that the Town and County are not equitably estopped from asserting immunity as a defense or preventing the operation of Willow Creek's game bird farm. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

s 3. Willow Creek owns 115 acres of land in the Town of Shelby, La Crosse County. Willow Creek's property is zoned as an "Exclusive Agricultural" district (Agricultural A) under La Crosse County Zoning Ordinance § 17.34. Agricultural A district uses are limited to specific agricultural activities, while Agricultural B district uses include activities that are more commercial in nature. The County has the authority to enact and enforce zoning ordinances while the Town has the power to veto a county zoning change.

s 4. In late 1993, Willow Creek contacted the Town to inquire whether a zoning change was required to operate a game bird farm on its property. The Town chairperson, Jeff Brudos, allegedly informed Willow Creek that no county rezoning was needed for Willow Creek's operation of a game bird farm.4 Shortly prior to the opening of the farm in late 1994, and after already having expended substantial sums of money, Willow Creek obtained a DNR license.5 s 5. In 1995, the County notified Willow Creek that because it was conducting a commercial hunting enterprise on property zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes, it needed to petition for rezoning. Subsequently, Willow Creek petitioned the County to rezone its property to Agricultural B. Willow Creek also met with the Town to discuss the possibility of obtaining a conditional use permit that would enable it to continue operation as Agricultural A property. The County and Brudos instructed Willow Creek to follow several conditions to guarantee the safe operation of the game bird farm. Willow Creek agreed to follow those conditions and took steps to ensure compliance.

s 6. The County informed Willow Creek in December 1995 that it should cease operation pending the resolution of the zoning issues. However, a month later, the County allowed Willow Creek temporarily to resume operation. Responding to citizen concerns about safety and noise from the operation of the game bird farm, the Town passed a resolution in February 1996 indicating that it would neither approve the rezoning of Willow Creek's property nor grant a conditional use permit.

s 7. Although the County granted Willow Creek's petition for rezoning in March, the Town vetoed the County's decision consistent with the Town's prior resolution against rezoning and a conditional use permit. Subsequently, the County issued Willow Creek a citation for violating the County's zoning ordinance by conducting commercial hunting activities on property zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes s 8. In May 1996, Willow Creek filed the first of two suits, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Town and County had acted in excess of their authority and had exercised their powers in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner. In addition to the declaratory judgment, Willow Creek requested an injunction prohibiting the Town and County from taking further action in interference with the operation of its game bird farm. It also argued that the Town and County should be equitably estopped from preventing the operation of the game bird farm, because Willow Creek had relied to its detriment upon the misrepresentations of Town Chairperson, Jeff Brudos.

s 9. The Town and County moved for summary judgment asserting that they had acted according to their statutory authority in deciding to enforce the zoning ordinance and to veto Willow Creek's petition to rezone. They also argued that the DNR's authority to issue a license for the operation of a game bird farm did not preclude the County's authority to devise and enforce zoning ordinances.

s 10. Subsequently, Willow Creek filed a notice of claim with the Town and County pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), making a formal demand for money damages. Upon the disallowance of its claims, Willow Creek filed a second suit raising essentially the same issues as in its first suit but this time seeking money damages.

s 11. In July 1997, the circuit court granted the Town's and the County's motions for summary judgment and dismissed Willow Creek's first suit. Subsequently, the Town, the County, and its insurer, WMMIC, moved for summary judgment on the second suit, arguing that claim preclusion barred Willow Creek's second suit and that the Town and County were immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) because their actions represented discretionary acts. In December 1997, the circuit court dismissed Willow Creek's second suit and granted the motions for summary judgment. Willow Creek appealed both summary judgments, and the appeals were consolidated.

s 12. The court of appeals determined that although the DNR has the statutory authority to regulate game farms, its licensing authority does not preclude the Town and County from creating and enforcing zoning ordinances. In addition, the court concluded that the Town and County did not act arbitrarily or in excess of their statutory authority by issuing Willow Creek a citation for operating its game bird farm on property zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes. The court also concluded that the Town and County are immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).

[1, 2]

s 13. When we review motions for summary judgment, we follow the same methodology as does the circuit court. Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 337-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). If there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the resolution of the action is appropriate for summary judgment. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).

[3]

s 14. Our initial inquiry of whether the DNR's authority to regulate the operation of game farms prevents the Town and County from regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm involves a matter of statutory interpretation and presents a question of law. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). Likewise, our subsequent inquiries of immunity and equitable estoppel present questions of law. Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996); Harms v. Harms, 174 Wis. 2d 780, 784, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993). This court reviews questions of law independently of the determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals, while benefiting from their analyses. Miller v. Thomack, 210 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997).

Licensing v. Zoning Authority

s 15. We address first whether the DNR's authority to regulate the operation of game farms under Wis. Stat. § 29.574 and Wis. Admin. Code NR § 16.02 prevents the Town and County from regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm.6 If we decide that the DNR's authority to license precludes the zoning authority of the Town and the County, we need not address the remaining issues raised by Willow Creek on this appeal.

s 16. Willow Creek maintains that because the regulation of game farms lies within the exclusive province of the DNR, the Town and County had no authority to restrict the operation of Willow Creek's farm through the enforcement of the County zoning ordinance and the veto of Willow Creek's rezoning petition. We disagree. The location of game bird farms remains subject to local zoning rules, notwithstanding a DNR license granting an owner the right to establish such a farm.

[4]

s 17. Municipal bodies have only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by the legislature or are necessarily implied from the powers conferred. First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Town of Catawba, 183 Wis. 220, 224, 197 N.W. 1013 (1924). Wisconsin Stat. § 29.574 provides for the licensing of "game bird and animal" farms and gives...

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