Willprecht v. Willprecht

• Decision Date: 06 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20190201,20190201
• Citation: 941 N.W.2d 556
• Parties: Wendy Michele WILLPRECHT, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee v. Kevin John WILLPRECHT, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

941 N.W.2d 556

Wendy Michele WILLPRECHT, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee
v.
Kevin John WILLPRECHT, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant

No. 20190201

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed April 6, 2020

Jason W. McLean, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-appellee.

Robert J. Schultz, Fargo, N.D., for defendant, appellee, and cross-appellant.

Tufte, Justice.

¶1] Wendy Willprecht appeals and Kevin Willprecht cross-appeals from a judgment granting the parties a divorce, distributing the marital estate, awarding primary residential responsibility for the parties’ children, and ordering child support. We conclude the district court’s property distribution is not clearly erroneous, but the court erred in calculating Kevin Willprecht’s child support obligation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I

[¶2] Wendy and Kevin Willprecht were married in 1999. They had four minor children together at the time of the divorce trial. Kevin Willprecht is a self-employed farmer, and the parties acquired farmland throughout the marriage. In 2018, Wendy Willprecht sued for divorce.

[¶3] The parties stipulated Wendy Willprecht will have primary residential responsibility for the children and Kevin Willprecht will have parenting time. The district court adopted the parties’ stipulation and incorporated it in the divorce judgment.

[¶4] The district court held a bench trial on the remaining issues, including property

[941 N.W.2d 561

division, spousal support, and child support. The court distributed the parties’ property and debts and awarded Wendy Willprecht a net property award of $2,076,302 and Kevin Willprecht a net property award of $3,562,998. The court calculated Kevin Willprecht’s child support obligation and ordered him to pay $3,092 per month in child support. The court concluded no spousal support was required and ordered each party would be responsible for their own attorney’s fees.

II

¶5] Kevin Willprecht moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing Wendy Willprecht has accepted substantial benefits of the judgment. He argues that Wendy Willprecht accepted the real estate she was awarded, she sent letters demanding he pay the credit card and bank debt, she threatened contempt if he did not pay the debt, and she demanded the rental income from farmland and half of the crop-price protection payment immediately even though no due date was set in the judgment. He contends Wendy Willprecht waived the right to appeal by accepting over $1 million in assets and taking affirmative steps to receive the benefits by drafting the deeds and requesting immediate payment.

[¶6] Generally, one waives the right to appeal by unconditionally, voluntarily, and consciously accepting a substantial benefit from a divorce judgment. Tuhy v. Tuhy , 2018 ND 53, ¶ 7, 907 N.W.2d 351. A party moving to dismiss the appeal must clearly establish waiver of the right to appeal by the other party. Id. This Court has sharply limited the waiver rule in divorce cases.

Id. We have said:

The party objecting to the appeal has the burden of showing the benefit accepted by the appealing party is one which the party would not be entitled to without the decree. There must be unusual circumstances, demonstrating prejudice to the movant, or a very clear intent on the part of the appealing party to accept the judgment and waive the right to appeal, to keep this Court from reaching the merits of the appeal.

Id.

[¶7] Kevin Willprecht does not allege he is prejudiced. Wendy Willprecht argues she should receive a greater share of the property as well as spousal support. Kevin Willprecht does not argue that the district court erred in distributing the marital estate or that Wendy Willprecht is entitled to less than she was awarded. Wendy Willprecht did not receive and accept any benefits that she would not be entitled to receive if the judgment were reversed. See Eberle v. Eberle , 2009 ND 107, ¶ 24, 766 N.W.2d 477 ; Sommers v. Sommers , 2003 ND 77, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 586. Kevin Willprecht has not established that Wendy Willprecht clearly waived the right to appeal. We deny his motion to dismiss the appeal.

III

[¶8] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred in distributing the marital estate.

A

[¶9] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred in determining the value of the parties’ property. She contends the court misapplied N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, the parties agreed to the valuation for some of the property but did not reach an agreement on the valuation for other property, and the court used a different valuation date to determine the value of the other property. She claims the agreed-to valuation date must be used for all of the parties’ property and different dates cannot be used for different property.

[941 N.W.2d 562

[¶10] A district court’s findings on the value of marital property will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Lee v. Lee , 2019 ND 142, ¶ 6, 927 N.W.2d 104. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or, on the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Id. "A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous if the [district] court’s findings are based either on physical or documentary evidence, or inferences from other facts, or on credibility determinations." Id. (quoting Hoverson v. Hoverson , 2001 ND 124, ¶ 13, 629 N.W.2d 573 ). The court’s valuation depends on the evidence the parties present. Lee , at ¶ 6.

¶11] The district court found the parties agreed on the value of many assets, but they disagreed about the values of the business assets, particularly the harvested crops in storage. The court found there were three potential dates to use for valuation: "[t]he date of separation (December 2017), the date that the action was initiated (May 2018), and the date of trial (March 3, 2019)." The court decided to use the date of separation, finding Kevin’s valuation as of that date was the most "well-supported" by the evidence.

[¶12] Section 14-05-24(1), N.D.C.C., governs the district court’s distribution of the marital estate, including the valuation of marital property, stating:

When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution of the property and debts of the parties. Except as may be required by federal law for specific property, and subject to the power of the court to determine a date that is just and equitable, the valuation date for marital property is the date mutually agreed upon between the parties. If the parties do not mutually agree upon a valuation date, the valuation date for marital property is the date of service of a summons in an action for divorce or separation or the date on which the parties last separated, whichever occurs first.

[¶13] The primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature’s intent. Markegard v. Willoughby , 2019 ND 170, ¶ 9, 930 N.W.2d 108. We interpret statutes as a whole and harmonize them to give meaning to related provisions. Baker v. Autos, Inc. , 2019 ND 82, ¶ 10, 924 N.W.2d 441. We construe statutes to give effect to each provision, so no part is rendered inoperative or superfluous. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38. We give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence. Baker , at ¶ 10. We give words in a statute their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless they are defined by statute or a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. "When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05.

[¶14] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1) states that the valuation date "is the date mutually agreed upon between the parties." If the parties do not agree upon a valuation date, the valuation date "is the date of service of a summons ... or the date on which the parties last separated, whichever occurs first." The statute does not preclude an agreement to different valuation dates for different items of property. If the parties agree to a valuation date only for some property and not for other property, the statutory default will supply the date for valuing the other property.

[¶15] Here, the parties agreed to the same valuations for most of the assets in the marital estate. For the assets the parties were unable to agree on, the district

[941 N.W.2d 563

court determined the value of the property as of the date of separation, which was the default under the statute. The court did not misapply N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.

B

[¶16] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by failing to value and include the 2018 crop in the property distribution. She contends the court should have used the crop insurance to determine the value of the crop because the evidence established the crops were insured under revenue protection crop insurance and guaranteed Kevin Willprecht would receive at least a set amount for the crops.

¶17] The district court used the date of the parties’ separation to determine the value of property that the parties were unable to agree upon, including the crops. The court found the parties separated in December 2017. The 2018 crop did not exist at the time of the separation. The court did not err by failing to include the 2018 crops in the...