Wills v. Drabek
| Decision Date | 18 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-607 |
| Parties | ANTHONY THOMAS WILLS, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN DRABEK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is now before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Richard Drabek and Danny First (docket no. 27), a "letter motion" to intervene filed by non-party Michael Knudsen (docket no. 21), and a "letter motion" for joinder filed by non-party Steven Alexander (docket no. 24).
Plaintiff, Anthony Thomas Wills, filed this action on June 4, 2013. See Compl. (docket no. 1). Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on August 21, 2014, naming three defendants: Corrections Officer (CO) Drabek; CO First; and CO "John Doe." See Amend. Compl. (docket no. 17). CO John Doe is not a party to this action, having been neither identified nor served with a summons. Plaintiff set forth the following allegations in the amended complaint:
5. Plaintiff's have witnessed them do this to almost all inmates on A-Side Unit 1 (no yard or showers) at Ionia Correctional Facility. They do it frequently and everyone on their "don't like list" never get showers or yard period. All 3 Defendants frequently assault inmates in the shower area because the cameras don't point that way, or in dayrooms where there are no cameras. Everyone is terrified to do anything.
Id. at ¶ IV. Plaintiff was transferred from ICF to Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) on June 4, 2013. Id. This Court has construed plaintiff's claims as involving First Amendment retaliation. See Opinion (docket no. 6). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages for his time in segregation at ICF. Id. at ¶ V.
The amended complaint also named Steven Alexander as an additional plaintiff in this matter, alleging, among other things: that Alexander was placed in segregation on April 23, 2013 (four days before plaintiff); that Alexander was denied a shower on or about May 5, 2013; thatAlexander was placed on suicide watch after "accidentally" cutting his wrist on May 16, 2013; that Alexander was placed in a different cell for further observation after his wrist wound "opened up and started to bleed" on May 22, 2013; that Alexander was chained "in a hogstyle position" and denied water for 24 hours; that CO Doe told Alexander "that they were going to poison his food"; that on May 24, 2013, CO First told Alexander that "[i]f you don't stop whining about your arm bitch, I'll make sure you are gassed and then we'll rape you"; that CO Doe told Alexander that he was "going to die in here" and pushed his thumb into Alexander's wound on his arm making it bleed; and, that Alexander was denied pen and paper due to being placed on suicide watch. See Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ IV.2, IV.3 and IV.4.
The Court rejected plaintiff's attempt to include Alexander as a plaintiff, finding that "[n]o basis exists for concluding that Steven Alexander has personally indicated an intent to proceed as a Plaintiff in this action" and that plaintiff "may only represent himself with respect to his individual claims, and may not act on behalf of other prisoners." See Order Re Various Motions at pp. 2-3 (docket no. 15).
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 45 n. 2 (1984); Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1996). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and lawsof the United States, and (2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants Drabek and First seek summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties' burden of proof in deciding a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust available administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. One reason for creating prisoner grievance procedures under the PLRA was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.'" Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.
The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances. See Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective July 9, 2007). A prisoner must first attempt to resolve a problem with the staff member within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ P. If the issue is not resolved, then the grievant may file a...
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